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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(1996). 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court correctly grant a directed verdict because it 
determined that, as a matter of law, Heritage Savings Bank ("Heritage") did not 
have a duty to bid (or otherwise credit) the fair market value of a parcel at the 
foreclosure sale? 
"'This court's standard of review of a directed verdict is the same as that imposed 
upon a trial court.' . . . A trial court is justified in granting a direct verdict only if, 
examining all evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no 
competent evidence that would support a verdict in the non-moving party's favor." 
Merino v. Albertson's, Inc., 975 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1999) (quotingManagement Comm. 
ofGraystone Pines Homeowners Ass yn v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 
1982)). In granting the directed verdict, the trial court ruled that as a matter of law, 
Heritage did not have any such duty. This legal determination is reviewed for 
correctness. Turnbaugh v. Turnbaugh, 793 P.2d 940, 941 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
II. Does sequential foreclosure of more than one piece of collateral, where 
there is no deficiency action filed, come within § 57-1-32 or otherwise constitute a 
deficiency action for which a fair market value is determined for the first property 
foreclosed? 
This is a legal issue reviewed for correctness. Id. 
1 
III. Did the lower court correctly dismiss the equitable unjust enrichment 
claims because it had decided the underlying contract claim on the merits? 
This is a legal issue reviewed for correctness. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS1 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21 (1998) provides, in relevant part: 
57-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds - Qualifications. 
(1) (a) The trustee of a trust deed shall be: 
(ii) any depository institution as defined in Section 7-1-103, or insurance 
company authorized to do business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the 
United States. 
(2) The trustee of a trust deed may not be the beneficiary of the trust deed, 
unless the beneficiary is qualified to be a trustee under Subsection (l)(a)(ii), 
(iii), (v), or (vi). 
A copy of the 1998 version of Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21 is contained in the 
Addendum at Tab A. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-27 (1998) provides: 
(1) On the date and at the time and place designated in the notice of sale, the 
trustee or the attorney for the trustee shall sell the property at public auction to the 
highest bidder. The trustee, or the attorney for the trustee, may conduct the sale 
and act as the auctioneer. The trustor, or his successor in interest, if present at the 
sale, may direct the order in which the trust property shall be sold, if the property 
consists of several known lots or parcels which can be sold to advantage 
separately. The trustee or attorney for the trustee shall follow these directions. Any 
person, including the beneficiary or trustee, may bid at the sale.. . . 
1
 The determinative statutes listed here are the versions in effect during the relevant time 
period, i.e., 1996-1998, copies of which are contained in the Addendum at Tab 1. All 
references to statutes contained in this brief are to the versions in effect from 1996-98. 
2 
A copy of the 1998 version of Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-27 is contained in the 
Addendum at Tab B. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1998) provides: 
At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust deed, as 
hereinabove provided, an action may be commenced to recover the balance due 
upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as security, and in such 
action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the indebtedness which 
was secured by the trust deed, the amount for which such property was sold, and 
the fair market value thereof at the date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the 
court shall find the fair market value at the date of sale of the property sold. The 
court may not render judgment for more than the amount by which the amount by 
which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, 
including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of the 
property as of the date of the sale. In any action brought under this section, the 
prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and reasonable attorney fees in 
bringing an action under this section. 
A copy of the 1998 version of Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 is contained in the 
Addendum at Tab C. 
NATURE OF THE CASE,2 COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION, 
This case involves Heritage's sequential foreclosure of two pieces of real property 
pledged by Five F under a trust deed to secure a $1.2 million loan on which Five F 
defaulted. At trial, Five F claimed that Heritage, as the trust deed beneficiary, should have 
bid the purported fair market value of the parcel at the first foreclosure sale so as to avoid 
2
 Five F's "Statement of the Case" is defective because it improperly contains numerous 
factual assertions without any record citation. Because of this failure, Heritage will 
respond directly only to Five F's "Statement of Facts." Further, Five F discusses in a 
number of places earlier rulings of the lower court that it asserts are allegedly 
inconsistent with the Court's final directed verdict ruling. (See App. Br. at 8-12.) The 
purpose of Five F's discussion of these earlier rulings is puzzling since courts may 
amend or change their views of the law before the end of trial, and Five F points to no 
contrary authority. 
3 
foreclosing on a second parcel. At the conclusion of all the evidence at trial, the trial court 
granted a directed verdict in favor of Heritage because there was no support for Five F's 
theory of liability under the Utah trust deed statute, Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-19 to -45 
("Trust Deed Statute"), or Utah law.3 Five F appeals from a final judgment entered by the 
Honorable J. Phillip Eves of the Fifth Judicial District Court for Washington County on 
November 29, 2001, granting a directed verdict to Heritage. (R1826 at 850:10-1.) Copies 
of the relevant portion of the transcript containing the trial court's ruling (R1826 at 846:14-
852:25), the Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict (R1791-92), and the 
Final Judgment (Rl793-94), are contained in the Addendum at Tabs D, E, and F. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS4 
1. Five F is a limited liability company established to develop real estate in 
the St. George area. (R1823 at 28:21-24.) Ray Fowler ("Fowler") is the managing 
member of Five F. (R1823 at 31:3-4; Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 at 3.) 
3
 The complete absence of any legal authority for Five F's position is demonstrated by 
Five F's Appellant's Brief, which contains a grand total of six case citations not one of 
which addresses the issues in this case, i.e., whether Heritage had a duty to bid (or 
otherwise credit) the fair market value at the foreclosure sale where no deficiency action 
is filed. 
4
 In 27 of Five F's 37 purported facts, Five F cites only to the ''Amended Proposed 
Pretrial Order, R1538." ("Proposed Order"). Because Five F regularly cites to that 
Proposed Order, a copy is contained in Addendum at Tab G. 
4 
2. In March of 1996, Five F5 entered into a purchase agreement with Phillip 
Foremaster (the "Purchase Agreement") for 46 acres of raw land on River Road, 
St. George, Utah (the "River Road Property") at a purchase price of $4.7 million. (R1823 
at 29:5-12, 48:15-22.) Five F hoped to develop commercial buildings, retail space, and 
other buildings on the River Road Property. (R1823 at 29:9-16.) 
3. In the Purchase Agreement, Five F agreed to pay Foremaster $10,000 down 
and $10,000 per month in earnest money through August 1996, $1,114,000 on 
September 15, 1996 (the "September 15 Payment"), and approximately $1,000,000 in 
annual payments thereafter until the purchase price was paid in full. (R1823 at 48:20-
49:4.) Failure to make the September 15 Payment would result in Five F's forfeiture of 
the $60,000 paid in earnest money. 
4. Throughout the summer of 1996, Five F unsuccessfully attempted to obtain 
a "bridge loan" from other banks or short-term funding from brokers. (Rl 823 at 79:17-
80:2,95:23-96:6.) 
Five Fys Loan Application to Heritage 
5. In late August 1996 Five F approached Heritage for a $1.2 million "bridge 
loan" to make the September 15 Payment while seeking elsewhere permanent financing 
for its River Road Property development. (Rl 823 at 29:17-30:2, 49:15-21, 80:4-9; 
R1824 at 301:21-23; R1826 at 737:12-17.) 
5
 Net Capital Construction ("NCCC"), a company owned by Fowler, was the original 
party to the Purchase Agreement. Five F succeeded to NCCC's interest. (R1823 at 
52:3-10.) 
5 
6. On September 5, 1996, Kerry Soper, a consultant employed by Five F, 
sent a letter to Heritage on behalf of Five F (the "September 5 Letter') stating: 
The loan that Ray Fowler/NCCC has requested from Heritage Savings Bank to 
allow for the closing of the purchase of the subject property is truly a bridge loan 
and is not intended to be long term. Our organization is 100% confident that the 
larger funds needed to continue the project will be delivered as agreed and on a 
timely basis. 
(R1823 at 52:3-54:9, 205:17-206:24; Plaintiffs Exhibit 61.) 
7. As proposed collateral for the loan, Five F offered a 10.44 acre piece of 
River Road Property (the "Parcel")6 as collateral. The Parcel was raw commercial land, 
its frontage was limited, and it had an uncertain value. (1824 at 394:23-395:15.) As a 
result, it was more difficult to sell than developed land. (R1824 at 395:10-11.) Given 
these circumstances, Heritage's loan committee and board of directors would not approve 
the loan without additional collateral, and Heritage so informed Five F. (R1823 at 861-
12; R1824 at 306:20-22, 394:19-395:11, 396:10-17.) Thereafter, Five F readily agreed to 
pledge two four-plexes along with the Parcel as collateral to obtain the loan.7 (R1823 at 
86:13-19.) Five F understood that all of the collateral pledged would be at risk if Five F 
defaulted. (R1823 at 93:10-18, 211:11-13.) 
6
 This 10.44 acre Parcel was part of the 46 acres purchased from Foremaster which parcel 
Foremaster was willing to subordinate for the Heritage loan from which he would be 
paid the $1,114,000.00 September 15 Payment. (R1823 at 50:8-10.) 
On September 10, 1996, in advance of making the loan Heritage ordered an appraisal on 
the Parcel for the purpose of considering the loan, which came in at $1,650,000 (the 
"Johnson Appraisal"). (R1824 at 307:17-25; Johnson Appraisal, Plaintiffs Exhibit 21.) 
Heritage also ordered appraisals on the two four-plexes (the uRynearson Appraisals"), 
each of was appraised at $306,000. (R1824 at 308:1-15; Rynearson Appraisals, 
Plaintiffs Exhibits 22 and 23.) 
6 
The Loan Agreement and Trust Deed 
8. On September 12, 1996, Five F executed a promissory note for the 
$1,200,000 loan (the CwNote"), secured by a Trust Deed With Assignment of Rents on the 
Parcel and the two four-plexes (the 'Trust Deed"). (R1823 at 86:20-9, 87:25-88:5, 
89:16-90:22, 92:12-23; Plaintiffs Exhibits 1 and 2, copies of which are contained in the 
Addendum at Tabs H and I.) The Note was also guaranteed by Mr. and Mrs. Fowler 
individually. (Note; Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 at 3, attached at Tab H.) 
9. Under the Note, Five F was to make payments of $10,250 on November 1 
and December 1, 1996, with a payoff of the balance due on December 31, 1996.8 (Note, 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 at 1, attached at Tab H; R1823 at 89:1-11.) 
10. Under the Trust Deed, Heritage was the beneficiary, and Five F was the 
trustor. (Trust Deed, Plaintiffs Exhibit 2, attached at Tab I.) Heritage was designated as 
trustee, as permitted by Utah law. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21(2). 
Five F's Default 
11. Five F failed to pay off the Note by the due date of December 31, 1996. 
(R1823 at 100:8-102:18.) 
12. On January 8, 1997, Heritage sent Five F a default notice pursuant to the 
Trust Deed and Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-27. (R1823 at 103:23-104:6; Default Notice, 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 6.) 
8
 The Note provided for a 5% late fee if Five F did not pay within five days of the due 
date, default interest at 18% if Five F did not pay within 15 days of the due date, and 
recovery of Heritage's costs and attorney fees incurred in foreclosure. (Note at 1-2, 
attached at Tab H; R1823 at 89:16-90:22.) 
7 
13. By letter dated February 11, 1997, Heritage agreed that if Five F paid 
$240,000 on or before February 12, 1997, Heritage would release its Trust Deed lien on 
one of the two four-plexes. (R1823 at 106:4-110:6; Letter dated 2/11/97, Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 7.) On February 12, 1997, Five F made a $240,000 payment and, accordingly, 
Heritage released its Trust Deed lien on the second four-plex. (R1823 at 109:2-110:7-9.) 
Five F's Bankruptcy Filing 
14. On May 23, 1997, before Heritage could proceed to a foreclosure sale, Five 
F filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. (Bankruptcy Order dated 12/10/97, Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 28 at 8 ^  2.1; R1823 at 112:12-15.) The bankruptcy filing effectively gave Five F 
an additional year to try to obtain financing for its development or to sell the Parcel. 
15. On February 18, 1998, the bankruptcy court approved the Chapter 11 plan 
proposed by Five F (the "Plan"), which provided that if Five F was unable to sell the 
Parcel by May 31, 1998, Heritage could proceed with its foreclosure of the Trust Deed 
properties. (Bankruptcy Order dated 12/10/97, Plaintiffs Exhibit 28 at 11 Tf 6.3; R1823 
at 125:1-11.) The Plan specifically set forth the order of foreclosure: "In the event the 
[Parcel] has not sold by May 31, 1998 or the Class 3 Claimant9 is not paid the allowed 
amount of its claim by that date, Class 3 may continue its foreclosure proceedings on that 
property in accordance with state law. In the event of such foreclosure and should Class 
3 not be paid in full therefrom, Class 3 may then continue its foreclosure proceedings on 
the four-plex . . . mentioned above." (Bankruptcy Order dated 12/10/97, Plaintiffs 
9
 Heritage was the Class 3 claimant. (Bankruptcy Order dated 12/10/97, Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 28 at 9 K 4.3.) 
8 
Exhibit 28 at 1 H 6.3; R1824 at 244:18-245:11; Bankruptcy Order, Defendant's Exhibit 
85.) 
The Foreclosure Sale on the 10.44 Acre Parcel 
16. Five F failed to pay off the loan by the May 31, 1998 deadline set in the 
Plan. As a consequence, Heritage noticed the foreclosure sale of the Parcel. (R1823 at 
125:1-9.) 
17. In advance of the scheduled foreclosure sale on the Parcel, Heritage sought 
to "make the real estate market aware of this upcoming foreclosure" to increase the 
potential of a third party buyer. (R1824 at 443:9-15.) Brian Chadaz, the President of 
Heritage, "went through a directory of real estate professionals in the area, [and] 
identified those individuals who themselves or perhaps [may] have clients who would be 
interested in purchasing this property." (R1824 at 443:16-23.) Heritage then sent out a 
letter to thirty-three individuals so identified, stating: 
Heritage Savings Bank is foreclosing on a prime piece of real estate property. 
Attached is a copy of a notice that will be appearing in the Spectrum periodically 
prior to the foreclosure sale which will take place on July 13th, 1998. This 
property is located in one of the prime commercial areas in Washington County. 
If you are interested or have a client who may be interested in this property please 
contact me. I would be happy to provide further information regarding this 
property. 
(R1824 at 444:5-446:4; Letter to Real Estate Professionals, Exhibit 90.) These efforts 
went far beyond the notice requirements of the Trust Deed or the Trust Deed Statute.10 
10
 On April 3, 1998, three months before the sale, Heritage ordered another appraisal on 
the Parcel from Morley & McConkie (the "Morley & McConkie Appraisal"), which 
valued the Parcel at $1,380,000. (R1824 at 348:11-349:7; Morley & McConkie 
Appraisal, Plaintiffs Exhibit 27.) 
9 
18. In accordance with Section 57-1-25 of the Trust Deed Statute, Heritage 
published the required notice of sale. (R1825 at 440:6-9; Notice of Sale, Defendant's 
Exhibit 88.) It also ran additional advertisements of the foreclosure sale in The Spectrum 
to provoke interest. (R1825 at 446:14-18; Advertisement, Defendant's Exhibit 89.) 
19. On July 13, 1998, Heritage's attorney conducted the foreclosure sale of the 
Parcel. At the time of the foreclosure sale, Heritage calculated that the total amount due 
and owing under the Note, including costs and attorney fees, was $1,314,685.33. (R1824 
at 351:20-25.) Heritage hoped that someone else would successfully bid at the 
foreclosure sale,11 but there were no bids from third parties. (R1825 at 458:4-6, 458:21-
22.) Heritage credit bid the amount of $1,090,000 which was the only and high bid. " 
Five F was represented by Fowler at the foreclosure sale but did not bid, and did not 
object to Heritage's bid. (R1823 at 125:7-25; R1824 at 257:10-12; R1825 at 457:8-17.) 
20. Pursuant to Section 57-1-27, as the high bidder, Heritage obtained full title 
to the Parcel. (R1825 at 458:23-459:2.) 
21. Five F asserts, without record citation, that Heritage had "absolute 
certainty" that its credit bid for the Parcel "was hundreds of thousands of dollars less than 
11
 A bank "invariably prefer[s] to have cash" as opposed to raw land, and Heritage hoped 
a third party would bid. (R1826 at 718:19-719:2, 778:12-19.) 
12
 Mr. Beesley testified that in calculating Heritage's bid, "we didn't really know at that 
time, have any idea at that time what that property was really worth. All we knew was 
that Mr. Fowler couldn't sell it for what he owed and that nobody else wanted to buy it 
that we knew of. So that was our . . . strategy. And . . . we looked at all kinds of things. 
But at the end of the day we . . . structured our bids to obtain the collateral so that we 
would have . . . the protection that we were offered when we made the loan. " (R1826 
at 720:7-15.) 
10 
fair market value . . ." (App. Br. at 7.) The record evidence is to the contrary. At the 
time of the bid, the total amount due and owing under the Note was $1,314,685.33. {See 
T| 19, supra) The most recent appraisal of the Parcel obtained by Heritage was 
$1,380,000.00. {See footnote 10, supra.) Moreover, everyone in this case, including 
Fowler and Five F's economic expert, Derk Rasmussen, admitted the Parcel had 
uncertain value, (R1825 at 588:5-8 (Rasmussen testimony)), and was difficult to sell. 
(R1826 at 830:11-831:3 (Fowler testimony).) Finally, Five F's assertion lacks reality. If 
the Parcel really had excess value, then Five F, acting in its own interest, or a third party 
would have bid a higher amount at the foreclosure sale and captured this purported excess 
value. 
22. Pursuant to the Trust Deed Statute (Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-29), the 
proceeds of the foreclosure sale were applied first to the foreclosure costs and then to the 
outstanding debt, leaving a balance owing on the Note of approximately $229,000. 
(R1824 at 261:14-20, 364:3-5; R1825 at 459:8-14.) 
23. Five F asserts that Heritage "manipulated" the Trust Deed bidding process. 
(App. Br. at 14.) However, Five F never points to any step in the foreclosure sale process 
which was contrary to the Trust Deed, the Trust Deed Statute, or other law. Indeed, at 
the conclusion of trial, Judge Eves asked Five F"s counsel if he could point to any action 
by Heritage in specific violation of the Trust Deed or statutory procedure and he 
answered that he could not. (R1826 at 842:21-843:6.)13 
13
 The following dialogue took place at trial: 
11 
24. Despite constant efforts at selling the Parcel and its own ''development" 
work with the City of St. George beginning immediately after the foreclosure sale, 
Heritage was not able to sell the Parcel for over two years. In October 2000, Heritage 
was finally able to sell the Parcel for $1,682,000, on terms favorable to the buyer. 
(R1824 at 389:4-8; R1825 at 466:15-20.) 
25. Not even including the time and effort devoted to the marketing of the 
Parcel by Heritage, the 2000 sales price of the Parcel was not appreciably higher than the 
foreclosure sale price plus default interest and sales costs. (R1826 at 793:25-796:4.) 
The Foreclosure Sale on the Remaining Four-Plex 
26. On July 14, 1998, Heritage sent a notice of foreclosure sale for the 
remaining four-plex. (R1823 at 127:11-16; Notice of Trustee Sale dated 7/14/98, 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 112.) 
27. Five F sought to enjoin that foreclosure sale by filing this action. Its 
motion for preliminary injunction was denied by the trial court. (R68-69.) Five F then 
filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Stay with the Utah Supreme Court, which was 
denied. See Five F, L.L.C. v. Heritage Savings Bank, No. 981461 (August 12, 1998), 
(R56-57). 
THE JUDGE: . . . Assuming that your version of the facts is absolutely true in this case, 
and setting aside the question of what's fair, was there anything here done that was not 
permissible under the foreclosure statutes or the agreement of the parties? 
MR. HATHAWAY [for Five F]: No. 
(R1826 at 842:21-843:1.) 
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28. Following the decisions of the trial and supreme courts in this case, the 
foreclosure sale on the four-plex took place on August 12, 1998. At that foreclosure sale, 
Heritage credit bit $210,000. (R1823 at 128:16-24.) As the high (and only) bidder at the 
foreclosure sale, Heritage acquired title to the four-plex. (R1824 at 369:13-16; R1825 at 
460:2-13.) 
29. Citing only to the Pretrial Order, Five F asserts in its Statement of Facts 
that "Heritage had a buyer for the four-plex lined up prior to August 12, 1998, for a 
purchase price of $280,000. (Amended Proposed Pretrial Order R1538)." (App. Br. at 
17 TJ 25.) Although it is irrelevant, that statement is, in any event, absolutely false. The 
Amended Proposed Pretrial Order contains no such statement nor is there evidence 
anywhere else in the record to support such an assertion.14 
30. Although the amount of the loan was not fully extinguished by the two 
foreclosure sales, Heritage never pursued a deficiency action against Five F or against 
Fowler and his wife, the guarantors of the Note. (R1824 at 262:13-19; R1825 at 461:7-
14.) 
14
 After Heritage acquired the four-plex, Mr. Chadaz talked with the property manager 
about the possibility of managing the four-plex for Heritage. The manager then asked 
whether Heritage was interested in selling the four-plex, and Mr. Chadaz indicated that 
Heritage might be interested. The property manager did, in fact, bring a party forward, 
and Heritage sold the four-plex to that party on August 31, 1998, for $280,000 on 
favorable contract terms. (R1824 at 372:7-25; R1825 at 461:23-463:2.) 
13 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The fundamental issue in this case is whether a trustee or beneficiary under a trust 
deed has a duty to bid (or otherwise credit) the fair market value of property at a 
foreclosure sale where other collateral exists that may be subsequently foreclosed to 
satisfy the debt.15 It is undisputed that no such duty is imposed by the Utah Trust Deed 
Statute, Utah case law, or the Note and Trust Deed in this case. Five F cites no contrary 
authority from Utah or any other jurisdiction to support its novel theory. Rather, Five F 
attempts to manufacture this new and unprecedented duty under four different theories, 
each of which fails as a matter of law. 
In fact, Five F seeks to overturn the long-standing process of nonjudicial 
foreclosures in Utah. Public policy, as incorporated in the Utah Trust Deed Statute, 
permits lenders to credit bid at foreclosure sales whatever amount they deem prudent to 
protect their interests after default. Thus, Five F seeks to amend the Trust Deed Statute to 
impose a fair market value bidding requirement in foreclosure sales where the legislature 
has determined not to impose one. Five F's position would be an unprecedented shift in 
5
 Five F does not clearly articulate what, in its view, Heritage did wrong in connection 
with the foreclosure sales. In several places, Five F describes Heritage's bid as less than 
the fair market value or "too low," (App. Br. at 7, 29), implying that Heritage should 
have made a fair market value bid. In other places, Five F asserts that Heritage bid for 
and acquired the Parcel at a price which it allegedly knew was less than the appraised 
value, {id. at 7), implying that Heritage should have bid the alleged appraised value. In 
still other places, Five F describes Heritage simply as having foreclosed on the Parcel 
which had a value it knew was in excess of the outstanding debt, {id. at 21, 23, 25), 
implying that whatever Heritage chose to bid, it should have not been able to proceed 
with foreclosure of the four-plex. Both for analytical simplicity and for practical 
reasons discussed elsewhere, Heritage describes Five F's position as an argument that 
Heritage had a duty to bid the fair market value. 
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the law with far-reaching adverse impact on the lending market. Moreover, although it 
nowhere acknowledges it, Five F s argument effectively would transform the nonjudicial 
foreclosure process into a judicial foreclosure process. Such an approach would shift to 
lenders new risks and impose additional costs, inevitably impacting the efficiencies of the 
foreclosure process and increasing costs for both borrowers and lenders in the mortgage 
market. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE LAW IMPOSES NO DUTY ON A TRUST DEED BENEFICIARY TO 
BID THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PARCEL AT THE 
FORECLOSURE SALE. 
A. The Operation Of Utah's Trust Deed Statute Provides A Well-Defmed 
Procedure For Foreclosure, Which Heritage Followed. 
A trust deed is a document by which a borrower pledges real property to a lender 
as security for a loan. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-19(3); (R1825 at 674:8-11.) Under Utah's 
Trust Deed Statute there are three parties to a trust deed: a trustor/borrower (in this case, 
Five F), a trustee who handles the foreclosure sale in case of a default (in this case, 
Heritage), and a beneficiary/lender (Heritage). Utah Code Ann. § 57-l-19(l)-(6); (R1825 
at 674:14-21.) In Utah, under specified circumstances, the same party can be both the 
beneficiary and trustee.16 Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21(2) (R1825 at 675:17-676:1.) 
16
 There are only certain parties that can fill this dual role. See Utah Code Ann. §57-1-
21(2). 
15 
The Trust Deed Statute creates a mechanism for foreclosing on property without 
the involvement of the courts as an efficient mechanism for lenders to satisfy a defaulted 
obligation through recourse to the collateral. 
In the event a borrower fails to repay and defaults on a loan, the beneficiary can 
send a notice of default, followed by a notice of a foreclosure sale on the real property. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23; (R1825 at 675:6-16.) On the date and at the time 
and place designated in the notice of sale, the trustee is required to sell the property "at 
public auction to the highest bidder." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-27. The foreclosure sale is 
"a way of turning land into cash . . . to satisfy the debt." (R1825 at 679:18-23.) 
"Any person, including the beneficiary or trustee, may bid at the sale." Utah Code 
Ann. § 53-1-27. There is no minimum amount anyone, including the beneficiary, must 
bid. (R1825 at 684:19-685:2.) A beneficiary may "credit bid" whereby the beneficiary 
simply bids a credit toward the debt rather than bidding with cash. (Rl 825 at 683:18-
684:7.) A trustor borrower may also bid at the sale, and indeed the philosophy of the 
Trust Deed Statute is that if the value of the collateral exceeds the amount of the debt the 
trustor/borrower will protect that "equity" by bidding itself. 
Under Section 57-1-27, the trustee must sell the property to the highest bidder. 
The only time that a trustee should reject the highest bid is when the bid is so low that it 
"shocks the conscience" or reaches "unjust extremes." See Thomas v. Johnson, 801 P.2d 
186, 188 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (the remedy of setting aside a foreclosure sale is 
appropriate only in cases which reach unjust extremes); Smith v. Juhan, 311 F.2d 670, 
672 (10th Cir. 1962) ("In this jurisdiction, it is well settled that a judicial sale regularly 
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made with notice and in the manner prescribed by law will not be denied confirmation 
or be set aside for mere inadequacy in price unless the price is so grossly inadequate as to 
shock the conscience of the court and is coupled with slight additional circumstances 
indicating unfairness such as chilled bidding."). 
Upon conclusion of the foreclosure sale, title passes to the successful bidder. Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-1-28(2). "The trustee shall apply the proceeds of the trustee's sale, first, 
to the costs and expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale . . . second, to 
the payment of the obligation secured by the trust deed, and the balance, if any, to the 
person or persons legally entitled to the proceeds . . . . " Id. § 57-1-29. 
If the debt is not fully satisfied, the trustee may proceed to notice up additional 
collateral for foreclosure sale. Pursuant to Utah's "one action rule," Id. § 78-37-1. and 
related case law, no collection lawsuit can be filed aeainst a borrower under Section 57-
1-32 until all real property collateral has been foreclosed. At that point, if the obligation 
is not fully satisfied, a lender may file a deficiency action under Section 57-1-32. 
B. Utah's Trust Deed Statute Does Not Impose Any Duty On A 
Beneficiary To Bid Fair Market Value At A Foreclosure Sale. 
Utah's Trust Deed Statute sets out the rights and duties of the respective parties to 
a trust deed. It does not impose any duty on a beneficiary (let alone a trustee) to bid fair 
market value at a foreclosure sale, or even to bid at all. See, e.g., First State Bank v. 
Keilman, 851 S.W.2d 914, 924 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) ("[A] mortgagee is under no duty to 
take affirmative action beyond that required by statute or the deed of trust to ensure a 
'fair' sale '"). The Utah Trust Deed Statute merely states: 
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(1) On the date and at the time and place designated in the notice of sale, the trustee or 
the attorney for the trustee shall sell the property at public auction to the highest 
bidder. . . . Any person, including the beneficiary or trustee, may bid at the sale. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-27 (emphasis added). Thus, the permissive language that a 
beneficiary may bid necessarily means that there is no obligation that it must bid. 
Because a creditor-beneficiary has no duty to bid under the statute, it follows that it could 
have no duty to bid the fair market value of property subject to a foreclosure sale. 
The absence of any such duty on a beneficiary is confirmed by two other parts of 
the Trust Deed Statute. Section 57-1-27 provides that the trustee "shall sell the property 
at public auction to the highest bidder." Using the instant case as a hypothetical, if a third 
party instead of Heritage had bid $1,090,000 for the Parcel, Heritage, acting as trustee, 
would have been obligated by statute to accept that bid, would have credited that amount 
against the Note and proceeded with the second foreclosure sale on the four-plex. In that 
common circumstance, Five F would find itself in exactly the same place with no 
conceivable complaint against anyone. (R1825 at 467:15-21.) Nevertheless, under Five 
F's theory, Heritage presumably would have a duty to put in a higher bid—a view 
directly at odds with Section 57-1-27. The fact that it was Heritage rather than a third 
party that bid the $1,090,000 thus makes no legal difference, demonstrating the flaw in 
Five F's argument. 
In addition, the defense found in Section 57-1-32 regarding the fair market value 
of foreclosed property is clearly limited to only one setting. Section 57-1-32 provides 
that the "court shall find the fair market value at the date of sale of the property sold," if 
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and when a subsequent deficiency action is filed. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32. 
Under rules of statutory construction, the inclusion of such a fair market value in the 
deficiency action setting necessarily implies that no such treatment occurs in other 
aspects of the Trust Deed Statute, including the foreclosure setting of Section 57-1-27. 
See Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110,1j 14, 993 P.2d 875 ("statutory 
construction presumes that the expression of one should be interpreted as the exclusion of 
another"); Sorenson's Ranch Sch. v. Oram, 2001 UT App 354,111, 36 P.3d 528 (same). 
Moreover, in addition to the fact that the Utah statute is clear, Five F cites no case 
law or other authority to support its theory that Heritage was required to bid fair market 
value at the foreclosure sale. Because Five F is arguing for a new, unprecedented legal 
rule, its unsupported argument should be rejected. 
Finally, Heritage's approach was consistent with existing practice in Utah. At 
1 R 
trial, Heritage's foreclosure expert, Professor David Thomas, testified: 
Q. . . . 
Now, under those circumstances when Heritage came to credit bid at the, at 
the July 13 sale, in your opinion was there anything improper about Heritage 
coming in and entering a credit bid in the amount of $1,090,000? 
A. No. 
17
 Section 57-1-32 allows the borrower to protect its equity before a deficiency judgment 
against the Borrower is entered. 
18
 Professor Thomas' expert testimony comports with his definitive treatise on Utah 
property law, co-authored with James Backman. See David A. Thomas and James H. 
Backman, Thomas and Backman on Utah Real Property Law 773-74, 782-85 (1999). 
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(R1825at685:3-686:4.)19 
Finally, there is a practicality in the legislature's creation of an efficient 
nonjudicial foreclosure process, which Five F's theories would upset. Under Five F's 
view, Heritage had a duty to bid the appraised value or fair market value of the parcel (or 
credit one of those amounts against the Note irrespective of its bid). But this view simply 
does not work in a nonjudicial foreclosure setting. If Five F's theory is that Heritage 
should have bid (or recognized) the "appraised" value, there is the problem of 
determining how to set the appraised value where there are multiple appraisals (as is 
common and is the case here) or where the creditor and debtor have conflicting 
appraisals. Those problems would inevitably lead to litigation over the "appraised" value 
before a creditor could proceed with other foreclosures. If, on the other hand, Five F's 
view is that Heritage should have bid the alleged "fair market value" (or credited that 
value against the Note), there is the similar problem of ascertaining the fair market value 
- a problem necessarily leading to litigation before a further foreclosure action could 
proceed on other collateral. Thus, Five F's theory surely would convert the statutorily 
prescribed nonjudicial foreclosure process into a judicial litigation process. 
A trustee typically will refuse to sell to a high bidder only if the bid "is so low that it 
shocks the conscience." (R1825 at 682:16-25.) Professor Thomas testified that 
Heritage's bid was not so low that it would "shock the conscience." (R1825 at 683:2-
6.) 
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II. THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR ANY OF FIVE F'S 
UNPRECEDENTED THEORIES THAT HERITAGE HAD A DUTY TO 
BID THE FAIR MARKET VALUE AT THE FORECLOSURE SALE. 
Faced with the clear and longstanding law that a trust deed beneficiary is free to 
bid at the foreclosure sale, if it chooses to bid at all, whatever it determines will protect 
its interest, Five F advances four unprecedented theories in an attempt to create a new 
duty to bid fair market value. Each of these theories fails as a matter of law. 
A. Heritage Had No Duty To Bid Fair Market Value Because Of Its Status 
As Trustee. 
Five F's first theory is that Heritage had a duty to bid fair market value because, as 
the trustee under the Trust Deed, it had a fiduciary duty to Five F to act in Five F's 
interest, and that acting in Five F's interest meant bidding fair market value at the sale. 
(See App. Br. at 7.) This theory is incorrect as a matter of law for two reasons. First, 
under Utah law, a trust deed trustee-trustor relationship, standing alone, does not create a 
fiduciary duty and Five F presented no evidence to establish any of the elements under 
First Security Bank of Utah N.A. v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1256 (Utah 1989) 
("Banberry") that would create such a duty. Second, even if Heritage, as trustee, had a 
fiduciary duty to Five F, it does not impose on a trustee a duty to accept only a fair 
market value bid or, when the trustee is also the beneficiary, even to make such a bid. 
1. The Trustee-Trustor Relationship, Standing Alone, Does Not 
Create A Fiduciary Duty. 
Under Utah law the trust deed trustee-trustor relationship, standing alone, does not 
create a fiduciary duty. Rather, as the Utah Supreme Court has held, "the existence of a 
duty between the trustee and trustor may be implied by the factual situation of a 
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particular case." Banberry, 780 P.2d at 1256. In other words, there is no duty unless the 
plaintiff can show that certain factual predicates exist. The Court in Banberry held that a 
fiduciary duty between a trust deed trustee and a trustor arises only if one of the 
following three elements is established: 
(a) the trustor reposes its trust or confidence in the trustee and relies on the 
trustee's guidance; or 
(b) the trustee could exercise extraordinary influence over the trustor; or 
(c) the trustee stands in a dominant position to the trustor. 
Id. 
a. Five F Presented No Evidence At Trial To Meet The 
Banberry Criteria For A Fiduciary Relationship. 
The undisputed evidence at trial demonstrated that Five F could show none of the 
Banberry factors. As to Banberry'*s first factor, Five F presented no evidence that it 
reposed trust or confidence in Heritage or relied on Heritage's guidance. Fowler testified 
that Five F approached Heritage for the loan and did not rely on any advice from Heritage 
about the River Road Project. (Rl 824 at 200:21-23.) Further, Fowler admitted that 
Heritage had no input regarding Five F's business plan. (Rl824 at 200:13-201:1.) 
Indeed, Fowler acknowledged that Five F was "wholly independent from Heritage Bank 
with respect to [the River Road Project]," (R1824 at 201:2-4), and that the transaction 
was "arms-length." (R1824 at 202:5-10.) "When the parties deal 'at arm's length' or in 
In its brief, Five F asserts that Fowler "shared confidential business plans and other 
information with Heritage." (App. Br. at 19 \ llz.) But there is a critical difference 
between disclosing plans to Heritage as part of a loan application process, as Five F did, 
and seeking advice or guidance from Heritage on those plans, which Five F did not. 
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an adversarial relationship, no fiduciary relationship can be said to exist." Gold 
Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1064 (Utah 1996). Thus, the evidence 
shows that Five F placed no relevant trust or confidence in Heritage, nor did it rely on 
Heritage's guidance. 
With respect to Banberry's second factor, Five F presented no evidence that 
Heritage exercised extraordinary influence over it. Indeed, Fowler admitted that there 
was no such influence: 
Q. And at anytime in those discussions, (short inaudible, audio faded) 
you were free to terminate negotiations and go somewhere else? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Fleritage had no influence or control over you in that respect? 
A. That's correct. 
(R1824 at 202:11-17.) This testimony precludes any claim of "extraordinary 
influence" within the meaning of Banberry's second factor. 
Finally, there was no evidence at trial supporting Banberry's third factor, 
i.e., that Heritage was in a dominant position over Five F. A lender/borrower 
relationship, without more, does not constitute a dominant relation. See First 
Security Bank of Utah N.A. v. Banberry Development Corporation, 786 P.2d 
1326, 1332 (Utah 1990) (noting that " 'relation of mortgagor and mortgagee is not 
of a fiduciary character.'") {quoting Willett v. HerricK 155 N.E. 589, 595 (Mass. 
1927). At the time Five F approached Heritage for the loan, Five F had no other 
outstanding loans with Heritage. (R1824 at 201:13-24.) Therefore, Heritage was 
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not in any position to influence Five F's decisions. By Five F's own testimony, 
the process of obtaining the loan was a "business negotiation" which Five F was 
free to terminate at any time. (R1824 at 202:1-14.) Thus, Five F presents no 
evidence to show Heritage was in a position to "dominate" Five F. 
Given Five F's evidentiary failure, none of the Banberry factors are met and 
Heritage, as a trust deed trustee, had no fiduciary duty to Five F. 
b. Five F's Reliance On Blodgett Is Misplaced. 
Five F nevertheless asserts that Heritage owed Five F a fiduciary duty as trustee, 
without regard to the existence of any of the three Banberry factors. (App. Br. at 24-25.) 
In its argument on this point, Five F ignores the controlling authority of Banberry and 
relies instead on outdated and very general language in Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 
298, 302 (Utah 1970), which states: "[t]he duty of the trustee under a trust deed is greater 
than the mere obligation to sell pledged property in accordance with the default 
provisions of the trust deed instrument, it is to treat the trustor fairly and in accordance 
with a high punctilio of honor." (App. Br. at 25 {citing Blodgett 590 P.2d at 302).) Five 
F points to this language as the basis for its claim that Heritage as trustee owed it a 
fiduciary duty. However, Five F's reliance on Blodgett is misplaced for two reasons. 
21
 In its brief, Five F argues that "[g]iven the well-known 'golden rule' ('thems that got 
the gold makes the rules'), Heritage could and did demand from Five F almost anything 
that Heritage desired and Five F had to knuckle under or not get the loan." (App. Br. at 
19 T{ 32b.) The standard lender-borrower relationship, which Five F tries to describe 
colorfully, does not create the kind of "extraordinary influence" or "domination" 
contemplated in Banberry. 
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First, Banberry clarified the very language in Blodgett on which Five F now 
relies. Citing Blodgett, the Banberry Court explained: 
And in cases [a] where a trustor reposes its trust or confidence in the trustee and 
relies on the trustee's guidance or [b] where the trustee could exercise 
extraordinary influence over the trustor or [c] where the trustee stands in a 
dominant position to the trustor, it is possible that the trustee is bound by a 
fiduciary duty to act in the interest of the trustor. 
Banberry, 780 P.2d at 1256 (emphasis added). Thus, Banberry directly rejects Five F's 
argument that a trust deed trustee has a fiduciary duty to a trustor irrespective of the 
requisite showing that one of the three Banberry elements exists. Second, even if 
considered without Banberry's clarification, Blodgett 's general fiduciary language 
contains no suggestion that a trustee (or beneficiary) has any duty to bid any amount at a 
foreclosure sale or that a trustee has duties different than those set forth in the statute. 
2. Even If Heritage, As Trustee, Had A Fiduciary Duty, That Duty 
Did Not Require Heritage To Bid Fair Market Value At The 
Foreclosure Sale. 
Even if Heritage as trustee had a fiduciary duty to Five F, as a matter of law it 
did not breach that duty. Heritage acted in strict accord with Utah law as well as with the 
terms of the Trust Deed. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d at 925 ("a trustee fulfills his duty to act 
with impartiality and fairness by strictly complying with the terms of the deed of trust")-
As trustee, Heritage's express duties were to notice the default and sale and to conduct 
1
 The trial court apparently found that Heritage had a fiduciary duty, as trustee, to Five F 
although the trial court made no finding on whether Five F had made any evidentiary 
showing as to the three factors. (Rl 826 at 849:2-8; 850:2-9.) Although the trial court 
reached the correct result, i.e., Heritage acted in compliance with the Trust Deed Statute 
and Trust Deed and therefore had no liability to Five F. the trial court incorrectlv ruled 
that Heritage had a fiduciary duty. 
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the sale in accordance with the statute and Trust Deed, which it did. Under both 
Paragraph 15 of the Trust Deed and Section 57-1-27 of the Trust Deed Statute, the 
Trustee was required to accept Heritage's bid because it was the highest bid submitted. 
Frontier Fed. Sav. and Loan Assn. v. Douglass, 853 P.2d 553, 558 (Ida. 1993) (finding 
that trustee was required to accept bid of only bidder at sale, even though bidder was also 
mortgagee). Indeed, if Heritage as trustee had rejected Heritage's credit bid, it would 
have breached its statutory duty as trustee.23 Five F does not assert that Heritage, as 
trustee, should or could have rejected the one and only bid it received on the Parcel. 
While it is unclear exactly what conduct Five F alleges constituted a breach of 
Heritage's duty as trustee, Five F presumably contends that the breach occurred when 
Heritage (as trustee) failed to reject the credit bid submitted by Heritage (as beneficiary). 
(App. Br. at 7.) Such a theory is directly rejected by case law in Utah and other 
jurisdictions. As discussed above, the only time that a trustee may reject the highest bid 
is when that bid is so low that it "shocks the conscience" or reaches "unjust extremes." 
See Thomas, 801 P.2d at 188 (the remedy of setting aside a trustee's sale is appropriate 
only in cases which reach unjust extremes). Given the degree of public notice Heritage 
gave to the foreclosure auction, Heritage's bid for the parcel reflects a fair market value. 
Moreover, Heritage's bid clearly did not come close to the legal test that it 
"shock[] the conscience" or reach an "unjust extreme." In fact, Heritage's bid was well 
within range. And, Professor Thomas testified that Heritage's bid was not so low that it 
"shock[ed] the conscience." Indeed was not remotely close to that level. (R1825 at 
682:16-683:2-6.) The amount that Heritage bid translates to $104,406 per acre, which is 
a greater amount per acre than Five F paid when it purchased the property in 1996, i.e., 
$102,173.91 per acre. (R1823 at 194:1-5.) See CrosslandMortgage Corp. v. Frankel, 
596 N.Y.S.2d 130, 131 (App. Dev. 2nd. Dept. 1993) (bid of $55,000, representing 27%-
34% of property's approximate market value of $160,000 to $200,000, did not shock 
conscience); Benavides v. Shenandoah Fed. Sav. Bank, 433 S.E.2d 528, 531 (W. Va. 
1993) (bid of $65,000, representing 48% of alleged value of $136,500, did not shock 
conscience); Myles v. Cox, 217 So.2d 31, 33 (Miss. 1968) (bid of $3,218, which was 
40%-50% of property's value of $6,500-$8,000, did not shock the conscience of the 
court); Juhan, 311 F.2d at 673 (sale for 75% of appraised value was not "so grossly 
inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court."). 
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Finally, even if Heritage as trustee had a duty to reject any bid that was not a fair 
market value bid, Five F presented no expert testimony at trial as to the fair market value 
of the Parcel as of the date of the foreclosure sale or that Heritage's bid was "shockingly" 
low. That evidentiary failure also defeats Five F's claim. 
B. Heritage Had No Duty To Bid Fair Market Value As A Result Of Its 
Joint Status As A Trustee And Beneficiary, 
Five F next argues that Heritage's joint status as both trustee and beneficiary under 
the trust deed imposed on Heritage a heightened duty. (App. Br. at 21.) Five F asserts 
that "[e]ven if you assume that under the parties' agreements and foreclosure law, 
Heritage would in the absence of a fiduciary duty have been able to bid low and then 
proceed to foreclose on the other parcels of collateral owned by Five F - everything 
changed when Heritage voluntarily assumed the dual role of trustee." {Id. at 25-26.) Not 
surprisingly, Five F cites no law for this novel proposition. 
Utah law expressly permits a financial institution such as Heritage to function as 
both trustee and beneficiary under a trust deed without imposing any additional duties 
relating thereto. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21(2). Thus, Five F's theory of an enhanced 
fiduciary duty for filling both roles cannot be sustained. 
C Heritage Had No Duty To Bid Fair Market Value Because Of The 
Implied Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing. 
Five F's third theory is that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
imposed on Heritage a duty to bid the fair market value at the foreclosure sale. (App. Br. 
at 27-28.) Five F argues that "[j]ust because on the face of the documents a party 'can' 
do something, does not mean that the party 'should' do that something." {Id. at 22-23.) 
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In this case, Five F agreed to the terms of the Trust Deed that, consistent with 
Utah's Trust Deed Statute, specifically authorized Heritage to proceed with a foreclosure 
sale upon default and provided that the Parcel would be sold "at public auction to the 
highest bidder." (See Trust Deed TI 15.) Despite this, under a theory of good faith and 
fair dealing, Five F argues that Heritage as trustee should have acted contrary to the Trust 
Deed and not sold the Parcel to the highest bidder or, as the beneficiary, should have bid 
a theoretical fair market value itself. There is no legal support for either position. 
1. Heritage Did Not Have An Obligation To Exercise An Express 
Contract Right To Its Detriment. 
Five F contends that Heritage breached the implied covenant by "seeking to take 
additional collateral when the debt had already been paid."24 (App. Br. at 22-23.) 
However, the duty of good faith and fair dealing does not require a party who has 
received an express contract right to exercise that right to its own detriment for the 
purpose of benefiting the other party. Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 
1991) ("Nor can a covenant of good faith be used . . . to require a party vested with a 
contract right to exercise that right in a manner contrary to that party's legitimate self-
interest.") 
Five F clearly misstates or misunderstands the trust deed statute. By operation of law, 
Five F's debt was not paid by the first foreclosure sale. The "proceeds" of the sale, i.e., 
the credit bid, by statute applied first to the costs and expenses of the foreclosure and 
then to the "payment of the obligation secured by the trust deed." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-1-29. Thus, since the amount of the high bid was less than the outstanding 
obligation, the debt was not paid. 
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Under Utah statutory law and the Trust Deed, Heritage had no duty to bid at all, 
let alone to bid the fair market value of the Parcel. Bidding a number higher than it did 
would have been to Heritage's detriment because the value of the raw land was uncertain, 
the property had not been sold over the prior two years, and Heritage would bear the risk 
of any decrease in the property's value.25 (See R1825 at 450:11-23, 451:24-452:15; 
R1826 at 720:7-15, 721:25-722:1, 725:10-16, 733:3-734:4, 743:6-9, 750:15-20, 760:23-
761:1,761:21-25.) 
Heritage had the express contractual right, under both the Trust Deed and the 
bankruptcy Plan, to foreclose on the additional collateral of the four-plex if the actual 
proceeds from the sale of the Parcel did not satisfy the debt. Under Brehany, Heritage 
was not required to take an unknown and uncertain risk and forfeit its contractual right to 
foreclose on the four-plex simply because it would have benefited Five F. 
2. Five F Could Have No Reasonable Expectation That Heritage 
Would Bid The Fair Market Value Of The Parcel. 
Five F argues that it "almost certainly would have a reasonable expectation that 
only enough of its collateral to actually satisfy the debt would be foreclosed upon by 
Heritage." (App. Br. at 27.) The only factual support presented by Five F for that 
argument relative to its expectations under the Note and Trust Deed is the assertion that 
"[njeither Five F nor Ray Fowler bid at the sale because they believed that the 
foreclosure by Heritage on the 10.44 acre [Parcel] would and did satisfy the entire debt to 
If the value of the Parcel decreased after the auction, Heritage would have no recourse 
to the borrower or guarantors after three months. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32. 
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Heritage.' (App. Br. at 17 f 21.) But Five F cites no separate record evidence for that 
assertion. 
Five F's position on this point is both legally wrong and illogical. First, Five F 
could have no reasonable expectation contrary to Utah law. It necessarily expected that 
the Parcel would be sold to highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, whether or not that high 
bidder was Heritage and whether or not Five F agreed with the bid. As discussed above, 
the hypothetical of a third party successfully bidding $1,090,000 disposes of Five F's 
argument. Thus, Five F could have no reasonable expectation that the proceeds of the 
foreclosure auction on the Parcel would satisfy its debt. 
Second, Five F could have no reasonable expectation that Heritage would bid at all 
at the foreclosure sale. See Boatmen's Bank of Pulaski Co. v. Wilson, 833 S.W.2d 879, 
882 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (noting mortgagee was under no obligation to bid at all). 
Neither the Note, the Trust Deed, nor the Trust Deed Statute impose any obligation on 
the beneficiary to bid, let alone to bid Five F's expected value of the Parcel at a 
foreclosure sale. 
This assertion is unsupportable because Five F had tried unsuccessfully to develop or 
sell the Parcel for over two years and made no showing at trial that it had the resources 
to buy the Parcel if it had bid. In addition, Fowler testified at trial: 
Q. Did you ever communicate to the bank before you signed this, say to the bank 
before you loan me the $1.2-million I'm asking you for I just want to be clear that 
even though the trust deed doesn't say it I expect you to bid fair market value if I 
default. Did you ever say anything like that to the bank? 
A. No. 
(R1824 at 275:23-276:4.) 
30 
Moreover, case law from other jurisdictions is to the contrary. See, e.g., New 
England Savings Bank v. Lopez, 630 A.2d 1010, 1015 (Conn. 1993) ("We can find no 
basis, however, in our state law or understandings regarding foreclosure by sale for the 
proposition that a debtor is legally entitled to a credit for the fair market value of the 
property sold. A debtor's legal entitlement is, instead, to a credit for the amount of the 
sale proceeds.55); Olbres v. Hampton Cooperative Bank, 698 A.2d 1239, 1243 (N.H. 
1997) (mortgagee did not act negligently or in bad faith and did not lack due diligence by 
bidding $135,000 where pre-loan appraisals set value equal to or exceeding $330,000).27 
See also Dreyfuss v. Union Bank of California, 11 P.3d 383, 392 (Cal. 2000) ("[e]ven if 
the foreclosure sale price was less than what the fair market value of the property would 
have been under ordinary marketing conditions, that fact, without more, did not result in 
a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing/5). 
The reason for this rule is self-evident. There is risk associated with owning 
property, especially raw land. Its value may rise or fall. It may be difficult to sell, as 
proved to be the case here, forcing the successful bidder to hold it longer than desired. 
Under Utah law, the high bidder at a foreclosure sale takes title to the property and 
therefore assumes the entire risk therefor. Moreover, it is undisputed that an appraisal is 
not a guarantee of the present fair market value of property, let alone what the property 
will be worth in the future.28 (R1824 at 442:4-14.) As a result, property can and often 
27
 Professor Thomas testified that in Utah there was no minimum amount that Heritage 
was required to bid. (R1825 at 684:24-685:2.) 
28
 Professor Thomas explained why a lender would bid less than existing appraisals: 
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does sell for less than its appraised value. {Id) Moreover, appraisals of raw land, as 
here, do not "have the same level of certitude that you might expect in the home 
mortgage market/' (R1826 at 715:5-9.) According to Mr. Beesley, Heritage's CEO, 
"every lender that makes a loan will likely have an appraisal in the file that is for a 
substantial amount greater than the loan." Mr. Beesley went on to explain that "if the 
appraisals could be relied on with certainty there would never be a bad loan, there would 
always be a margin. But.. . when a loan goes into default it's been my experience that 
the appraisals tend to . . . show their weakness. Because the loan wouldn't go into default 
if the borrower were able to sell it for . . . its appraised value or something near its 
appraised value." (R1826 at 715:16-716:4.) 
Thus, as a practical matter, Five F could have no reasonable expectation that 
Heritage would bid fair market appraisal value for the Parcel. At the time of the first 
foreclosure sale, there was particular uncertainty regarding the value of the Parcel 
because it was raw commercial ground. Indeed, Five F's own economic damages expert, 
Q. Can you tell me based on the experience that you've had in the foreclosure 
process why a lender would come to a foreclosure sale and enter a credit bid that 
was less than the amount of the appraisals that had been received? 
A. In my opinion it's because the lender is a . . . concerned about whether the 
actual fair market value of the property is going to be anywhere near that credit 
bid. The lender has the entire risk . . . that it will not be. And . . . particularly in 
view of the fact that no other bidders have come forward in the auction, that's a 
significant risk. 
(R1825 at 685:3-686:4.) 
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Derk Rasmussen, acknowledged the Parcel could decrease in value in the future. 
(R1825 at 584:13-19.) As striking proof of this reality, Fowler, Five F's president, 
acknowledged the uncertain value and "difficulty" in trying to sell the Parcel: 
Q. Would it be fair to say that it was your personal decision not to try to sell 
the Parcel before the foreclosure sale? 
A. It was a rather impractical decision. // would have been impractical to try 
to sell a narrow piece of land a, that a, was part of a bigger picture. 
Q. And you put Heritage in the position of having itself to try to sell what you 
just admitted was a difficult piece of property to sell. Correct? 
A. Yes. 
(RI826 at 830:1 i-S31:3 (emphasis added).) 
Most compelling is Rasmussen's admission that he had previously advised a 
financial institution to credit bid less than the lowest appraised value in the financial 
institution's files, which is exactly what Heritage did in this case. (R1825 at 585:8-16.) 
Where Five F's own expert has previously advised a financial institution to do exactly 
what Heritage did with respect to the Parcel in this case, Five F cannot seriously contend 
that Heritage should have taken a risk that was detrimental to its own interests. 
These factors and circumstances demonstrate why Five F could have no 
reasonable expectation as to what, if anything, Heritage might bid for the Parcel. 
Rasmussen further testified that the Parcel "had risk associated with it and it had no 
income," (R1825 at 588:5-8), and acknowledged that Heritage would have borne the 
risk that the Parcel might go down in value or not sell at all. (R1825 at 584:13-19.) 
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a. Heritage Did Not Have A Duty To Bid The Full Amount 
Of The Debt Or Otherwise Extinguish It. 
Five F also suggests that Heritage had a good faith obligation to treat Five F's debt 
as having been extinguished because the Parcel allegedly was worth more than the 
amount of the debt. (App. Br. at 9.) That argument is also contrary to law. See First 
Comm. Mortgage v. Reece, 108 Cal. Rptr.2d 23, 27 n.l (Cal. Ct. App. Div. 3 2001) ("The 
lender 'is not required to open the bidding with a full credit bid, but may bid whatever 
amount [it] thinks the property is worth."') (quoting Commonwealth Mortgage Assurance 
Co, v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. Rptr. 425, 432 (1989)); Virginia Housing DevpAuth. v. 
Fox Run Ltd. Partnership, 497 S.E.2d 747, 752 (Va. 1998)) ("VHDA was under no 
obligation to bid the full amount of the debt at the foreclosure sale, especially if, in its 
estimation, the debtor had assets that could satisfy any deficit remaining after the sale."). 
As one Court noted, u[w]hen, as was the fact here, 'a mortgagee . . . is both seller and 
buyer, his position is one of great delicacy. Yet, when he has done his full duty to the 
mortgagor in his conduct of the sale under the power, and the bidding begins, in his 
capacity as bidder a mortgagee may buy as cheaply as he can, and owes no duty to bid 
the full value of the Property as that value may subsequently be determined by a judge or 
a jury." WestRoxbury Co-Op Bank v. Bowser, 87 N.E.2d 113, 115 (Mass. 1949). 
D. The Foreclosure Process Followed By Heritage Is Not The Legal 
Equivalent Of A Deficiency Judgment. 
Finally, Five F argues that the "policy" of the "deficiency judgment statute (§57-
1-32) should be applied to the present situation." (App. Br. at 29.) Five F cites no 
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authority for this proposition, and it offers no other basis to substitute its view of public 
policy for that of the Utah Legislature. 
1. Five F Is Barred From Raising This Issue On Appeal Because It 
Did Not Raise This Issue At Trial. 
Heritage was entitled by Utah statute to foreclose seriatim on the additional 
collateral without implicating the deficiency judgment statute. Indeed, the deficiency 
judgment statute is implicated only when the creditor files an action seeking a deficiency 
judgment. See § 57-1-32. Nevertheless, Five F argues that Heritage's foreclosure on any 
collateral other than the Parcel was the equivalent of seeking a deficiency judgment and 
that, as a result, Heritage should not have been permitted to foreclose on any collateral 
other than the Parcel. (App. Br. at 7.) However, Five F did not raise this issue at trial,30 
In its brief, Five F states that the issue of whether foreclosing on the four-plex was the 
equivalent of seeking a deficiency judgment was "[preserved for appeal," listing a 
number of record citations, copies of which are contained in the Addendum at Tab J. 
(App. Br. at 3.) A search of the citations referenced shows no such preservation. 
Contrary to this assertion, Five F never raised this issue at trial. Indeed, Five F's citations 
to the trial testimony do not even remotely reference the concept of a deficiency 
judgment. With respect to the trial record, Five F cites "Plaintiffs Opening Argument 
R.1823 at 28." {Id.) However, that page consists solely of the first several lines of Five 
F's opening statement in which Five F's counsel thanked the jury for its service. 
Likewise, the other citations to the trial record do not reference a deficiency argument. 
See R1825 at 621 (discussion of fiduciary duty and Blodgett v. Marsh), R1825 at 636 
(discussion of good faith and fair dealing) and R1825 at 642 (discussion of late fee 
charges) and R1826 at 836 (discussion of judicial estoppel). Moreover, Five F's citation 
to its Trial Memorandum at R1522-1530 is improper because it does not even mention 
the deficiency argument. Five F's citation to the Proposed Pretrial Order at R1701-1735 
discusses a "deficiency judgment," but in a different context than it now argues on 
appeal. In the Pretrial Order, Five F states that Heritage "pursu[ed] the deficiency 
judgment to the extent of rents collected during Five F's bankruptcy." (R1467) 
(emphasis added), not that foreclosure ot the four-plex was a deficiency. The Pretrial 
Order simply does not preserve the deficiency argument that Five F now advances on 
appeal. 
35 
and it is therefore now precluded from raising it on appeal. State v. Archambeau, 820 
P.2d 920, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (as a general rule, party who fails to bring issue 
before trial court is barred from asserting issue initially on appeal); accord Jones v. 
Loosle, 2001 WL 311195 *1 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). 
Even if Five F's "deficiency" argument were properly before this Court (which it 
is not), it fails for two additional reasons. First, Utah law specifically defines a 
deficiency action, and foreclosing on additional collateral is not such an action. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-1-32. Second, a deficiency judgment is a personal liability; it does not 
extend to foreclosure against other collateral. 
The remaining citations are to filings that were not introduced at trial, but rather 
were ruled on or submitted long before trial. In two filings, Five F made only general 
references to a deficiency, but did not sufficiently argue the issue it now attempts to 
appeal. In Five F's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Rl-44), Five F referenced 
an attempt "to obtain a deficiency" (R20-21.) However, that motion was denied (R68-
69), and Five F has not appealed that denial here. In Five F's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Heritage's Motion for Summary Judgment, Five F discusses "a deficiency 
for the cash rents collected pursuant to the Bankruptcy Court's order." (R627 (emphasis 
added)). However, as was the case in the Pretrial Order, Five F's deficiency argument 
related only to Heritage's pursuit of additional collateral, the cash rents, as opposed to the 
argument Five F advances on appeal, i.e., whether "bidding on the second trustee's sale 
[involving the four-plex] . . . derogatfed] . . . Utah law with regard to deficiency 
judgments." (App. Br. at 3.) Moreover, the pursuit of "cash rents" was originally part of 
Heritage's counterclaim, which Heritage later voluntarily dismissed. (R1462-64.) 
Finally, there is no reference to this argument at all in the plaintiffs Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R1038-1077.) Therefore, any argument 
that pursuit of the "cash rents" was the pursuit of a deficiency is moot. Perhaps most 
troubling is the fact that Five F uses this identical series of citations for six of its seven 
issues, which reveals that this string of citations was simply inserted in the brief without 
any analysis of whether the referenced portions of the record actually referenced any 
particular issue. 
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2. Heritage's Foreclosure Of Its Collateral Is Not A Deficiency 
Judgment Under Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 Because It Is Not An 
"Action." 
Deficiency judgments in Utah are governed by Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32. 
Heritage's foreclosure of the four-plex was not an "action" within the meaning of Utah's 
deficiency statute (§ 57-1-32) and, therefore, Five F's position must be rejected. 
Five F attempts to bring the foreclosure sale on the four-plex within the purview of 
this statute by arguing that Heritage's foreclosure against the second parcel of property 
(the four-plex) was a "defacto deficiency judgment against Five F." (App. Br. at 29.) 
However, the Utah Supreme Court has rejected this very argument. 
In Phillips v. Utah State Credit Union, 811 P.2d 174 (Utah 1991), the Utah 
Supreme Court considered whether a creditor who had already foreclosed on one parcel 
of real property could liquidate a second item of collateral (the proceeds of a note and 
mortgage assigned by the debtor) which was pledged for the same debt, despite the fact 
that the creditor had failed to file a deficiency action within the three month period 
following the initial foreclosure sale. The Court concluded that the creditor's use of 
additional collateral does not constitute an "action" within the meaning of § 57-1-32: 
In this case, however, USCU did not seek a deficiency judgment 
against Phillips, but merely sought to retain its additional security. USCU's 
retention and use of this additional security was not legal action, but merely 
a retention of its validly assigned security interest, and was not the type of 
"action" against Phillips which is prohibited by section 57-1-32.... 
We therefore hold that where a creditor takes more than one item of 
security upon an obligation secured by a trust deed, the creditor is not 
precluded from making use of that additional security merely because the 
creditor has not sought a deficiency judgment within three months of a 
non-judicial sale of one of the items covered by the trust deed property, nor 
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is the creditor required to seek a deficiency judgment under section 57-1-32 in 
order to maintain its right to the additional security, so long as the security 
is applied toward the debt owed on the original loan. 
Id. at 178. Thus, the liquidation of additional collateral following a foreclosure sale is not 
subject to §57-1-32, which is applicable only to a creditor's action to obtain a deficiency 
judgment against the debtor. 
The Phillips decision is consistent with well-settled law from other jurisdictions 
holding that pursuit of additional collateral is not the same as seeking a deficiency 
judgment. See, e.g., Hodges v. Mark, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 700, 703 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) 
("[additional security in the form of property . . . or assignments or [sic] rents . . . can be 
exhausted notwithstanding the antideficiency legislation."); Bank ofChenoa v. Bagby, 
467 N.E.2d 596, 598 (111. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that "[ujntil all of the collateral-
including personalty and realty—has been disposed of, a deficiency does not exist" and 
that bank's foreclosure on two mortgages that secured notes was not an attempt to obtain 
deficiency judgment, but rather "was simply the act of a creditor exercising his remedies 
against collateral for a note in default."); Hatch v. Security-First Nat'I Bank, 19 Cal.2d 
254, 262 (1942) (fair value provisions of deficiency statute do not apply to multiply-
secured creditor who realizes on additional security without attempting to secure money 
judgment for unpaid balance). 
The facts and legal arguments in Dreyfuss v. Union Bank of California, 11 P.3d 
383 (Cal. 2000) {"Dreyfuss"), are strikingly similar to the present case. In Dreyfuss, the 
borrowers took out a loan from a bank which was secured by a deed of trust and 
guaranteed personally by the borrowers. Id. at 385. After the borrowers defaulted, the 
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loan agreement was modified and two additional parcels of real property were pledged 
as collateral. However, the borrowers again defaulted, and the bank initiated foreclosure 
proceedings on all three parcels. Subsequently, the borrowers filed bankruptcy, resulting 
in an automatic stay. Under a forbearance agreement, the debt was discounted if paid in 
full by a date certain. However, the borrowers failed to make that payment, and therefore 
the bank recommenced nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. At the time of the 
foreclosure sale, the outstanding indebtedness exceeded $3.75 million, and the bank made 
a $2.15 million credit bid on the first parcel of property. Because there was still 
outstanding debt, the bank held a foreclosure sale on the second parcel of collateral, at 
which it made another successful credit bid, leaving a $200,000 debt. Id. at 386. Finally, 
the bank foreclosed on the third parcel of property, which extinguished the debt. Id. 
Notably, the bank never sought a money judgment against the borrowers or guarantors 
after foreclosure of the collateral. Id. 
On appeal, the court addressed whether California's antideficiency provisions 
"restrict the ability of a creditor to exhaust multiple items of collateral in a series of 
nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings." Id. The borrowers contended "that the policies 
underlying the antideficiency provisions preclude a creditor from obtaining not only a 
deficiency judgment, but what they characterize as the 'functional equivalent of a 
deficiency judgment,'" contending, as Five F does here, that "application of the fair 
market value provisions of [the deficiency statute] is required to avoid a windfall 
recovery to the creditor/' Id. at 389. The borrowers further stated u[w]ithout such 
protection, a borrower who secures a debt with items of multiple security runs the risk 
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that all of it will be sold to satisfy the obligation, even if the fair market value of one 
item of security is sufficient to satisfy the debt."31 Id. at 389-90. Rejecting the 
borrowers' argument, the court stated: 
[W]e are unpersuaded by plaintiffs' proposal that we construe [the deficiency 
statute] with reference to multiple security situations to permit a borrower who 
believes the creditor did not credit the fair value of property recovered in prior 
sales to set aside a subsequent trustee's sale or provide for restitution of an unjust 
recovery. We also reject any similar suggestion that we construe the statute to 
permit a debtor to go to court to challenge the price obtained at a nonjudicial 
foreclosure sale and have subsequent sales enjoined if the sales to date have 
satisfied the debt based on a fair market valuation. 
Id. at 390. The Court also noted "there is a significant difference between selling 
additional security that has been pledged for a loan and recovering a deficiency judgment 
against the personal assets of the borrower." Id. at 391. 
Under Phillips and other authority, Heritage was simply foreclosing on additional 
collateral, and was not thereby obtaining a deficiency judgment against Five F. 
3. Heritage's Foreclosure Of Additional Collateral Was Not The 
Pursuit Of A Deficiency Judgment Because Heritage Did Not 
Seek A Personal Judgment Against An Individual. 
In addition, Five F misapprehends the nature of a deficiency judgment. Section 
57-1-32 clearly refers to a suit "to recover the balance due" on the Note against the 
31
 Regarding the borrowers' "windfall" argument, the court stated "[a]s to the potential of 
a windfall recovery to the creditor, because . . . the creditor is entitled to bid for the 
property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale in an amount less than the total amount due 
. . . there is always the theoretical possibility that the creditor could eventually sell the 
real property collateral for an amount greater than its successful credit bid and the 
amount of the outstanding debt. But that is true whether one or multiple items of real 
property collateral are sold, and whether the sales are conducted at once or seriatim." 
Dreyfuss, 11 P.3d at 390. 
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borrower. A deficiency judgment is the "imposition of personal liability on [a] 
mortgagor for [the] unpaid balance of [a] mortgage debt after foreclosure has failed to 
yield [the] full amount of [the] due debt/' Black's Law Dictionary at 379 (emphasis 
added). Thus, a deficiency judgment can result only when the lender seeks to impose 
personal liability on an individual or entity. This principle is reinforced by case law. See 
Hodges, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d at 703 (noting antideficiency statute "prohibits only a deficiency 
judgment in the strict sense, i.e., & personal judgment against the debtor. It does not 
prevent the creditor from realizing on additional security . . . .") (emphasis in original) 
{quoting 3 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1987) Secured Transactions in Real 
Property § 162, at 661). 
Here, Heritage simply did not seek a deficiency judgment, and further, Heritage 
has never sought to impose & personal liability on Five F or the Fowlers for the amount 
remaining after foreclosure, (R1824 at 262:13-19; R1825 at 461:7-14), which Five F 
acknowledged. (R1825 at 570:5-7.) Heritage simply held successive foreclosures sales 
of separate parcels of collateral, and such successive foreclosure sales are not deficiency 
judgments. See Dreyfuss, 11 P.3d at 388 (stating "[u]nder settled decisional law, a 
creditor's resort to any and all security on a debt does not implicate the antideficiency 
provisions.'^). Five F's attempt to analogize a legitimate foreclosure into a deficiency 
judgment must be rejected as a matter of law. 
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IIL FIVE F'S UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
Five F contends that "[a] finder of fact could have very reasonably concluded 
based upon the facts as adduced by Five F at trial that Heritage was unjustly enriched by 
its excessive recovery." (App. Br. at 28.) However, the unjust enrichment claim could 
not have been decided by the jury because Five F agreed in the Pretrial Order that "Five 
F's claim of unjust enrichment. . . will be tried by the Court outside the presence of the 
jury."32 (R1707.) Thus, Five F's unjust enrichment claim would not have been 
submitted to the jury in any event. Therefore, Five F's argument that the trial court 
should have submitted Five F's unjust enrichment to the jury contradicts its stipulation in 
the Pretrial Order. 
A. Unjust Enrichment Is Not Available Where There Is A Contract 
Claim, 
Five F contends that "[w]hen the trial court ruled that Five F had no contractual or 
breach of fiduciary duty claims against Heritage, it was improper for the court to refuse to 
consider Five F's unjust enrichment alternative theory for relief." (App. Br. at 28.) 
This argument is incorrect because the remedy of unjust enrichment is only 
available where there is no legal remedy. See Lysenko v. Saw ay a, 973 P.2d 445, 449 (Ct. 
App. 1999) affd, 7 P.3d 783 (Utah 2000) (noting "the Utah Supreme Court has stated 
Moreover, Five F stipulated in the Pretrial Order "that if its claim for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is submitted to the jury, then the unjust 
enrichment claim is withdrawn. Facts unique to the unjust enrichment claim and the 
defense of judicial estoppel, if any, shall not be argued to or in the presence of the jury." 
(R1707.) 
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that the unjust enrichment 'doctrine is designed to provide an equitable remedy [only] 
where one does not exist at law. In other words, if a legal remedy is available . . . the law 
will not imply the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment.5") {quoting American Towers 
Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1193 (Utah 1996))). 
Five F misapprehends the nature of the trial court's ruling. The trial court did not 
rule that Five F had no contractual basis for relief; rather, it ruled that Five F had failed to 
satisfy the elements of its contractual claim. Therefore, the trial court's ruling was based 
on Five F's failure of proof, not on Five F's absence of a contractual remedy. Because 
Five F had a contractual basis for relief, the trial court correctly declined to submit the 
unjust enrichment claim to the jury. 
Moreover, there was no unjust enrichment in this case for three reasons. First, 
Heritage was put at risk of not realizing fully on its loan by Five F's default. Second, 
Five F knew from the very beginning that Heritage viewed the Parcel as insufficient 
collateral for the loan. Third, Five F's position in this suit is itself fundamentally unfair. 
In effect, Five F wants Heritage to bear all the risk in a default. In Five F's view, it 
should be entitled to any upside with respect to post-foreclosure collateral, i.e., if 
Heritage is able to sell the foreclosed property for more than the original debt, Five F 
should get the benefit, but should have none of the downside risk, i.e., if Heritage had 
been unable to sell the Parcel for what it bid, it could not then seek a deficiency judgment 
against Five F or the guarantors. 
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SUMMARY OF RELIEF REQUESTED 
For the foregoing reasons, Heritage respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
decision of the Fifth Judicial District Court of Washington County. 
Dated this 7uJ day of April, 2003. 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
James S. Jardine 
/Brent D.Wride 
/
 y Elaina M. Maragakis 
and 
JONES WALDOiibLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
.George W. Pratt 
701395v2 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies 
mailed, postage prepaid, on this 1/"^ day of April, 2003 to 
Brian W. Steffensen 
Steffensen Law Office 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Satl Lake City, UT 84106 
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Addendum 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21 (1998) 
B. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-27 (1998) 
C. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1998) 
D. Court's Ruling R 1826 at 846:14—852:25 
E. Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict 
F. Final Judgment 
G. Amended Proposed Pretrial Order 
H. Plaintiffs Promissory Note 
I. Plaintiffs Trust Deed 
J. Matters cited by Five F as preserving issues for appeal 
Tab A 
Page 1 
ation Search Result Rank 1 of 1 Database 
ST S 57-1-21 UT-STANN98 
C.A. 1953 § 57-1-21 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE 
CHAPTER 1. CONVEYANCES 
Copyright 1953-1998 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier 
Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved. 
•1-21 Trustees of trust deeds --Qualifications. 
1) (a) The trustee of a trust deed shall be: 
(i) any member of the Utah State Bar; 
(ii) any depository institution as defined in Section 7-1-103, or insurance 
ipany authorized to do business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the United 
ites; 
(iii) any corporation authorized to conduct a trust business in Utah under 
\ laws of Utah or the United States; 
(iv) any title insurance or abstract company authorized to do business in 
ih under the laws of Utah; 
(v) any agency of the United States government; or 
(vi) any association or corporation which is licensed, chartered, or 
julated by the Farm Credit Administration or its successor. 
(b) Subsection (1) is not applicable to a trustee of a trust deed existing 
.or to the effective date of this chapter, nor to any agreement that is 
)plemental to that trust deed. 
[2) The trustee of a trust deed may not be the beneficiary of the trust deed, 
.ess the beneficiary is qualified to be a trustee under Subsection (1)(a)(ii), 
_i) , (v) , or (vi) . 
story: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 3; 1963, ch. 110, § 1; 1969, ch. 162, § 1; 1985, 
. 64, § 1; 1996, ch. 182, § 25. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
\mendment Notes. --The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1996, added the 
^section (1)(a) and (1)(b) designations, redesignating former Subsections 
i(a) to (f) as (1)(a)(i) to (vi); substituted "depository institution as 
fined in Section 7-1-103" for "bank, building and loan association, savings 
i loan association" in Subsection (1) (a) (ii); and made related and stylistic 
anges. 
'Effective date of this chapter."—The phrase "effective date of this 
apter," in Subsection (1)(b), first appeared in this section as amended by L. 
35, ch. 64, § 1. That act (L. 1985, ch. 64) took effect on April 29, 1985. 
Zross-References. —Utah State Bar, § 78-51-1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Copr. ) West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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ST S 57-1-27 UT-STANN98 
C.A. 1953 § 57-1-27 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE 
CHAPTER 1. CONVEYANCES 
Copyright 1953-1998 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier 
Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved. 
1-27 Sale of trust property by public auction --Postponement of sale. 
1) On the date and at the time and place designated in the notice of sale, 
i trustee or the attorney for the trustee shall sell the property at public 
:tion to the highest bidder. The trustee, or the attorney for the trustee, may 
Lduct the sale and act as the auctioneer. The trustor, or his successor in 
.erest, if present at the sale, may direct the order in which the trust 
>perty shall be sold, if the property consists of several known lots or 
reels which can be sold to advantage separately. The trustee or attorney for 
> trustee shall follow these directions. Any person, including the beneficiary 
trustee, may bid at the sale. Each bid is considered an irrevocable offer, 
I if the purchaser refuses to pay the amount bid by him for the property sold 
him at the sale, the trustee, or the attorney for the trustee, may again sell 
i property at any time to the highest bidder. The party refusing to pay the 
i price is liable for any loss occasioned by the refusal, including interest, 
sts, and trustee's and reasonable attorneys' fees. The trustee or the attorney 
: the trustee may thereafter reject any other bid of that person. 
(2) The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he considers expedient, 
stpone the sale up to a period not to exceed 72 hours. If the last hour of the 
stponement falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, the sale may be 
stponed until the same hour of the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, 
a legal holiday. The person conducting the sale shall give notice of the 
stponement by public declaration at the time and place last appointed for the 
Le. No other notice of the postponed sale is required, unless the sale is 
stponed for longer than 72 hours beyond the date designated in the notice of 
Le. In the event of a longer postponement, the sale shall be cancelled and 
noticed in the same manner as the original notice of sale is required to be 
^en. 
story: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 9; 1985, ch. 68, § 1; 1988, ch. 82, § 1. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ir market value bid. 
A trust deed beneficiary's offer of "fair market value" for property sold at a 
ustee's sale was the equivalent of a fixed-dollar offer and was therefore a 
d for purposes of Subsection (1). As the only bid, it was also the highest 
d, and the trustee was required by the statute to accept it. Thus, the trustee 
s not permitted to postpone, cancel, or renotice the sale pursuant to 
Copr. ) West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
TabC 
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ST S 57-1-32 
C.A. 1953 § 57-1-32 
Search Result Rank 1 of 1 Database 
UT-STANN9* 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE 
CHAPTER 1. CONVEYANCES 
Copyright ) 1953-1998 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier 
Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All rights reserved. 
1-32 Sale of trust property by trustee —Action to recover balance due upon 
igation for which trust deed was given as security --Collection of costs and 
orney's fees. 
,t any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust deed, 
hereinabove provided, an action may be commenced to recover the balance due 
»n the obligation for which the trust deed was given as security, and in such 
.ion the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the indebtedness which 
; secured by such trust deed, the amount for which such property was sold, and 
: fair market value thereof at the date of sale. Before rendering judgment, 
i court shall find the fair market value at the date of sale of the property 
.d. The court may not render judgment for more than the amount by which the 
>unt of the indebtedness with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including 
istee's and attorneyfs fees, exceeds the fair market value of the property as 
the date of the sale. In any action brought under this section, the 
availing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and reasonable attorney 
js incurred in bringing an action under this section. 
>tory: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 14; 1985, ch. 68, § 4. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
:orney fees. 
:iciency j udgment, 
:lusive remedy. 
.tiple liens. 
:ice. 
^-action rule. 
:-of-state lands. 
availing party. 
3cedural failure. 
:pose of section. 
:ed. 
Preemption by federal law. 
:orney fees. 
rrial court did not err in granting debtors attorney fees and costs as the 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT - ST. GEORGE COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIVE F, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HERITAGE SAVINGS BANK, 
Defendant. 
TRIAL 
(FOURTH DAY) 
Case 980501814 
Appeal 20020088-CA 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
BE IT REMEMBERED that the trial of this matter resumed 
before the above-named court on October 25, 2001. 
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by 
counsel, the following proceedings were held: 
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We, these are in our instructions, but there was a 
10th Circuit Case stating that the United States has complied 
with applicable statutes and regulations concerning the 
assessment of penalties, therefore do not breach its 
fiduciary duty. It's the Koozwoon (phonetic) case 57 F.3d 
920, which I think stands for the proposition if you comply 
with statutory duties if you, if you act within the law that 
it can't be a breach of fiduciary duty. 
THE JUDGE: All right. I'm going to take a 
recess and look over these cases that have been cited and 
then I'll rule on the motion. 
We'll be in recess. 
(Tape turned off.) 
COURT'S RULING 
THE JUDGE: All right. We're back in session. 
It's seven minutes or eight minutes to 4:00. The jury is 
not present. The parties and their counsel are present. 
Because of the way in which the issues in this 
lawsuit were framed from the outset the Court has refused and 
been hesitant, certainly, to grant any summary judgment or 
directed verdict without fully understanding the facts in the 
case, and especially those upon which the plaintiff relied to 
prove its claims. 
The Court has afforded the plaintiff the 
opportunity of fully presenting its evidence in this case and 
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fully discussing the application of the law to the facts 
presented in the evidence. 
It's not appropriate for a Court to weigh the 
evidence in this case in deciding a renewed motion for a 
directed verdict since the weighing of the evidence is the 
exclusive province of the jury. 
However, the Court has a duty to decide before 
submitting the matter to the jury whether there is evidence 
before the jury sufficient to allow the jury to determine 
that the plaintiff is entitled to prevail on its claims, 
given the applicable law. This decision is is accomplished 
by considering every fact and indulging every reasonable 
inference from the facts in favor of the plaintiff, and then 
asking the question assuming all the facts in this case are 
as the plaintiff says they are is there any way that a 
reasonable jury could find in the plaintiff's favor under 
the law. 
I've struggled with that process as we have worked 
through this case and during this trial because I was not 
fully advised when the trial started as to all of the details 
of the ways in which the plaintiff claimed that the bank had 
breached its fiduciary duty as trustee, or breached the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or received 
unjust enrichment. 
Having now heard the evidence along with the jury 
FIVE F VS. HERITAGE OCT. 25, 2001 
Penny C. Abbott, Reporter/Transcriber 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
the Court is able to rule on the application of the law to 
that evidence. 
Let me digress just long enough to mention that 
this has been a well tried case by very competent counsel who 
have done their level best to alert the, the Court as to the 
law and the facts. And the Court truly appreciates their 
courtesy and their professionalism and that of the courtesy 
of the parties. 
Now the Court must decide how the law applies in 
this case. 
After considering all the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff the Court has come to the 
conclusion that as a matter of law the jury in this case 
could not reasonably conclude given the evidence before it 
that the defendant bank engaged in any conduct which was 
not permitted under the agreement of the parties or under 
the statutes of this state applicable to this situation. 
The steps taken by the bank were allowed by the 
foreclosure statutes, the order in the bankruptcy court, and 
the agreement of the parties. 
So the ultimate question in this case turns out to 
be whether a bank can be found to have violated its fiduciary 
duty or to have violated its promise to treat the borrower 
with good faith and deal with the borrower fairly when the 
bank does no more than exercise its legal rights under the 
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law. 
Given the evidence in this case and which this jury 
would have to consider, the Court is of the opinion that the 
law does not contemplate that the bank can be found liable to 
the plaintiff for the breach of fiduciary duty or the breach 
of the implied covenant good faith and fair dealing or for 
unjust enrichment when the bank's conduct is permitted under 
the law. 
As to the plaintiff's claims for damages, the Court 
finds under the foreclosure statute and as a-matter of law 
that the plaintiff has no right to or claim against the 
collateral property once it has been sold at a properly 
noticed and properly carried out trustee's sale which has not 
been challenged. After that sale has occurred the property 
belongs to the buyer, he or the defendant bank. And 
plaintiff under the statute is not allowed to assert any 
claim against the bank because of what the bank later does 
with the property. 
Under the facts before this jury the accounting 
practices of which the plaintiff complains would only 
matter if the bank sought to pursue a deficiency judgment, 
which it has not done. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate 
that those alleged errors, even assuming that the plaintiff 
is correct as to those errors, would have changed the 
outcome of the foreclosure sale conducted by the defendant 
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bank. 
In deciding a motion for directed verdict the Court 
is not required to make findings of fact or conclusions of 
law according to the provisions of Rule 50, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. I do not intend these remarks to be so 
labeled. The purpose of these remarks is rather to make 
clear the basis or the reason for the Court's decision in 
this case in the event that the matter comes to the attention 
of a reviewing court. 
This Court now grants the defendant's motion for 
directed verdict as to all of plaintiff's claims in this case 
which were tried to the jury for the reasons stated above. 
Plaintiff has failed to present adequate proof of 
its claims to get the matter before the jury and the Court 
finds the plaintiff has no cause of action under the facts 
and law of this case. Those claims are hereby ordered 
dismissed and the jury will be discharged. 
Would you have the jury join us, please? 
MR. HATHAWAY: Your Honor, I take it it pertains 
as well to the unjust enrichment claim. 
THE JUDGE: I didn't mention the unjust enrichment 
claim. We've tried the case as a contract case. 
MR. HATHAWAY: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: And so I think the unjust enrichment 
claim would be moot at this point. 
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MR. HATHAWAY: All right. Thank you. 
THE JUDGE: All right. And just so I'm clear, do 
you disagree with that, either, either side? 
MR. JARDINE: No, Your Honor. 
MR. HATHAWAY: I just wanted that clarification. 
Thank you. 
THE JUDGE: All right. I appreciate that. 
Please be seated, folks. We now have present our 
nine stalwart jurors who have been very patient in this 
case. 
I will tell you now, ladies and gentlemen, that 
we're going to be excusing you at this juncture without 
requiring you to make any decision. I have granted a motion 
which has terminated these proceedings. 
I don't want you to walk away thinking you wasted 
four days. We brought you here on Monday to resolve the 
issues of this case. They have been resolved and your 
presence here, your willingness to hear the evidence as it 
came in, and to present a forum for the parties to litigate 
this case has contributed mightily to that resolution. The 
only thing that happened is you didn't have to make a 
decision which you might have contemplated making at the 
outset. 
We want to thank you for your willingness to 
serve. This is important public service. Even though you 
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didn't make the call, it's important public service. This 
is the way our system works and without you being here it 
wouldn't have worked. 
I'm going to release you from the admonition that I 
previously gave you which means you're now free to discuss 
the case with anyone you choose, or not discuss it if that's 
what you prefer. 
I hope you'll leave here with a sense of pride for 
having been involved in this, these proceedings. 
Benjamin Franklin once said that there are two 
pillars of freedom upon which our democracy rests, the right 
to vote and the right to serve on juries. And he said if he 
had to choose between the two he'd take the right to serve on 
a jury because it's the opportunity for the citizens of the 
community to come in and, and hear what's going on in the 
legal system and correct injustices. And that's the process 
you've been involved in. 
We truly appreciate you. Thank you. You are 
free to leave. 
Unless there's something else we'll be in, be in 
recess. 
MR. HATHAWAY: Thank you. 
MR. JARDINE: Thank you, Judge. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you. Appreciate you. 
WHEREUPON, the proceedings were concluded. 
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RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
George W. Pratt (USB #2642) 
Marci Rechtenbach (USB #8146) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
Attorneys for Defendant Heritage Savings Bank 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FIVE F, L.L.C., 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
Plaintiff, MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT 
vs. 
HERITAGE SAVINGS BANK, : Civil No. 98-0501814 
Defendant. : Honorable J. Philip Eves 
This case was tried to a jury on October 22, 23,24, and 25,2001. Following the 
presentation of all evidence by the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant orally moved the 
Court for a directed verdict in its favor. The Court took the motion under advisement. 
513919vl 
V 
Thereafter, the Court advised the parties and their counsel that, in the Court's view, the motion 
for directed verdict should be granted. 
Accordingly, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's motion for a directed verdict is granted. 
Judgment shall be entered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff in accordance with 
this order. 
DATED this 21 - day of November, 2001. 
Approved as to form: 
Honeff able J. Philip E 
Benson L. Hathawa§J, Jr. 
Attorney for PlairffifT^ 
Gj&rgeTW. Pratt 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FIVE F, L.L.C., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HERITAGE SAVINGS BANK, 
Defendant. 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 98-0501814 
Honorable J. Philip Eves 
Based upon the Court's Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict, and 
good cause appearing, 
513925vl 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this action, and all 
claims asserted by the plaintiff in its First Amended Complaint, are dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this #-f~ day of November, 2001. 
Approved as to form: 
7 <fcg 
Honorable J. Philip Eyes 
Benson L. Hathaway, prj 
Attorney for Plaintj 
George W. Pratt 
Attorney for Defendant 
» / « • / * 
o/ 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIVE F, L.L.C., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
HERITAGE SAVINGS BANK, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED PROPOSED 
PRETRIAL ORDER 
Judge: J. Philip Eves 
Civil No. 98-0501814 
This matter came before the Court on at a pretrial conference held on October 4,2001, 
before the Honorable J. Philip Eves. Benson L. Hathaway, Jr. of the law firm of Stirba & Hathaway 
appeared as counsel for the Plaintiff, Five F, Inc. ("Five F"). James S. Jardine of the law firm of 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker and George W. Pratt of the law firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbook & 
McDonough appeared as counsel for the Defendant Heritage Bank ("Heritage"). Based on 
proceedings during the final pretrial conference and the hearing on certain pending motions, the 
Court directed the parties to file an amended pretrial order on October 17, 2001. The following 
action was taken: 
A. JURISDICTION. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4. The jurisdiction of the court is not disputed and is hereby 
determined to be present. 
B. VENUE. Venue is proper before this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-13-4 
and 78-13-7. The parties agree that venue is properly laid in the Fifth Judicial District Court of 
Washington County, Utah. 
C. GENERAL NATURE OF THE CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES. 
1. FIVE F'S CLAIMS AGAINST HERITAGE. 
a. Five F claims that Heritage, as Trustee under its September 12, 
1996 Promissory Note and Trust Deed with Five F, owed Five F a 
fiduciary duty to act in the interest of Five F as Trustor and with a 
punctilio of honor. 
b. Five F claims that Heritage, as Trustee, breached its fiduciary duty 
to Five F, by, among other things, failing to consult with Five F prior to 
the trust deed foreclosure sale; by disregarding any interest Five F may 
2 
have had in the property; and, otherwise by not acting in the interest of 
Five F and with a high punctilio of honor. 
c. Five F claims that as a consequence of Heritage's breach of its 
fiduciary duty, Five F has been damaged by the loss of the value of its real 
property used as collateral under the subject note and trust deed, for lost 
rents, lost profits, lost future income and other benefits of ownership of the 
real property used as collateral under the subject note and trust deed. Five 
F claims in addition, that it is entitled to its attorney's fees, consequential 
damages, and punitive damages. 
d. Five F claims Heritage breached its contract, including its covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, under its September 12, 1996 promissory 
note and trust deed with Five F by, among other things, failing to consult 
with Five F in the process of its foreclosure and bid preparation; by the 
manner in which it accounted for the balance owed by Five F at various 
times during the life of the loan; in its calculation of the credit amount bid 
at the two foreclosure sales, by failing to give Five F credit for the value of 
the real property if foreclosed on, by reaping an excessive recovery for 
itself in substantial excess of its contract rights under its note and trust 
deed with Five F, and by depriving Five F of the benefit of its bargain with 
Heritage under its promissory note and trust deed. 
e. Five F claims as a result of Heritage's breach of its contract, 
including its covenant of good faith and fair dealing, that Five F has been 
3 
damaged by being deprived of the value of the real property used as 
collateral under the subject note and trust deed in excess of the amount 
Five F agreed to pay under those instruments, Five F's lost profits, lost 
rents, lost business opportunities and anticipated future earnings, its 
attorney's fees, costs and consequential damages. 
f. Five F alternatively claims that Heritage has been unjustly 
enriched through its excessive recovery in the foreclosure of all of the 
collateral pledged by Five F under its September 12, 1996 note and trust 
deed and its failure and refusal to duly credit bid Five F's contractual 
obligation against the value of the foreclosed real property, and Five F has 
been damaged by such unjust enrichment in the amount Heritage has 
received from Five F in this transaction, less the amount Heritage was 
entitled to recovery in its obligations with Five F. 
2. HERITAGE'S ANSWER AND DEFENSES: 
Heritage denies all of Five F's claims. On September 12,1996, Heritage made a loan to 
Five F in the amount of $1,200,000, which was secured by a note and trust deed on several 
pieces of property, with assignment of rents. Five F promised to repay the $1,200,000 by 
December 31, 1996, but failed to do so, prompting Heritage to begin a non-judicial foreclosure 
through a Trustee's Sale of its collateral. 
In May of 1997, Heritage's foreclosure was stopped when Five F filed a chapter 11 
bankruptcy petition. Five F proposed a plan of reorganization, which the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah confirmed by order entered February 18, 1998. Under 
the plan of reorganization, Five F was required to pay Heritage in full no later than May 31, 
1998, or if it did not do so, the confirmed plan expressly permitted Heritage to conduct a 
Trustee's Sale on the 10.44-acre parcel securing the Note. That sale was held on July 13, 1998. 
Heritage, acting as lender-beneficiary, credit bid $1,090,000, which was the highest bid at the 
sale and which therefore Heritage as trustee accepted. Heritage thus acquired title to the 10.44-
acre parcel and Five F was credited with $1,090,000 against its loan balance. Because there was 
a balance still owing on the Note, the plan further authorized Heritage to conduct a second 
Trustee's Sale on the four-plex property that also secured the loan. Accordingly, a second 
Trustee' Sale was held on August 12, 1998, at which sale Heritage credit bid $210,000. That bid 
was the highest bid and was therefore accepted by Heritage as trustee. 
As trustee, Heritage did not owe a fiduciary duty to Five F. Five F and Heritage had no 
confidential relation. Five F did not rely on Heritage for any business advice. Heritage did not 
have a position of dominance with Five F, since it was merely a lender to Five F. 
Moreover, Heritage in its role as trustee treated Five F fairly. Heritage fully complied 
with its statutory duties as trustee, including consulting with Five F on the order of the sale of the 
parcels. 
With respect to Five F's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, Heritage asserts that it has fully complied with the terms of its note and trust deed with 
Five F and did so in good faith. 
Once Five F defaulted on its Note and foreclosure proceedings began, Heritage had no 
obligation to bid on the properties at the Trustee's Sale. And even if Heritage elected to bid, it 
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was free to bid an amount it determined protected its interests. Five F's claim fails because 
Heritage complied with all of its duties under the note and trust deed. Moreover, Five F could 
not justifiably expect: (1) that Heritage would bid at all; (2) that Heritage would bid the amount 
of its debt or of any appraisal, especially when it considered the appraisals at best uncertain; or 
(3) that it would receive as credit against its loan anything more than the highest bid at the 
Trustee's Sale. 
As a matter of law, any evidence regarding the collateral property or its disposition after 
the trustee sale is irrelevant and inadmissible. 
Five F's unjust enrichment claim fails for three reasons. First, an unjust enrichment 
claim is precluded when there is a written contract, such as this, the note and trust deed. Second, 
even assuming arguendo that this claim is properly part of this lawsuit, it fails as a matter of 
fairness. Although it was possible that Heritage would ultimately sell the subject property for 
more than the amount it had bid, Heritage also took the corresponding risk that the property 
would be sold for less than the amount of Heritage's bid. Under law and equity, Five F is the 
party that bears the risks of the Trustee's Sale process. The outcome that Five F challenges was 
not unjust because Five F received what it had bargained for, and further, Heritage was not 
unjustly enriched because it received exactly what the Trustee's Sale process mandated. Third, 
when all of Heritage's default rights and indirect costs are considered, there was no enrichment. 
Finally, all of Five F's claims are barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Five F 
proposed and succeeded in obtaining confirmation of a chapter 11 plan which provided, with 
respect to Heritage, that if Five F did not pay Heritage in full by May 31, 1998, Heritage could 
then proceed to conduct a foreclosure sale of the 10.4 acre parcel and then, if it was not paid in 
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full from that sale, it could proceed to conduct a foreclosure sale of the remaining four-plex. 
Heritage proceeded in strict accordance with Five F's confirmed plan, was the high bidder at the 
first foreclosure sale, where it was not paid in full, and then scheduled the second foreclosure 
sale, where it was also the high bidder. Thus, Heritage acquired title to all its collateral through 
foreclosure, in strict accordance with Five F's confirmed bankruptcy plan. Consequently, Five F 
is judicially estopped to challenge the validity and results of the foreclosure sales, as it attempts 
to do in this suit. 
D. TRIAL OF CLAIMS BY COURT. 
Five F's claim of unjust enrichment and Heritage's defense of judicial estoppel will be tried 
by the Court outside the presence of the jury. Five F stipulates that if its claim for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is submitted to the jury, then the unjust enrichment 
claim is withdrawn. Facts unique to the unjust enrichment claim and the defense of judicial 
estoppel, if any, shall not be argued to or in the presence of the jury. 
E. UNCONTROVERTED FACTS. The following facts are established by 
admissions in the pleadings, by court order pursuant to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, or by stipulation of the parties and counsel. 
1. Plaintiff Five F is a Utah limited liability company with its principal place of 
business in St. George, Utah. 
2. Defendant Heritage Savings Bank is a Utah financial institution with its principal 
place of business in St. George, Utah. 
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3. On September 12, 1996, Heritage loaned Five F $1,200,000, and Five F executed 
a Promissory Note in favor of Heritage in the amount of $1,200,000.00. 
4. The Note was secured by a Trust Deed with Assignment of Rents, through which 
Five F conveyed to Heritage as Trustee, title to three parcels of real property, an undeveloped 
parcel consisting of 10.44 acres, and two four-plexes. 
5. Prior to closing the loan to Five F, Heritage had received appraisals on the three 
parcels of real property pledged to secure the loan (the 10.44-acre parcel of raw land, and the two 
four-plexes), in the amounts, respectively, of $1,640,000.00, $306,000.00, and $306,000.00. 
6. Mr. Fowler was aware of these appraisal valuations at the time of the closing. 
7. Heritage was the Beneficiary and also the Trustee under the Trust Deed, of which 
Fowler was aware when he signed the Trust Deed. 
8. Five F defaulted in its obligations under the Note, by failing to pay all principal 
and accrued interest by December 31, 1996, as required by the Note. 
9. On February 28, 1997, Heritage as Trustee commenced a nonjudicial foreclosure 
proceeding against all three parcels of real property by filing a Notice of Default with the 
Washington County Recorder. 
10. At the time of the December 31, 1998 default, Five F owed Heritage on its Note 
the full principal amount of approximately $1,200,000 plus interest and costs to be incurred in 
foreclosure. 
11. On March 17, 1998, Five F made a partial payment on the loan of $240,000, in 
exchange for reconveyance of one of the two four-plexes. 
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12. Heritage's foreclosure proceeding was interrupted when, on or about May 23, 
1997, Five F filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. 
13. In connection with the chapter 11 proceeding, Heritage assessed its lien against 
the real property securing the Note, as well as the rents collected by Five F from the remaining 
four-plex property. 
14. In its chapter 11 bankruptcy case Five F sought and obtained confirmation of a 
Plan of Reorganization, which was confirmed by order of the bankruptcy court on February 18, 
1998. 
15. Five F's Plan of Reorganization provided that Heritage could proceed with its 
foreclosure of the property if Five F did not paid Heritage in full by May 31, 1998. 
16. Five F failed to pay Heritage in full by May 31,1998. 
17. A trustee's sale was held on the 10.44-acre tract on July 13, 1998. 
18. At the July 13, 1998, trustee's sale, Heritage credit bid $1,090,000 and acquired 
title to the 10.44-acre parcel. 
19. On August 12, 1998, a trustee's sale was held on the four-plex property. 
20. At the August 12, 1998 Trustee's Sale, Heritage credit bid $210,000.00 and 
acquired title to the four-plex property. 
21. Heritage sold the four-plex to a third party on about August 20, 1998, for 
$280,000.00, yielding net sale proceeds to Heritage of $261,009.10. 
22. On October 6, 2000, Heritage sold the 10.44-acre parcel for $1,682,000.00. 
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F. CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT-l The contested issues of fact remaining for 
decision are: 
1. PLAINTIFF'S CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT: 
a. Whether Five F and its representatives reposed their trust or 
confidence in Heritage as Trustee and relied on Heritage's 
guidance. 
b. Whether Heritage was in a position to exercise 
extraordinary influence over Five F in the handling of the loan and 
foreclosure of the collateral. 
c. Whether Heritage stood in a dominant position vis-a-vis 
Five F in the handling of its loan and the foreclosure of the 
collateral. 
d. Whether Heritage as Trustee allowed Five F to participate 
in any meaningful way in the Trustee's Sale, including the 
calculation of the credit bid, and the calculation of balance owed. 
e. Whether Heritage as Trustee acted in the interest of Five F 
with a high punctilio of honor in its capacity as Trustee under its 
Promissory Note and Trust Deed with Five F. 
f. Whether Five F was damaged as a consequence of 
Heritage's conduct. 
By including various contested issues of fact or law herein, the parties do not agree that such issues are material, 
relevant, properly pleaded, or otherwise correct, and specifically reserve their right to argue against such issue at 
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g. Whether Heritage's conduct as Trustee was wanton, 
intentional, purposeful or in reckless disregard of the contractual 
and legal rights of Five F. 
h. The extent of the income and wealth of Heritage. 
i. Whether there is a probability that Heritage might repeat 
the conduct complained of. 
j . Whether as a result of the amounts paid to Heritage by Five 
F, together with the value of the real property taken by Heritage in 
foreclosure, Heritage has received the benefit of assets 
substantially in excess of the obligation arising in Five F under the 
Note and Trust Deed, to the detriment of Five F. 
k. Whether Five F understood that, in the event of Five F's 
default, Heritage could foreclose on the property used as collateral, 
but that value of the collateral would not be considered as credit 
against the loan. 
1. Whether Five F was justified in expecting to be obligated 
under its Promissory Note and Trust Deed with Heritage only to 
the extent of the face amount of the note, plus interest together 
with costs and fees. 
trial. Specifically, the parties have included contested issues of fact and law consistent with their prior positions 
presented to the Court in its motion, in order to preserve those issues. 
11 
m. Whether Five F expected to lose all of its collateral pledged 
to secure its Promissory Note with Heritage notwithstanding the 
actual value of the pledged property and its contractual obligations 
under the terms of the Promissory Note. 
n. Whether Heritage determined its credit bid at the sale of the 
10.44 acres, by deducting $225,000 from what it calculated Five F 
owed it, expecting it could retrieve this amount from a subsequent 
quick sale of the four-plex, which decision was made with full 
knowledge and consideration of the September 1996 appraisal of 
the 10.44 acres in the amount of $1,640,000, the April 1998 
appraisal in the amount of $1,830,000 and $1,380,000, and, that by 
Heritage's calculations, as of the date of the sale, Five F owed 
Heritage $1,314,685.33. 
o. Whether Heritage determined the amount to be credit bid at 
the Trustee's Sale of Five F's four-plex by deducting from the 
amount it calculated remained owed by Five F an amount 
calculated to be the approximate amount of rents which had been 
collected and were being held in a reserve account pursuant to the 
bankruptcy court's order. 
p. Whether Heritage's conduct in the performance of its 
obligations as Beneficiary under its Promissory Note and Trust 
Deed with Five F was contrary to Five F's justified expectations. 
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q. Whether Five F was damaged directly and as a 
consequence of Heritage's actions under the performance of its 
obligations under the Note and Trust Deed, 
r. Alternatively, whether Heritage received a windfall outside 
of its contractual obligations in the foreclosure and subsequent sale 
of the collateral, 
s. Whether Five F intended to bestow the value of the pledged 
collateral notwithstanding its value and Five F's contractual 
obligations. 
t. Whether Heritage was paid in full upon foreclosure of the 
10.44 acres on Five F's obligation under the Promissory Note and 
Trust Deed, 
u. What amount is required in equity to make Five F whole as 
a result of Heritage's unjust enrichment. 
2. DEFENDANT'S CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT 
a. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim 
(1) Did Heritage as trustee conduct the trustee sales in 
accordance with the statutory requirements? 
(2) Did Heritage, above and beyond its role as lender and 
mortgagee, have and exercise extraordinary influence over 
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Five F? If so, did Heritage exercise that influence 
unlawfully? 
(3) Did Heritage, above and beyond its role as lender and 
mortgagee, because of dependence, weakness of age, state 
of mental strength or state of business intelligence, hold a 
position of superiority or dominance over Five F? If so, did 
Heritage use that position of superiority or dominance 
unlawfully? 
(4) Did Five F, separate and apart from its pledge of property 
as collateral for its loan from Heritage, otherwise place its 
property in the charge of Heritage? 
(5) Did Heritage, above and beyond its role as lender and 
mortgagee, have an overmastering influence over Five F? 
If so, did Heritage use that influence unlawfully? 
(6) Did Five F, with Heritage's understanding, repose a 
continuous trust in the skill and integrity of Heritage, above 
and beyond the borrower-lender relationship? 
(7) Were the note and trust deed negotiated at arm's length? 
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(8) Did Five F request Heritage as trustee to consult with it in 
any respect? 
(9) Did Heritage as trustee have a fiduciary duty to Five F? 
(10) If Heritage as trustee had a fiduciary duty to Five F, was 
Five F injured by Heritage's conduct as trustee? 
(11) If Five F was injured by Heritage's conduct as trustee, what 
damages did it suffer? 
(12) If someone else had been substituted to act as trustee under 
the trust deed, would the outcome of the trustee's sales 
have been altered in any way? 
(13) By the time the foreclosure sales were conducted, had the 
relationship between Heritage and Five F become 
"adversarial," such that any fiduciary duties that may have 
existed were extinguished? 
b. Breach of Contract Claim 
(1) Did Heritage breach the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing? 
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(2) Did Five F expressly agree in its confirmed Chapter 11 plan 
that, in the event Heritage was not paid in full by May 31, 
1998, it could proceed with a trustee sale on the 10.4 acre 
parcel and then, if the proceeds from the trustee sale did not 
pay in full the Note, it could conduct a foreclosure sale of 
the four-plex? 
(3) Under the operation of the trust deed and trust deed statute, 
was Heritage paid the amount of the proceeds of the trustee 
sale or some other amount? 
(4) Did Five F have a justified expectation under its contract 
with Heritage, i.e., the promissory note, trust deed, and 
confirmed Chapter 11 plan, that if Heritage bid at the 
trustee sale, it would bid an amount for the 10.4 acre parcel 
equal to or greater than the fair market value, or the amount 
of any appraisal it had in its possession? 
(5) Did Five F have a justified expectation that Heritage would 
not foreclose, under any circumstances, on all of its 
collateral? 
(a) Did Five F ever disclose this expectation to 
Heritage? 
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(b) Did Five F deliberately fail to disclose this 
expectation to Heritage to induce Heritage to make 
the loan? 
(c) Was Heritage "paid in full" by its foreclosure on the 
10.44 acre parcel? 
(6) Did Five F have a justified expectation that in the event of 
foreclosure its collateral would not be sold at the Trustee's 
Sale to the highest bidder, which amount would be applied 
to its debt? 
(7) Would the obligations that Five F seeks to enforce against 
Heritage result in a better contract for Five F than the 
contract that Five F actually entered into with Heritage? 
(8) Is Five F attempting to establish new, independent rights or 
duties that were not created in the parties' contract, or 
agreed by Heritage? 
(9) In connection with the two foreclosure sales, did Heritage 
fully comply with all provisions of the trust deed and the 
foreclosure statute? 
17 
(10) Did Five F have a justifiable expectation that Heritage 
would consult with it about and agree upon Five F's 
position on the calculation of the bids it presented at the 
trustee sales? 
(11) Did Five F suffer damages as a result of any breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing? 
(12) What damages, if any, were suffered by Five F as a result 
of any breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing? 
c. Unjust Enrichment Claim 
(1) Was there an express contract governing the rights of 
Heritage and Five F in the event of a default on the Note by 
Five F? 
(2) Did Five F confer a benefit upon Heritage through 
Heritage's exercise of its contractual foreclosure rights? 
(3) If so, at the time such benefit was conferred, was Heritage 
aware of the benefit? 
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(4) Under the circumstances, would it be inequitable for 
Heritage to retain any benefit received through its exercise 
of its contractual foreclosure rights? 
(5) Did Five F engage in inequitable conduct to induce 
Heritage to enter into the contracts or otherwise engage in 
inequitable conduct? 
G. CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW. The contested issues of law, in addition to 
those implicit in the foregoing issues of fact, are: 
1. PLAINTIFF'S CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW 
a. Whether Heritage as trustee under the trust deed between Heritage 
Bank and Five F owed Five F a fiduciary duty. 
b. Whether Heritage breached that duty by failing to act in the 
interest of Five F and to accord itself with a high punctilio of honor. 
c. Whether Heritage's conduct was consistent with Five F's justified 
expectations under Five F's promissory note and trust deed with Heritage. 
d. Whether Five F's confirmed Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Plan is a bar 
to the instant action. 
e. Whether Heritage's duty under the Trust Deed is greater than the 
mere obligation to sell the pledged property in accordance with the default 
provision of the Trust Deed. 
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f. Whether Heritage's conduct in foreclosing on Five F's property 
comported with all requirements of Utah law. 
g. Whether Heritage has been unjustly enriched. 
2. DEFENDANT'S CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW 
a. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim 
(1) Did Heritage as trustee have a fiduciary duty to Five F as 
trustor when its only relation with Five F was as a lender 
negotiating with Five F at arm's length? 
(2) In light of Utah Code Ann. § 57-l-27(l)(1988), did 
Heritage as trustee have any duty to consult with Five F 
about the trustee sale other than as to "the order in which 
the trust property shall be sold?" 
(3) Did Heritage as Trustee owe a fiduciary duty to Five F as 
trustor under the facts of this case? 
(4) After the relationship between Heritage and Five F had 
turned adversarial, did Heritage owe any fiduciary duty to 
Five F? 
(5) Can a trier of fact consider any evidence regarding the 
collateral property or its disposition after the trustee sale? 
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(6) Can Five F now seek punitive damages under its breach of 
fiduciary duty claim when it did not pray for such damages 
or allege wanton, intentional or reckless conduct in its 
complaint? 
(7) Can Five F now seek lost profits under its breach of 
fiduciary duty claim when it did not pray for such damages 
and absent expert testimony, evidence of profits of similar 
businesses or evidence of subsequent profits? 
b. Breach of Contract Claim 
(1) Did Heritage as lender or beneficiary have a contractual 
duty to bid at the trustee sale of the 10.4 acre parcel? 
(2) If Heritage decided to bid on the 10.4 acre parcel, did it 
have a contractual duty to bid the fair market value of the 
parcel or the amount of an appraisal in its possession? 
(3) Was Heritage as beneficiary entitled to bid an amount at the 
trustee sale on the 10.4 acre parcel that it determined 
necessary to avoid any risk of loss or protect its own 
interests? 
(4) Is the note, trust deed and bankruptcy plan ambiguous in 
any material respect? Is parol evidence of Five F's 
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purported expectations admissible where those expectations 
are nowhere reflected in the promissory note, trust deed, or 
confirmed plan? 
(5) As a matter of law, could Five F have a justified 
expectation as to what would be bid or accepted at the 
trustee sale other than the highest bid? 
(6) Once the trustee sale under the deed of trust occurred, if it 
complied with all statutory requirements, were Five F's 
rights folly extinguished with respect to the property sold? 
(7) Can the trier of fact consider any evidence regarding the 
collateral property or its disposition after the Trustee sale? 
(8) Does the party's contract in this case - that is, the 
promissory note, trust deed, and confirmed Chapter 11 plan 
- specifically authorize Heritage to foreclose against the 
10.4 acre parcel and then, if not paid in foil from that sale, 
foreclose against the four-plex and acquire both at the 
foreclosure sales by credit bid, thus precluding any claim 
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing as a matter of law? 
22 
(9) By conducting the two separate foreclosure sales in 
accordance with the terms of the confirmed chapter 11 
plan, was Heritage simply exercising its express contractual 
rights, thus precluding the assertion of any claim for breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing? 
(10) Do the obligations that Five F seeks to imply, through the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, result in a 
better contract for Five F than the contract that was actually 
entered into with Heritage and proposed by Five F in its 
chapter 11 plan, thus precluding the assertion of any claim 
for breach of implied covenant? 
(11) By pursuing this claim is Five F attempting to establish 
new, independent rights or duties, that were not created in 
the parties' contract, or agreed to by Heritage? 
(12) Where Heritage fully complied with all provisions of the 
Note, Trust Deed, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Plan and trust 
deed foreclosure statute, can it be held liable for breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing? 
(13) May Five F introduce evidence of lost profits when it did 
not pray for such damages and absent expert testimony, 
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evidence of profits of similar businesses or evidence of 
subsequent profits? 
(14) May Five F introduce evidence on Heritage's internal rate 
of return with respect to its breach of contract claim? 
c. Unjust Enrichment Claim 
(1) As a matter of law, can Five F bring a claim for unjust 
enrichment where there is an express contract governing 
the rights of Heritage and Five F in the event of a default 
on the Note by Five F? 
(2) Was Heritage unjustly enriched through its exercise of its 
contractually agreed upon foreclosure rights? 
(3) Does Five F's inequitable conduct in inducing Heritage to 
make the loan preclude it from obtaining the equitable 
remedy of unjust enrichment? 
d. Other 
(1) Is Five F's confirmed bankruptcy plan a bar to any or all of 
Five F's claims under a theory of judicial estoppel? 
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(2) As a matter of law, can Five F attack the validity of the 
Plan of Reorganization it successfully advanced in its 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding? 
(3) Did the Plan of Reorganization, advanced by Five F and 
adopted by the bankruptcy court, give Heritage the legal 
right to foreclose on the second parcel if it was not "paid in 
full" by foreclosure on the first parcel? 
(4) Under Rule 9(g), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, may Five 
F recover alleged damages consisting of lost profits and 
loss of good will, when such alleged damages were not 
specifically prayed for in Five F's Amended Complaint? 
(5) As a matter of law, if Five F's obligation to Heritage under 
the Note was not satisfied by the proceeds of the first 
trustee sale, was it entitled to proceed with the trustee sale 
on the second parcel? 
H. ATTORNEYS' FEES. The parties reserve their arguments, if any, regarding their 
right to attorneys' fees and their entitlement to attorneys' fees for later presentation to the Court. 
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I. EXHIBITS 
1. PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS. Five F's exhibits will be provided to Heritage 
by October 5,2001 by 10:00 a.m. 
2. DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS. Heritage's exhibits will be provided to Five 
F by October 5,2001 by 10:00 a.m. 
3. EXHIBITS IN CUSTODY OF COURT CLERK. Exhibits received in 
evidence and placed in the custody of the clerk may be withdrawn from the 
clerk's office upon signing of receipts therefor by the respective parties offering 
them. The exhibits shall be returned to the clerk's office within a reasonable time 
and in the meantime shall be available for inspection at the request of other 
parties. 
4. EXHIBITS IN CUSTODY OF PARTIES. Exhibits identified and 
offered that remain in the custody of the party offering them shall be made 
available for review by the offering party to any other party to the action that 
requests access to them in writing. 
5. AUTHENTICITY. The parties shall file any objection to the authenticity 
of proposed exhibits not later than five business days from receipt of an exhibit. 
The proposed exhibits are subject to all other objections, if any, by an opposing 
party at the trial. 
6. SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBITS. If exhibits other than those exchanged 
on the date stated above are to be offered, the existence of which could not have 
reasonably been anticipated, they will be submitted to opposing counsel at least 
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72 hours before their introduction at trial. The opposing party reserves its right to 
object to such exhibits, outside the presence of the jury, by objection at trial or on 
motion. 
7. IMPEACHMENT EXHIBITS. Any exhibits to be used for 
impeachment of a witness called by an opposing party that are not otherwise 
disclosed pursuant to another part of this Order to the extent their use can be 
reasonably anticipated, shall be submitted to opposing counsel by 5:00 p.m. on 
the day preceding their proposed use, provided that the Court may permit use of 
such exhibits on shorter notice upon a showing of good cause. The foregoing 
does not apply to the use of documents for impeachment purposes that a party 
does not intend to offer as an exhibit. A party may object to the admission of an 
exhibit introduced pursuant to the provisions of this paragraph upon a showing of 
undue surprise and prejudice caused by the failure of the proponent to disclose its 
intended use of the document earlier. 
8. DEMONSTRATIVE EXHIBITS. 
a. Enlargement of Exhibits. Each party may, for demonstrative 
purposes, enlarge any exhibit, provided that (i) a copy of the exhibit to be 
enlarged has been provided to opposing counsel; (ii) the exhibit has been 
properly offered into evidence; and (iii) the exhibit has been received by 
the Court. Each party reserves the right to object to use of any exhibit that 
has been enlarged. Enlarged exhibits shall be used during the trial only 
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and will not be received into evidence and will not accompany the jury 
into the jury room, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties. 
b. Other Demonstrative Exhibits. The parties need not exchange or 
identify demonstrative exhibits at the time that the parties exchange other 
exhibits on October 5, 2001. If a party intends to use a demonstrative 
exhibit at trial, it shall provide 24 hours notice to the opposing party so 
that objections, if any, to the use of the proposed demonstrative exhibit 
can be made and those objections resolved by the Court not later than the 
afternoon preceding the day on which the proposed demonstrative exhibit 
is to be used. 
c. Summaries of Voluminous Documents. Documents that 
constitute summaries pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 1006, which may be 
offered in evidence, also need not be identified at the time the parties 
exchange other exhibits on October 5, 2001. However, the categories of 
source documents for such potential summaries should be exchanged by 
the parties on October 5, 2001. Such documents shall be numbered as 
exhibits. The parties shall provide copies of such summaries that they 
intend to offer as exhibits on or before October 15, 2001. The parties may 
seek exceptions from the Court for good cause. 
9. USE OF EXHIBITS BY OTHER PARTY. Each party reserves the 
right to offer into evidence an exhibit identified by any other party. 
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10. NUMBERING OF EXHIBITS. Five F may number its proposed 
exhibits beginning "P-l" and continuing with the use of consecutive numbers. 
Heritage may number its proposed exhibits beginning with the letter "D" followed 
by the next consecutive number after the last number used by Five F. 
J. WITNESSES. 
1. In the absence of reasonable notice to opposing counsel to the contrary: 
a. Plaintiff will call as lay witnesses: 
1. Ray Fowler 
2. William T. Thurman 
3. Brian Chadaz 
4. Daniel Johnson 
5. Randy Rynearson 
6. Stan McConkie 
b. Plaintiff may call as lay witnesses: 
1. Cathy Fowler 
2. Brent Beesley 
3. Thomas Rich 
4. Any witness called by Defendant 
c. Expert witnesses Plaintiff will call at trial 
1. Derk Rasmussen, RGL Gallagher 
136 East So. Temple, Suite 1770 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 355-0400 
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d. Expert witnesses Plaintiff may call at trial 
1. John K.Bushnell, MAI 
3446 Chaparral Drive 
St. George, Utah 84790 
In the absence of reasonable notice to opposing counsel to the contrary2: 
a. Defendant will call as lay witnesses: 
1. Brent Beesley 
2. Brian Chadaz 
3. Raymond Fowler 
4. Bill Thurman 
b. Defendant may call as lay witnesses: 
1. Kathy Fowler 
2. Kerry Soper 
3. Gary Esplin, City Manager, St. George, Utah 
4. Tom Rich 
5. Any witness subpoenaed by plaintiff 
6. Any witness listed by plaintiff 
7. Any witness called by plaintiff 
c. Defendant will call as expert witnesses: 
1. Merrill Norman 
2. David Thomas 
* The parties reserve the right to call any witness listed here by deposition if such witness is unavailable. 
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d. Defendant may call as expert witnesses: 
1. None at this time. 
e. Defendant may call other rebuttal witnesses as needed. 
3. Testimony Offered by Deposition. A party intending to present 
testimony by deposition shall designate the portions of the deposition testimony to 
be presented not later than October 12, 2001. Cross-designations to such 
depositions shall be made not later than October 17, 2001. Further cross-
designations may be made upon reasonable notice to the opposing party, and in 
any event prior to trial. Exceptions may be made upon stipulation of the parties or 
by the Court for good cause shown. 
4. Other Witnesses. In the event that witnesses other than those listed are to 
be called to testify at the trial, a statement of their names, addresses, and the 
general subject matter of their testimony will be served upon opposing counsel on 
or before October 17, 2001. This restriction shall not apply to rebuttal witnesses 
whose testimony, where required, cannot be reasonably anticipated before the 
time of trial. 
5. Notice of Witnesses. Each party will provide to the other party two days 
advance notice of the witnesses (including witnesses whose testimony being 
offered by deposition), and the order in which it intends to call those witnesses on 
each trial day, subject to any unforeseeable changes in the length or scheduling of 
witnesses. 
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K. REQUESTS FOR INSTRUCTIONS. Requests for instructions to the jury and 
special requests for voir dire examination of the jury will be submitted on October 17, 2001, 
subject to further rulings of the Court. The parties reserve the right to supplement their proposed 
jury instructions, and such supplementation shall be submitted to opposing counsel and the Court 
no later than October 22, 2001. The parties shall submit two hard copy versions of proposed jury 
instructions: one with annotations, and the other without annotations, and also shall bring to trial 
these proposed jury instructions on computer discs, in Corel WordPerfect 8 format. 
L. TRIAL BRIEF. The parties may submit a trial brief to the Court and to opposing 
counsel by October 18,2001. 
M. AMENDMENTS TO PLEADINGS. Five F filed its First Amended Complaint 
on May 11, 1999. The deadline for amending pleadings as established by the Court has expired. 
There were no other requests to amend pleadings. 
N. DISCOVERY. Discovery has been completed. 
O. PENDING MOTIONS. The following motions are pending in whole or in part: 
1. Heritage's Motion In Limine Re: Damages Claims, which the Court took 
under advisement. 
2. Heritage's Motion In Limine Re: Certain Accounting Documents For The 
Five F Loan And Documents Produced By Deloitte & Touche, issues on which 
the Court reserved until the time of trial. 
3. The Court took under advisement the issue of whether Plaintiff could seek 
punitive damages. 
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P. JUROR NOTEBOOKS. At the commencement of deliberations, each juror may 
be provided with a notebook containing materials mutually agreed to by the parties, or otherwise 
ordered by the Court. The cost of such notebooks shall be borne by both parties equally. 
Q. SPECIAL VERDICT. The parties will submit a special verdict form to the 
Court on October 19, 2001. 
R. TRIAL SETTING. The case is set for a jury trial on October 22-26,2001 at 9:00 
a.m. at the Fifth Judicial District Courthouse, Washington County, Utah. Counsel for both parties 
shall arrive the first day of trial at 8:45 a.m. 
S. MODIFICATIONS TO PRETRIAL ORDER. The parties may request a 
modification of this order as a result of any subsequent rulings by the Court and/or intervening 
events that necessitate modification of this order. 
T. POSSIBILITY OF SETTLEMENT. Possibility of settlement is considered poor. 
DATED this day of October, 2001. 
BY THE COURT 
J. Philip Eves 
District Court Judge 
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The foregoing proposed pretrial order (prior to execution by the court) is hereby adopted this 
day of October, 2001. 
614360v3 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED PROPOSED 
PRETRIAL ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, on this | (# -"day of October, 2001 to the 
following: 
Benson L. Hathaway 
Aimee K. Martinez 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
P. O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0810 
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PROMISSORY NOTE 
Loan # 600416 
(Secured by Utah Deed of Trust) 
$ 1,200,000.00 September 12,1996 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned promises and agrees to pay 
to the order of Heritage Savings Bank, at its office located at 95 
East Tabernacle, St. George, Utah 84770, or at such other place as 
the holder hereof may designate in writing, the principal sum of 
One Million Two Hundred Thousand and tfo/lOQ— Dollars 
($1,200,000.00), or so much thereof as shall from time to time be 
advanced to the undersigned, in lawful money of the United States 
of America, together with interest on the unpaid balance thereof at 
the rate of Ten and One Quarter percent ( 10.25 %) per annum 
until paid. 
Monthly interest payments of $10,250.00t will be due on 
November 1, 1996 and again on December 1, 1996. 
All sums of principal and interest due under this Note shall 
be paid in full on December 31, 1996 
Prepayment of principal may occur hereunder at any time and 
without penalty. Any partial prepayment made under this Note shall 
not operate to postpone or suspend the obligation to make, and 
shall not have the effect of altering the size of the regularly 
scheduled installments provided for herein. 
In the event any installment or payment (including an 
installment or payment with respect to which the late charge 
provided for in this paragraph has previously been imposed) 
provided to be made hereunder, or under any instrument given to 
secure the payment of the obligations evidenced hereby, has not 
been paid in full on or before ten (10) days after the payment is 
due, the holder hereof shall have the right to demand of and 
receive from the undersigned a late charge equal to five percent 
(5%) of the entirety of such installment or payment. 
In the event: (1) any installment or payment provided for 
hereunder is not paid in full within fifteen (15) days after its 
scheduled due date; or (2) the undersigned defaults in tne 
performance of any covenant or promise contained herein or in any 
instrument given to secure the payment of the obligations evidenced 
hereby; or (3) a petition is filed seeking tnat any cf the 
undersigned be adjudged a oankrupt; or (4) any of the undersigned 
makes a general assignment for the benefit of creditors; or (5) any 
of the undersigned suffers the appointment of a receiver; or (6) 
any of the undersigned becomes insolvent or undergoes liquidation, 
termination, or dissolution; then, in any of such events, the 
entire remaining unpaid balance of both principal and interest 
owing hereunder, shall, at the option of the holder hereof and 
without notice of demand, become immediately due and payable. 
Thereafter, said unpaid balance, with interest, shall, until paid 
and both before and after judgment, earn interest at the rate of 
eighteen percent (18%) per annum- The acceptance of any 
installment or payment after the occurrence of a default or event 
giving rise to the right of acceleration provided for in this 
paragraph shall not constitute a waiver of such right of 
acceleration with respect to such default or event or any 
subsequent default or event. 
In the event any payment under this Note is not made, or any 
obligation provided to be satisfied or performed under any 
instrument given to secure the obligation evidenced hereby is not 
satisfied or performed, at the time and in the manner required, the 
undersigned agrees to pay any and all costs and expenses 
(regardless of the particular nature thereof and whether or not 
incurred in conjunction with litigation, before or after judgment, 
or in connection with exercise of the power of sale provided for in 
the Deed of Trust securing this Note) which may be incurred by the 
holder hereof in connection with the enforcement of any of its 
rights under this Note or under any such other instrument, 
including court costs and reasonable Trustee's and attorney's fees. 
In the event of any other legal action regarding this Note, its 
terms or the interpretation of its provisions, the undersigned 
agrees to pay the costs and attorney's fees of the holder incurred 
in connection with any such action. 
Notwithstanding any other provision contained in this Note or 
in any instrument given to secure the obligation evidenced hereby: 
(1) the rates of interest charges, and penalties provided for 
herein and therein shall in no event exceed the rates, charges, and 
penalties which result in interest being charged at a rate equaling 
the maximum allowed by law; and (2) if, for any reason whatsoever, 
the holder hereof ever receives as interest in connection with the 
transaction of which this Note is a part, an amount which would 
result in interest being charged at a rate exceeding the maximum 
allowed by law, such amount or portion thereof as would otherwise 
be excessive interest shall automatically be applied toward 
reduction of the unpaid principal balance then outstanding 
hereunder and not toward payment of interest. 
The maker, sureties, guarantors, and endorsers hereof 
severally waive presentment for payment, protest, demand, notice of 
protest, notice of dishonor, and notice of nonpayment, and 
expressly agree that this Note, or any payment hereunder, may be 
expended from time to time by the holder hereof without in any way 
affecting the liability of such parties. This Note shall be the 
Join:: and several obligation of all makers, sureties, guarantors, 
and endorser, and shall be binding upon their respective heirs, 
personal representatives, successors, and assigns. In the event: 
any of the undersigned is a partnership or corporation, each person 
executing this instrument: on behalf of such entity individually and 
personally represents and warrants that this Note and each 
instrument signed in the name of such entity and delivered to 
secure the obligation evidenced hereby is in all respects binding 
upon such entity as an act and obligation of said partnership or 
corporation. 
Time is of the essence of this Note and each of the provisions 
hereof. 
This Note, given in consideration of a loan made by the payee 
hereof to the undersigned, is principally secured by a Deed of 
Trust covering real property situated in Washington County, State 
of Utah. This Note shall be governed by and construed in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
FIVE F L.L.C. 
CATHY7Q. FOWLER, MEMBER Raymoofci K. F o w l e r 
Managing Member 
BY: r7~?>L 
CATHY/J7. FOWLcR, 
as arPindividual 
12^^> By: / ^\^7P<^nn 
Raymond K.Fowler 
As an Individual 
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
Heritage Savings Bank 
94 E. Tabernacle 
St. George, Utah 84770 
TRUST DEED 
With Assignment of Rents 
THIS TRUST DEED, made this 12th day of September, 1996, 
between FIVE F L.L.C., as TRUSTOR, whose address is 1342 EAST 1250 
South, St. George, Utah 84770, HERITAGE SAVINGS BANK, as TRUSTEE, 
and HERITAGE SAVINGS BANK, as BENEFICIARY; 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN 
TRUST, WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, 
situated in Washington County, State of Utah: ^ ^ ^ „
 rtrtB--, 
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Together with all buildings, fixtures, and improvements 
thereon and all water rights, rights of way, easements, rents, 
issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges, and 
appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed 
with said property, or any part thereof, SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the 
right, power, and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon 
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness 
evidenced by a promissory note of even date herewith, in the 
principal amount of $ 1,200,000.00 , made by Trustor, payable to 
the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner, and with 
interest as therein set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals 
or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of each agreement of 
Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans 
or advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor, or its successors 
or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note or notes reciting 
that it is secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all 
sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the 
terms hereof, together with interest thereon as herein provided. 
TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF THIS TRUST DEED, TRUSTOR AGREES: 
1. To keep said property in good condition and repair; not 
to remove or demolish any building thereon; to complete or restore 
promptly and in good and workmanlike manner any building which may 
be constructed, damaged, or destroyed thereon; to comply with all 
laws, covenants,"and restrictions affecting said property; not to 
commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit, suffer, or permit 
any act upon said property in violation of law; to do all other 
acts which from the character or use of said property may be 
reasonably necessary, the specific enumerations herein not 
excluding the general; and, if the loan secured hereby or any part 
thereof is being obtained for the purpose of financing construction 
of improvements on said property, Trustor further agrees: 
(a) To commence construction promptly and to pursue same 
with reasonable diligence to completion in accordance with plans 
and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and 
(b) To allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at all 
times during construction. 
Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed 
by Beneficiary setting forth facts showing a default by Trustor 
under this numbered paragraph, is authorized to accept as true and ^ 
conclusive all facts and statements therein, and to act thereon £ 
hereunder. § 
% 
2. To provide and maintain insurance, of such type or types fa 
and amounts as Beneficiary may require, on the improvements now fg 
existing or hereafter erected or placed on said property. Such H 
insurance shall be carried in companies approved by Beneficiary 
w i t h Infif i n f l u a h l o r l a n c A C i n f a w ^ r r^-C ^^A i *-, -P^ -*-™
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Beneficiary. In event of loss, Trustor shall give immediate notice 
to Beneficiary, who may make proof of loss, and each insurance 
company concerned is hereby authorized and directed to make payment 
for such loss directly to Beneficiary instead of to Trustor and 
Beneficiary jointly, and the insurance proceeds, or any part 
thereof, may be applied by Beneficiary, at its option, to reduction 
of the indebtedness hereby secured or to the restoration or repair 
of the property damaged. 
3. To deliver to, pay for, and maintain with Beneticiary, 
until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full, such 
evidence of title as Beneficiary may require, including abstracts 
of title or policies of title insurance and any extensions or 
renewals thereof or supplements thereto. 
4. To appear in and defend any action or proceeding 
purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to said 
property, or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; and 
should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to also appear in or defend any 
such action or proceeding, to pay all costs and expenses, including 
cost of evidence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum, 
incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee. 
5. To pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and 
assessments affecting said property, including all assessments upon 
water company stock and all rents, assessments, and charges for 
water, appurtenant to or used in connection with said property; to 
pay, when due, all encumbrances, charges, and liens, with interest, 
on said property or any part thereof, which at any time appear to 
be prior or superior hereto; and to pay all costs, fees, and 
expenses of this Trust. 
tj, Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act 
as herein provided, then Beneficiary or Trustee, but without 
obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor 
and without releasing Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: 
Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may 
deem necessary to protect the security hereof, Beneficiary or 
Trustee being authorized to enter upon said property for such 
purposes; commence, appear in, and defend any action or proceeding 
purporting to affect the security hereof or the rights or powers of 
Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase, contest, or compromise any 
encumbrance, charge, or lien which in the judgment of either 
appears to be prior or superior hereto; and in exercising any such 
powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its 
absolute discretion it may deem necessary therefor, including cost 
of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees. 
Lo pay immediately and with demand all oum& expended 
hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, with interest from date of 
expenditure at the rate of ten and one quarter percent (10.25%) per 
annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be secured 
hereby. If not paid within thirty (15) days of written demand, 
interest shall accrue at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per 
annum. 
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT: ^ ^ ^ ._-.„_ _ ^  _ __
 n ^ ^ ^ ^ 
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8. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or 
damaged by reason of any public improvement or condemnation 
proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other 
manner, Beneficiary shall be entitled to all compensation, awards, 
and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its 
option to commence, appear in, and prosecute in its own name any 
action or proceedings, or to make any compromise or settlement, in 
connection with such taking or damage. All such compensation, £ 
awards, damages, rights of action and proceeds, including the o 
proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting said § 
property, are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may, after O 
deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorney's fees, £ 
apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. Trustor agrees 2 
to execute such further assignments of any compensation, award, W 
damages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary oi "" 
Trustee may require. 
9. At any time and from time to time upon written request of 
Beneficiary, payment of its fees, and presentation of this Trust 
Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, 
for cancellation and retention), without affecting the liability of 
any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby, 
Trustee may (a) consent to the making of any map or plat of said 
property; (b) join in granting any easement or creating any 
restriction thereon; C join in any subordination or other agreement 
affecting this Trust Deed or the lien or charge thereof; (d) 
reconvey, without warranty, all or any part^ of said property. The 
grantee in any reconveyance may be described as "the person or 
persons entitled thereto," and the recitals therein of any matters 
or facts shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof. 
Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the 
services mentioned in this paragraph. 
10. As additional security, Trustor hereby assigns to 
Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all rents, 
issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this 
Trust Deed and of any personal property located thereon. Until 
Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured 
hereby or in the performance of any agreement hereunder, Trustor 
shall have the right to collect all such rents, issues, royalties, 
and profits earned prior to default as they become due and payable. 
If Trustor shall default as aforesaid, Trustor's right to collect 
any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall have the 
right, with or without taking possession of the property affected 
hereby, to collect all rents, royalties, issues, and profits. All 
persons obligated to pay such rents or other obligations at any 
time during the term of this Trust Deed are hereby authorized and 
directed by Trustor to pay same to Beneficiary upon demand by it. 
Failure or discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time 
to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any manner affect 
the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and 
authority to collect the same. Nothing contained herein, nor the 
exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or be 
construed to be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, 
lease, or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a 
subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such 
tenancy, lease, or option. 
II Upon any default by Trustor hereunder, Beneficiary may at 
any time without notice, either in person, by agent, or by a 
receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to 
the appointment of Beneficiary as such receiver), and without 
regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby 
secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any 
part thereof, in its own name sue for or otherwise collect said 
rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, 
and apply the same, less costs and expenses of operation and 
collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any 
indebtedness secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may 
determine. 
12. The entering upon and taking possession of said property, 
the collection of such rents, issues, and profits, or the proceeds 
of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for 
any taking or damage of said property, and the application or 
release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any default 
or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant 
t o such n o t i c e .
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13. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly 
enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as a waiver of such 
right, and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not £ 
constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent default. 2 
o 
14. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor O 
in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the j5 
performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby 2 
shall immediately become due and payable at the option of H 
Beneficiary. In the event of such default, Beneficiary may execute 
or cause Trustee to execute a written notice of default and of 
election to cause said property to be sold to satisfy the 
obligations hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record 
in each county wherein said property or some part or parcel thereof 
is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee the note 
and all documents evidencing expenditures secured hereby. 
15. After the lapse of such time as may then be required by 
law following the recordation of said notice of default, and notice 
of default and notice of sale having been given as then required by 
law, Trustee, without demand on Trustor, shall sell said property 
on the date and at the time and place designated in said notice of 
sale, either as a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order 
as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor 
to direct the order in which such property, if consisting of 
several known lots or parcels, shall be sold), at public auction to 
the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of 
the United States at the time of sale. The person conducting the 
sale may, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from 
time to time until it shall be completed and, in every case, notice 
of postponement shall be given by public declaration thereof by 
such person at the time and place last appointed for the sale; 
provided, if the sale is postponed for longer than one day beyond 
the day designated in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be 
given in the same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee 
shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs 
and expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, 
including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's fees; (2) 
cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale 
and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; (3) all sums expended under 
the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 10% per 
annum from date of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured 
hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or persons 
legally entitled thereto; or the Trustee, in its discretion, may 
deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County Clerk of the 
county in which the sale took place. 
16. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary 
shall have the option to declare all sums secured hereby immedi-
ately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner 
provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property, 
and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceeding all 
costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the court. 
17. Beneficiary may appoint a successor Trustee at any tim< 
by filing for record, in the office of the County Recorder of each 
county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a 
substitution of trustee. From the time the substitution is filed 
for record, the new Trustee shall succeed to all the powers, 
duties, authority, and title of the Trustee named herein or of any 
successor Trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and 
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof 
made, in the manner provided by law. 0 0 5 4 3 7 3 5 B K 1 0 3 5 IMHI I 
18. This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, 
and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, devisees, 
administrators, executors, successors, and assigns. All 
obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and several. The term 
"Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any 
pledgee, of the note secured hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever 
the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine 
and/or neuter, and the singular number includes the plural. 
l!i. Trustee accepts this Trust when tins Iiust Deed, duly >^ 
executed and acknowledged, is made a public record as provided by & 
law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of o 
pending sale under any other Trust Deed or of any action or § 
proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be H < 
party, unless brought by Titibtee. M 
>0, This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the law 53 
of the State of Utah. 
21. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any 
notice of default and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to 
it at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
FIVE F L, I..C 
CATHY O ^ W L E R , MEMBER ^ ^ RAYMOND K. FOWLER 
Managing Member 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY UK WASHlNL/HlN 
; f J s . 
On the 12th day of September 1996 personally 
appeared before me Raymond K. Fowler, who being by me duly sworn 
did say that he is the Managing Member, of Five F L.L.C., a Utah 
Limited Liability Company and that the within and foregoing 
instrument was signed in behalf of said company by authority of a 
resolution of its board of directors and said Raymond K. Fowler 
duly acknowledged to me that said company executed the same. 
tmt NOTAf?[7pUBL,c 
s : M y - e d m m i s ^ ? ^ V ^ ^ 
17-ftfi-Q7rcEOftCE. i m e t 77o • 
sOcC 2H9D7 j 
LAfcftY T. BLAKE 
G e o r g e , UT 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
On the 12th day of September, 199b, personally appeared before me LATHY 0. IdWIl 
who being by me duly sworn did say that she is a member, of Five F L.L.C., a Utah 
Limited Liability Company and that the within and foregoing instrument was signed in 
behalf of said company by authority of a resolution of its board of directors and said 
Raymond K. Fowler duly acknowledge tor4ae_ttiat said company executed the same. 
Commission Expires: 
12-28-97 . 
R 
If^TJ. BLAKE 
Rent F«~» r w * )w~«* wnrx *~m nn« unq rnm &m ra 
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BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR. (Bar No. 4219) 
RICHARD J. ARMSTRONG (Bar No. 7461) 
STTRBA & HATHAWAY 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-8300 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DIST.RICT CO URT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIVE F, L L C , 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
HERITAGE SAVINGS BANK, 
Defendant. 
PlaintiffFive F, L.L.C., by and through counsel undersigned, hereby submits the following 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. 
INTRODUCTION 
This case involves a Promissory Note executed by Plaintiff, and payable to Defendant. AS 
collateral security for the Note, Plaintiff provided Defendant a trust deed on two parcels of real 
property. Plaintiff was unable to pay the principal when due and the obligation fell into default. As 
a result, Defendant, pursuant to its security interest, non-judicially foreclosed on one of the parcels 
of real property by conducting a trustee's sale. The only bidder at the sale was Defendant, who credit 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 
ORDER 
civil NO. (liOSb lljtj . 
t 
seeking a preliminary injunctioi i, I "iaintiff seeks merely to maintain the status qi 10 di u ii ig the penci sncy 
of this litigation, so as to maintain the interests of its business. Any possible harm to Defendant that 
may arise as a result of granting the restraining order is clearly inconsequential. Defendant does not 
stand to lose the v all ic of the si lb ject propei ty, since it has already received, through non-judicial 
foreclosure proceedings, an asset that is worth more than what Defendant bid and subsequently paid 
for it. I he fourplex at issi le is i not a higl ily liqi rid asset ai id tl lerefore its v alue is i lot si isceptible to 
fluctuations which would injure Defendant's interest in the asset The instant case presents an 
emergency which should not require Plaintiff to make the same showing of hardship that would be 
needed to be si IOW n to si istain. a finding in favor of Plaintiff later on in tl lis case. Simply stated, the 
hardship that Plaintiff will suffer if the restraining order does not issue outweighs any hardship that 
Defei idai it i \ ill likely suffei if the restraii ling order does issue. 
C. Public Interest 
The public interest can only be advanced by issuing a temporary restraining ordei iii this case. 
If r v v - , * » foreclose on Plaintiffs second property without first being required to 
apply a fair market value offset to the earlier foreclosure, then Defendant will receive a substantial 
windfall as Plaintiff s ei editoi , at Plaintiffs expense and detrimei it. "1 he public interest is i lot sei ' red 
in such a situation, since creditors should only be allowed to execute in cases of default on property 
for amounts that equal the amount of the outstanding loan balance. . \ . A m L;C demonstrated below, 
such - ,( • .rpose behind Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32. Under this provision, Defendant is prevented 
from making an unreasonably low bid at the earlier foreclosure sale, acquiring the asset below its 
value, ai id then foreclosii ig on additional property for the deficiency. 
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I ikelihood oj Sue xess on the Merits 
A plaintiff moving for a temporary restraining order need only show a reasonable probability 
of success on the merits, not an overwhelming likelihood of such success. See Atchison v. Topeka 
& Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255, 261 (lutn v_n. ivM;, Gilder v. PGA Tour, Inc., 
936 F.2d 417, 422 (9th Cir 1991) Such likelihood is otherwise described as "a fair chance of 
success oi I tl le i nei its." Johnson v. California State Bd. of Accountancy, 520 I \2d 344, 349- 50 (9th 
Cir. 1975). Where the balance of factors tips toward the moving party, a preliminary injunction may 
issue if such party "has raised questions so serious and difficult as to call for more deliberate 
investigation " Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C.L. Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir !'l,Kl). 
The law governing the instant case indicates that Plaintiff will likely succeed on the merits 
i inciei 1) lug tl le instai it actioi i. Ii litially, the general rule govei i rii ig a ci eclitoi \s i ight to ii istigate ai \y 
action to obtain a deficiency against a debtor is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1994). This 
law states as follows: 
^
 any j j m e wj thjn three months after any sale of property under a trust deed, as 
hereinabove provided, an action may be commenced to recover the balance due upon 
the obligation for which the trust deed was given as security, and in such action tlic 
complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the indebtedness which was secured by 
such trust deed, the amount for which such property was sold, and the fair market 
value thereof at the date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the 
fair market value at the date of sale of the property sold. The court may not render 
judgment for more than the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with 
interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds 
the fair market value of the property as of the date of the sale. In any action brought 
under this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and 
reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an action under this section. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (1994). 
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"It is cieai I'iuin tliu plain language of [t: / ' ^ ••_*-w * ^ K^-1 K -
apply to any action to recover the balance due on the obligation secured by a trust deed, following 
a nonjudicial sale." Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 892 P.2d 1, 2 ( L L H IV^5 , : emphasis in qi i :>ted 
i '. J, w nether the action is judicial or nonjudicial, the fair market value credit provision 
.r. s v~-l-32 applies to limit a creditor in foreclosing against a debtor's assets, secured by a trust 
* '%-.'. • . > • a deficiency,, As stated by California's appellate coin ts, stati ites si ich as § 
57-1-32 are to be read liberally to effectuate the legislative purposes underlying them, including to 
prevent a multiplicity of actions and to prevent the creditor from making an unreasonably Jot\ bid at 
the foreclosure sale, acquiring the asset below its value, and also recovering a deficiency against the 
debtor. See Bank of America Natl Trust v. Graves. 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 288, 290 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1996),,, 
In this case, Defendant's planned action of selling the fourplex property at a non-judicial 
foreclosure sale flies in the face of the policies and the rule stated in § ^ ?-1 • \ " UeIenJ.ini • In. n lo 
bid below the 10-acre's fair market value. The property appraised at $1,640,000, as compared to the 
loan obligation to Defendant amounted to approximately $1,285 million. Now, after the sale, 
Defendant seeks contini led non, ji idicial actioi t to obtain a deficiency against Plaintiff Had fair market 
value been bid at the time of the first trustee's sale, a deficiency would not now exist, and Plaintiff 
would be relieved of his obligations. As a, i nattei of law, I Maintiff is entitled to have its loai I obligation 
to Defendant offset by the fair market value of the 10-acre property as it existed at the time of that 
property's foreclosure. Only in this way will the purpose behind § 57-1-32 be fulfilled. See Surety 
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30. Five F disputes Heritage's Statement of Fact paragraph 30 in the following 
particulars. Fundamentally, Five F's claim is that Heritage breached its fiduciary obligations as a 
trustee, 
by, among other things, not allowing Five F to participate and give 
direction in the order in which the property securing the trust deed 
was to be sold; by selling the parcels of property at separate Sheriffs 
Sales; by acting directly as trustee for purposes of the sale when it 
was itself also the beneficiary under the trust deed note; by accepting 
a credit bid in an amount substantially less than the value of the real 
property; by not taking any action whatsoever to protect the interest 
of the trustor in the real property and under its obligations under the 
Note and Trust Deed; and, as otherwise shown at trial. 
See Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, \ 26. By acting as both trustee and beneficiary, Heritage 
was able to orchestrate the calculation of its credit bid and facilitate the actual credit bid made on 
both the 10.44 acres and subsequently on the fourplex to enable it to consume all of Five F's real 
property, which it knew at the time were appraised at values in substantial excess of the amounts 
owed and credit bid, and still enable itself to seek a deficiency for the cash rents collected pursuant 
to the Bankruptcy Court's order. See Chadaz Deposition, 112:13-116:13, and 125:2-128:21, 
Exhibit D. Mr. Fowler also testified as follows: 
Q: Do you claim that Heritage at any point in your relationship 
with it attempted to deceive you? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Okay. Tell me what that was. 
A: When they failed to live up to their fiduciary responsibilities 
as trustee. When they under credit bid less than fair market 
value for the properties. When they turned-sent their 
attorneys to turn down a in-the-bag sale, a confirmed sale, 
where all the creditors would be paid. I think-I think there's 
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I would have been consulted about the ramifications of the sale of the property." See id., Vol. II, 
182:7-183:2. Mr. Fowler testified further that he believed Heritage's failure to approach him with 
their intention to low-ball the credit bid was a violation of the duty. See id., Vol. II, 184:5-16. The 
sum total of Heritage's conduct acting as trustee and beneficiary was to "put itself in a position so 
that it could then foreclose on the second piece of property." See id., Vol. II, 191:16-192:10. 
In considering Heritage's fiduciary obligations, it is logically impossible to delineate 
between its function as trustee and beneficiary. To this end, it is undisputed that Heritage credit bid 
and accepted its own credit bid of $ 1,090,000 at the foreclosure sale of a piece of property Heritage, 
as trustee and beneficiary, knew had recently been appraised for as much as $ 1,640,000 and as little 
as $1,380,000, when the amount owed by Five F on the Promissory Note according to Heritage's 
calculations was at the time approximately $1,314,000. See Chadaz Deposition, 114:14-115:3, 
Exhibit D. It is also undisputed that the credit bid amount calculated by Heritage of $ 1,090,000 was 
based only on its internal figures for the purpose of leaving a deficient amount sufficient to enable 
it to foreclose on the fourplex. None of this information was provided to Mr. Fowler of Five F. See 
id., 115:4-116:13. 
Similarly, in determining the amount to bid at the subsequent foreclosure sale of the 
fourplex, Heritage, determined a credit bid of $210,000 specifically for the purpose of enabling it 
to gobble up rents which had been generated at the fourplex and held pursuant to the Bankruptcy 
Court order. This bid amount was determined by Heritage knowing full well that it was less than 
the amount owed by Five F by about $29,000, and that the Bank had received appraisals of the 
fourplex at approximately $306,000. See Chadaz Deposition, 125:2-128:18, Exhibit D. Heritage 
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giving rise to Five F's claim. At bottom, Five F has endeavored to perform precisely as it agreed 
in its Promissory Note and Trust Deed, namely to repay a loaned principal amount with interest and 
attorney's fees. 
A. Judicial Estoppel Does Not Preclude Five F's claim. 
The Utah Court of Appeals' language relied on by Heritage in support of its argument that 
the doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes Five F's claim is fatal to, and highlights the absurdity of 
Heritage's position. Specifically, the court states that "a party with knowledge of the facts . . ." will 
not be allowed to take a position in subsequent litigation which contradicts a petition taken prior 
litigation. See Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah App. 
1990). Even if Five F has now taken a position different than it has taken in its confirmed Plan of 
Reorganization or at any other point in any other litigation, which it most decidedly has not, 
Heritage cannot reasonably suggest that Five F was aware of all of the facts. Heritage had no 
meaningful communications with Five F from the time the Note went into default until the present. 
Five F did not receive statements or accounting or any other documents aside from the notice of 
trustee's sale documents, from the time of default until the commencement of this suit. See Chadaz 
Deposition, 137:1-139:3, Exhibit D. Heritage, without the knowledge, consent or notice to Five F, 
devised its artifice to enable the foreclosure on all of the property and the assertions of a deficiency 
claim on rents collected pursuant to the Bankruptcy Court's order sometime in early July 1998, long 
after the Plan of Reorganization was entered into. See Disputed Fact paragraphs 26 and 27 supra. 
It strains reason to suggest that Five F upon negotiating its Plan of Reorganization in January 1998, 
had to anticipate Heritage's conduct that amounts to a breach of an obligation of good faith, much 
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balance owed, plus interest and attorney's fees, though nothing more. This position was in the 
language of Five F's Plan: 
In the event the real property has not sold by May 31, 1998, or 
[Heritage] is not paid the allowed amount of its claim by that date, 
[Heritage] may continue its foreclosure proceeding on that property 
in accordance with state law. In the event of such foreclosure and 
should [Heritage] not be paid in full therefrom, [Heritage] may then 
continue its foreclosure proceedings on the fourplex . . . 
See Five F's Plan of Reorganization ^ 6.3, Exhibit B, [emphasis added.] Five F does not agree to 
anything more than its obligations under its Note and Trust Deed. Second, in order for Heritage's 
res judicata argument to succeed, the claims of breach of fiduciary duty, breach of covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing and unjust enrichment included in Five F's present complaint, are claims which 
"could have been raised" in Five F's bankruptcy proceeding. See Searle at 690. It is unreasonable 
for Heritage to suggest that Five F knew, should have or could have known, when it negotiated its 
Plan of Reorganization in January of 1998, that Heritage, in July of 1998, would orchestrate its 
credit bidding at the foreclosure sale of Five F's property in such a way as to allow Heritage to 
foreclose on the 10.4 acres, the fourplex and still seek a deficiency for rents collected according to 
the Bankruptcy Court's order. 
V. HERITAGE HAS OBTAINED A WINDFALL FROM ITS COLLATERAL. 
Heritage presently owns 10.4 acres along River Road in St. George, Utah, which was 
appraised in September 1996 for $ 1,640,000, was subsequently appraised in November 1997 by Dan 
Johnson, the Bank's appraiser, at $1,850,000, and was appraised by the Bank again in 1998, when 
apparently it was not satisfied with Mr. Johnson's reassessment of the value, at $1,380,000. There 
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is no evidence that the value of real property located on River Road in St. George, Utah has gone 
down in value since 1996. Johnson Deposition, 33:16-36:19, Exhibit E. 
Heritage also foreclosed and credit bid $210,000 on a fourplex which it sold within three 
weeks for $280,000. Chadaz Deposition, 129:9-23, Exhibit D. Heritage claims in this action a 
deficiency of approximately $25,000 which arises from rents collected by Five F from the fourplex 
pursuant to the Bankruptcy Court's order. In addition, according to Mr. Chadaz, Heritage carries 
on its books a balance owed on Five F's loan of $1,330,582.74, notwithstanding it has foreclosed 
and taken all the collateral pledged under the September 12, 1996 Promissory Note. On the other 
hand, Five F has nothing. All of its assets have been foreclosed upon by Heritage and the amassed 
amount of rents collected while in bankruptcy are subject to Heritage's claim of deficiency. 
Possession by Heritage of all of Five F's real property, together with Heritage's apparently insatiable 
appetite for more cash, arises from Five F's September 12, 1996 agreement to repay a loan of 
$1,200,000, plus interest and attorney's fees in the event of default as necessary. Heritage has 
indeed received a windfall and has been excessively compensated as a consequence of the 
unfortunate default by Five F on its Note and Trust Deed. This being so, Heritage still asserts that 
it is owed $1,330,585.72, plus the deficiency against the rents it claims in this action. See Heritage 
Memorandum, p. 23. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Five F respectfully requests that Heritage's Motion for 
Summary Judgment be denied. 
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FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FIVE F, L.L.C., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
HERITAGE SAVINGS BANK, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF FIVE F'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO HERITAGE'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 98-0501814 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
Plaintiff, Five F, L.L.C. (hereinafter "Five F", by and through undersigned counsel, 
respectfully submits this memorandum in opposition of Defendant's, Heritage Saving Bank 
(hereinafter, "Heritage") motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs first 
amended complaint. 
INTRODUCTION 
Heritage contends that summary judgment should be granted as to Five F's claims of breach 
of fiduciary duty, breach of contract and unjust enrichment, since, it reasons, Five F did not provide 
an expert witness to define the standard of care as proof of its claims, since it is "[ijmplicit in each 
of Plaintiff s claims [that] Heritage breached some duty of care . . . " See Heritage's Memorandum 
in Support Page 2. As a threshold matter, "standard of care" is not implicated, by Five F or by law, 
in claims brought for breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing or unjust 
enrichment. Affording Heritage the most liberal construction of the authorities cited in its 
memorandum can, at best, only extend its suggested analysis to Five F's claim of breach of fiduciary 
duty. However, while the determination of whether the relationship between parties gives rise to a 
fiduciary duty, and whether that duty is breached by the conduct of Heritage as trustee, as previously 
determined by this Court, are issues of fact left to the trier of fact; the fiduciary duty, and 
specifically that duty between a trustee and a trustor, has been previously established as a matter of 
law by Utah Supreme Court precedent. 
Further, the testimony of Professor Thomas, proferred by Heritage in support of its motion 
is, according to Professor Thomas' own imprimatur, merely his view of how the judge and jury in 
this case should hold. Consequently it is improper and should be excluded under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 702, 703, and 704. Professor Thomas' fantasy that the "relief sought by [Five F] is not 
sanctioned or authorized by any known legal rule or ruling . . ." is, in any event, wrong. As has 
previously been fully briefed, argued and ruled upon by this Court the legal basis for Five F's claim 
under breach of fiduciary duty exists under the Utah Supreme Court's Rulings in First Security Bank 
of Utah v. Banberr)? Crossing, etal, 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989); mdBlodgettv. Martsch, 590 P.2d 
298 (Utah 1978). Five F's claims for breach of contract and breach of covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing are grounded in St. Benedicts Dev. Co. v. St. Benedicts Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991) 
and its progeny, together with fundamental contract law, known to any first year lawyer. Its unjust 
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enrichment claim is grounded in the long-established equitable principles articulated in American 
Towers Assoc. , Inc. v. CCIMechanical, 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996). Professor Thomas' review 
apparently overlooked these Utah Supreme Court decisions. 
STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS 
Five F responds to Heritage's Statement of Undisputed Facts as follows, referencing the 
numbers used by Heritage designating "Undisputed Facts" in its Memorandum in Support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
1. Five F disputes Heritage's so called "Statement of Fact" paragraph 1. Whether or 
not proof of a standard of care is required under the analysis of each of Five F's claims is a question 
of law, and not an issue of fact. Further, Five F includes claims in its complaint for breach of 
fiduciary duty, breach of contract, including the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust 
enrichment. A copy of Five F's Amended Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". Whether 
a litigant must present evidence of a standard of care through expert testimony in a context of a 
breach of fiduciary duty claim is more fully addressed below. As to Five F's claim of breach of 
contract and the implicit covenant of good faith and fair dealing, there is no divinable requirement 
of proof of standard of care. It is Hornbrook Book Law that whether or not a contract has been 
breached is determined by the fact finder's application of the terms of the agreement between the 
parties, as determined as a matter of law by the court, to the conduct of the parties. If the conduct 
is inconsistent with the express terms of the parties' agreement, a breach has occurred. Further, if 
one party acts inconsistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of the 
other, effectively depriving the other of the fruits of its agreement, the covenant of good faith and 
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fair dealing has been breached. See St. Benedicts Dev. Co. at 200; Cook v. Zions First National 
Bank, 919 P.2d 57, 60 (Utah App. 1996). 
To prevail on a claim of unjust enrichment, Five F must prove that it conferred a benefit on 
Heritage, that Heritage knew of the benefit, and Heritage's retention of the benefit is conferred under 
circumstances as would make it inequitable for it to retain the benefit, without compensating Five 
F for its value. See American Towers Assoc, Inc. at 1192. There is no requirement of proof of 
standard of care through expert testimony as part of the proof required in Five F's Second and Third 
Claims for Relief. 
2. Five F does not dispute that it has not retained an expert to testify as to Heritage's 
standard of care. Five F disputes, however, that it must, as a matter of law, retain such an expert, 
as more folly set forth below. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN SUPPORTING A PRIMA FACIE CASE AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANT. 
Five F does not dispute the legal standard articulated by Heritage in its first point of its 
memorandum. Five F has previously satisfied this burden in regard to all the elements of its claims 
against Heritage, as determined by this Court in its May 22, 2000 Memorandum Opinion. A copy 
of the Courts May 22,2000 Memorandum Opinion is attached hereby as Exhibit "B". The real point 
of Heritage's Motion is Five F's failure to offer expert testimony of standard of care, not an alleged 
general failure of proof. 
II. PROOF OF STANDARD OF CARE THROUGH EXPERT TESTIMONY 
UNNECESSARY IN DETERMINING TRUSTEES LEGAL DUTY TO TRUSTOR. 
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Heritage relies on three cases, Keller v. Albright, 1 F.Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Utah 1977); Preston 
& Chambers, P. C v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260 (Utah Ct App. 1997); Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 
780 P.2d 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), to support its argument that Five F must prove standard of care 
through expert testimony to prevail on all its claims. Heritage is correct in generally stating that in 
negligence cases involving trades or professions outside the knowledge of the lay person, the 
standard of care must be established by expert testimony. For example, in Keller v. Albright, and 
Preston & Chambers, P. C v. Koller, the plaintiff and defendant/counter claim plaintiff, respectively, 
asserted claims of legal malpractice. Both courts cited a long string of cases involving medical 
malpractice, architectural malpractice, engineering malpractice, legal malpractice, and insurance 
coverage, in concluding "where the average person has little understanding of the duties owed by 
particular trades professions", expert testimony is required. Keller at 1281 andPreston & Chambers 
at 263. In Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, where the finder of fact was ultimately to decide 
whether the trustee was negligent in reconveying the trustee property and releasing Wycalis' 
corresponding security interest based on a forged request for reconveyance, the Utah Court of 
Appeals determined that evidence of the standard of care for trustees might be helpful See Wycalis 
at 823. According to the Court of Appeals, Wycalis's claim was at its very essence a negligence 
claim, see Wycalis at 825, not one for breach of fiduciary duty. In dictum, the Court of Appeals in 
the Wycalis decision, notes, the distinction between a negligence claim as compared to a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim as being that a fiduciary is held to a higher standard than one of ordinary care 
given the fiduciary relationship. See Wycalis, fn. 9. It continues, "nonetheless, the fiduciary nature 
of the trustee's responsibility really goes to the standard of care to which a trustee is held, rather than 
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to supplant negligence analysis," Id., intimating, perhaps, that were Ms. Wycalis claim one for 
breach of fiduciary duty, instead of negligence, she would be treading in an area where the 
applicable standard of care "may be established, as a matter of law, by legislative enactment or prior 
judicial decision." [citations omitted]. Wycalis dX%25. 
Any question of the applicability of standard of care testimony of an expert in the context 
of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty was resolved by the Utah Supreme Court, about one week 
after the Wycalis decision inFirst Security Bank of Utah v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253,1258 
(Utah 1989). In Banberry, the plaintiff challenged the trustee's conduct contending that the trustee 
breached a fiduciary duty owed to the defendant Banberry. Id. at 1256. The defendant argued that 
the court erred in excluding testimony of an expert witness as to standard of care. Id. In Banberry 
the Supreme Court explained: 
Banberry offered testimony of two specialists in real estate law to 
determine a question of fact: What is the standard of care used by 
attorneys in the community in preparing a notice of default, and did 
[the trustee] breach that standard? The question before the court, 
however, involved a question of law: What is the legal duty a trustee 
owes a trustor, and did [the trustee] breach that duty? Questions of 
law are to be determined by the court. Based upon the court's correct 
determination regarding the question of law, we find no error in its 
subsequent exclusion of the expert's testimony. 
Banberry at 1258. 
As this Court is fully aware, and as it has previously determined, a fiduciary duty may be 
found to exist in a relationship between a trustee and a trustor 
where a trustor reposes its trust or confidence in the trustee and relies 
on the trustee's guidance or where the trustee could exercise 
extraordinary influence over the trustor or where the trustee stands in 
a dominant position to the trustor, it is possible that a trustee is bound 
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by a fiduciary duty to act in the interest of the trustor. [Italics 
added]. 
Banbeny at 1256, citing Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978). Whether or not the 
relationship exists is a question of fact, and has been determined, as part of the law of this case, to 
require a decision of the jury. See Court's May 22, 2000 Memorandum Decision, p.3, Exhibit B. 
Further, whether or not the trustee's conduct in this case was to the disadvantage of Five F remains 
a factual determination. Id. However, the fiduciary duty itself is not subject to what the standard 
of care in the industry might be, but is, as unequivocally articulated by the Supreme Court, "a 
fiduciary duty to act in the interest of the trustor." Banberry at 1256. In regard to the relationship 
between a trustee and trustor, the Utah Supreme Court has concluded: 
[t]he duty of the trustee under a trust deed is greater than the mere 
obligation to sell pledged property in accordance with the default 
provisions of the trust deed instrument, it is a duty to treat trustor 
fairly and in accordance with a high punctilio of honor . . . the ease 
and facility of foreclosure under [the trust deed foreclosure statute] 
commends it over the more cumbersome form of mortgage which 
mut be foreclosed in court, but this very fact imposes upon courts the 
duty of scrutinizing all sales had under it which are questioned, and 
of setting those aside in which fraud or overreaching has been 
practiced by the trustee. 
Blodgett at 302. The fiduciary duty in this case has been precisely articulated by the decisions of 
the Utah Supreme Court in Banbeny and Blodgett v. Martsch. Five F adds nothing to that by 
presenting expert testimony as to what responsibilities are of a trustee in the community as of 
August 1998. Further, as this Court has concluded, any lay person can determine by evaluating the 
nature of the relationship between Five F and Heritage and considering Heritage's conduct as trustee 
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whether or not Heritage acted in the interest of Five F, the trustor, that is, fairly and in accordance 
with the highest punctilio of honor. Id. 
Five F's claim against Heritage is not grounded in negligence but breach of the legal 
fiduciary duty. The fiduciary duty, namely the heightened standard of acting in the interest of the 
trustor, is established by legal precedent. A fact finder would not in any way be assisted in 
determining issues of fact by receiving the expert testimony, and any such testimony should 
appropriately be excluded. See Banberry at 1258 and Fed. R.Evid. 702 and 704, Advisory 
Committee Notes. Consequently, summary judgment is inappropriate on Five F's First Claim for 
Relief, Breach of Fiduciary Duty. As standard of care is not implicated in Five F's Second Claim 
for Relief for breach of contract and covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and Five F's Third 
Claim for Relief based on unjust enrichment, summary judgment is inappropriate as to those claims 
as well. 
III. HERITAGE'S "EXPERT" PROFESSOR DAVID A. THOMAS IS NOT AN EXPERT 
ON DUTIES OF TRUSTEE AND HIS TESTIMONY IS APPROPRIATELY 
EXCLUDABLE UNDER UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 702, 
Whether Professor Thomas' testimony should be excluded has been fully addressed in Five 
F's Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Exclude and will not be revisited entirely here. May 
it serve to say that, by his own admission, each of Professor Thomas' opinions are simply his view 
of how the judge and/or jury in this case should ultimately decide the issues, and is consequently 
excludable under long-established American jurisprudence and Utah case law precedent. See Fed. 
R.Evid. 704, Advisory Committee Note; State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602,607-8 (Utah App. 1998); 
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State v. Tenney,9l3 P.2d 750,756 (Utah App. 1996); and, Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225,1231 
(Utah App.) cert, denied 821 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). 
Heritage is hard pressed, in any event, to establish that Professor Thomas is an expert as to 
trustee's duties in the foreclosure and sale of commercial real estate in southern Utah as of August 
1998. Professor Thomas testified in his deposition that he could not recall ever representing anyone 
whose property interest was in foreclosure, see David A. Thomas Depo., 12:2-18, attached hereto 
as Exhibit "C", that he "possibly" acted as trustee for an individual client, in fewer than 10 instances 
in the 70fs and 80fs. Id. 12:19 through 13:17, none of which ever went to trustee's sale. Id. 14:13-
16. Notwithstanding a long and prolific career in academia, Professor Thomas has precious little 
experience in the world of trustee foreclosures. Id. Little of his research, writing and teaching has 
to do with trust deed foreclosure. See Exhibit C, 19:8—32:4. Any opinions stated by Professor 
Thomas regarding the propriety of credit bids, the relevancy of factors considered by the trustee and 
the impact of appraisals are, even if ultimately determined by the Court to be appropriately 
admissible, in a vacuum and without any practical experience or even academic support. Id. 
Although Professor Thomas clearly would like to supplant his conclusions of law and fact 
for those of this Court and the potential future jury, his opinions add nothing to the fiduciary duty 
established by the Utah Supreme Court, namely that one having a fiduciary duty to another, must 
act "in the interest o f the party to whom the fiduciary duty is owed, Banberry at 1256; fairly and 
with the highest punctilio of honor. Blodgett at 302. Professor Thomas' testimony will add nothing 
to the jury's determination and whether evidence of fraud or a relationship of trust or confidence, 
extraordinary influence or dominant position trigger the heightened legal fiduciary duty, and 
C:\MyFtles\Five FY5TH DISTRICRexclude reply.opp.wpd 9 
whether Heritage, as trustee, acted in the interest of Five F as trustor, fairly and with high honor, 
in its foreclosure of Five F's property. As a standard of care does not come into play in Five F's 
Second Claim for Relief on the theory of breach of contract and breach covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, and Five F's Third Claim for Relief for unjust enrichment, Professor Thomas' 
testimony, even if otherwise admissible, would be of no assistance to the fact finder in hearing and 
determining the issues of fact presented at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, and to the extent referenced herein, for the reasons set forth 
in Five F's Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Professor David A. 
Thomas, Five F respectfully requests that the Court deny Heritage's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this *? day of March, 2001. 
& HATHAWAY 
BENSON L. HATHAW^ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
: Civil No. 98-0501814 
HERITAGE SAVINGS BANK, 
: Judge J. Philip Eves 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff Five F, by and through undersigned counsel, respectfully submits the following 
Trial Memorandum of Law to assist the Court to understand and anticipate remaining legal issues 
relevant to this case. Specifically, this memorandum will discuss (1) whether a plaintiff must 
expressly make a claim for punitive damages in his Complaint in order to receive such damages at 
trial; (2) whether the determination that parties to a trust deed have become adverse so as to negate 
any fiduciary duties is a question of law or fact; (3) whether to establish a fiduciary duty in Heritage 
as Trustee, Five F must prove more than a trustee/trustor or lender/borrower relationship; and (4) 
whether Five F is entitled to seek damages for both the value of the property lost and the lost income 
associated with such properties. 
ANALYSTS 
I. A PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT NEED NOT CONTAIN A SPECIFIC CLAIM 
FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ORDER FOR A PLAINTIFF TO CLAIM 
SUCH DAMAGES AT TRIAL. 
According to Utah R.Civ. P. 8(a)(2), eveiy pleading setting forth a claim for relief should 
contain a demand for judgment. However, this rule must be viewed against the backdrop of Utah 
R.Civ. P. 54(c)(1), which states that "every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party 
in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his 
pleadings." In other words: 
"While under Rule 8(a)(3), supra, every pleading setting forth a 
claim for relief should contain a demand for judgment, this prayer for 
relief constitutes no part of the pleader's cause of action; a pleading 
should not be dismissed for legal insufficiency unless it appears to a 
certainty that the claimant is entitled to no relief, legal, equitable or 
maritime, under any state of facts which could be proved in support 
of the claim, irrespective of the prayer for relief; and, except as to a 
judgment by default, the prayer does not limit the relief, legal 
equitable or maritime, which the court may grant" 
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc. 675 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Utah 1983) (quoting 6 J. Moore, W. 
Taggert & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice ^ 54.60 at 1212-14 (2d ed. 1983)). Therefore, 
"it is not necessary to claim exemplary [i.e., punitive] damage by specific denomination" if the facts 
otherwise support an award of such damages. Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1182 (citation and internal 
quotations omitted) (alteration in original). 
This issue is similar to the one faced by the Utah Supreme Court in Behrens, where the 
defendant opposed plaintiffs motion to amend her complaint to include a claim for punitive 
damages that was filed just prior to trial. See 675 P.2d at 1181-82. The defendant's argument was 
-?-
procedural; it claimed that plaintiffs motion had not been presented in writing and was not 
accompanied by the proposed amended complaint as required by Utah R.Civ. P. 7(b)(1). On appeal, 
the Utah Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs argument because, under Rule 54(c)(1), a plaintiffs 
complaint need not contain a prayer for punitive damages in order to claim such damages at trial. 
See id. at 1182 "[I]f the plaintiff were able to adduce the necessary foundational evidence at trial, 
she could claim punitive damages under Rule 54(c) without a formal amendment to the pleadings." 
Id. 
Here, Five F has plead and claims that Heritage, as Trustee, breached the fiduciary duty it 
owed to Five F pursuant to the parties' trust deed. Under Utah law, under a claim of breach of 
fiduciary duty, Five F is entitled to punitive damages if it can prove that Heritage's conduct was 
willful, malicious, intentionally fraudulent, or in reckless disregard of Five F's rights under the Trust 
Deed. Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1 (1991 as amended). See also General Business Machines v. 
National Semiconductor Datachecker/DTS, 664F.Supp. 1422, 1424 (Utah 1987); and Restatement 
of Torts § 874 comment b and § 908. Therefore, assuming that Five F is able to set forth 
foundational evidence to support its claim for punitive damages, it is not necessary for Five F to 
include a specific claim for punitive damages in its complaint in order claim such damages at trial. 
Behrens at 1182. 
IL THE ISSUE OF WHETHER AND AT WHAT POINT THE PARTIES 
BECAME ADVERSE IS A QUESTION OF FACT TO BE DETERMINED BY 
THE JURY. 
Utah courts have held that a fiduciary relationship may cease to exist when the parties' 
relationship becomes adversarial. See Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1064 
(Utah 1996); OngInternational (U.S.A.), Inc. v. D &DManagement, 850 P.2d447,454 (Utah 1993) 
(fiduciary duty extinguished when partners' relationship becomes adversarial and partners deal at 
amis length). Since this issue involves the existence of a fiduciary relationship, it is a factual 
question that must be determined by the jury. 
While the precise legal duty owed by a fiduciary is a question of law, see First Sec. Bank of 
Utah N.A. v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Utah 1989), the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship is a question of fact. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that "there is no 
invariable rule which determines the existence of a fiduciary relationship." First Sec. Bank of Utah 
N.A. v. Banberry Crossing, 786 P.2d 1326,1333 (Utah 1990). Rather, a fiduciary relationship must 
be inferred from the factual circumstances surrounding the relationship. See id. This Court .has 
already concluded that the existence of a fiduciary relationship is a factual determination. See May 
22, 2000 Memorandum Decision, p. 3, citing First Sec. Bank of Utah N.A. v. Banberry Crossing, 
780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1999); an&Blodgettv. Martsch, 590 P.2d298 (Utah 1970). This precedent is 
consonant with the United States District Court for the District of Utah, which similarly has 
recognized that the existence of a fiduciary relationship is a question of fact. General Business 
Machines v. National Semiconductor Datachecker/DTS, 664 F.Supp 1422 (D.Utah 1987). There, 
the Defendant moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs claim for breach of fiduciary duty on 
the grounds that there was no fiduciary relationship between itself and the plaintiff. After reviewing 
Utah law regarding the creation of fiduciary relationships, the court stated that "whether . . . a 
fiduciary relationship was created involves questions of fact." Id. at 1226. Since the plaintiff had 
-4-
produced evidence which suggested the existence of a fiduciary relationship, the defendant's motion 
for summary judgment was denied. Id. at 1225. 
Here, the question of whether the relationship between Five F and Heritage became adverse 
and the parties began dealing at arms length goes directly to whether a fiduciary relationship existed 
between the parties and when that fiduciary relationship existed. It follows, therefore, since the 
issue involves the existence of a fiduciary relationship, it is a question of fact that must be 
determined by the jury. 
III. A TRUSTEE UNDER A DEED OF TRUST OWES THE TRUSTOR A 
FIDUCIARY DUTY SIMPLY BY VIRTUE OF THE PARTIES TRUSTEE-
TRUSTOR RELATIONSHIP. 
A trustee under a deed of trust always owes the trustor a fiduciary duty to treat the trustor 
fairly and in accordance with a high punctilio of honor, and to act in the trustor's best interest. 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, "[t]he duty of the trustee under a trust deed is greater 
than the mere obligation to sell the pledged property in accordance with the default provision of the 
trust deed instrument, it is a duty to treat the trustor fairly and in accordance with a high punctilio 
of honor." Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1978). This duty exists and is inherent in 
the trustee/trustor relationship itself. According to Blodgett v. Martsch, and the cases cited there, 
merely by virtue of the trustor to trustee relationship, given the ease of foreclosure outside of a 
juridical process, the relationship is to be carefully scrutinized and gives rise to a duty in the trustee 
to act fairly and according with the high punctilio of honor. Blodgett at 302. 
In addition to this duty of fairness and honor, the Banberiy Court stated that a trust deed 
trustee has an expanded duty to act in the trustor's "best interest": 
-S -
[i]n cases where a trustor reposes its trust or confidence in the trustee 
and relies on the trustee's guidance or where the trustee could 
exercise extraordinary influence over the trustor,. . . 
Banberry, 780 P.2d at 1256. These conditions do not abrogate the fundamental fiduciary nature of 
the relationship between the trustee and trustor, and the trustee's inherent duty to treat the trustor 
with fairness and honor. See Blodgett, 590 P.2d at 302. Rather, these duties exist solely by virtue 
of the parties' trustee-trustor relationship. By the same token, the relationship of a trustor to a 
trustee is, of itself, evidence of the existence of the fiduciary relationship and satisfies one if not all 
of the Banberry requirements. See supra. Moreover, there is nothing in the Blodgett v. Martsch 
decision or Banbeny decision which requires a showing of a relationship in addition to 
trustor/trustee, to satisfy the existence of a fiduciary relationship. See supra. In fact, the Utah 
Supreme Court in the Banberry II decision considering the existence of a fiduciary relationship 
between a borrower and a lender, notably not between the trustor and trustee, cited with approval 
the following: 
Generally, in a fiduciary relationship, the property, interest or 
authority of the other is placed in the charge of the fiduciary. 
Banberry, 786 P.2d 1326, 1332 (Utah 1990) citing Dennis on State 
Bankv. Madeira, 640 P.2d 1235, 1241 (Kan. 1982). 
It continued 
But it is manifest in all the decisions that there must be not only 
confidence of one in the other, but there must exist a certain 
inequality, dependence, . . . or other conditions, giving to one 
advantage over the other. 
Id. quoting Dennison State Bank, at 1241. After applying those principles, the Supreme Court in 
Banbeny II concluded that no such evidence existed in the relationship between the lender and 
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borrower, and consequently concluded that no fiduciary obligation existed. In this case, the very 
nature of the trustee/trustor relationship is based on the conveyance of the trustor to the trustee of 
the trustor's real property used as collateral securing trustor's performance under the promissory 
note and trust deed. This fundamental difference distinguishes the relationship from that of a 
borrower to a lender. That fact in and of itself satisfies not only the Banberry land II requirements 
but the requirements of Blodgett v. Martsch which result in the springing into existence of fiduciary 
duties articulated in those cases. In the end, the relationship of the trustee to a trustor is 
fundamentally different from that of strictly a borrower and lender and satisfies the requirements 
for the creation of the fiduciary duty as articulated by the Utah Supreme Court. 
IV. IN A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY THAT RESULTS IN A 
LOSS OF PROPERTY, THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
BOTH THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY LOST AND LOST PROFITS. 
A claim for breach of fiduciary duty is a tort cause of action. See Beck v. Farmers Ins. 
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795,799 (Utah 1985). "The general objective of tort law [is] to place an injured 
person in a position as nearly as possible to the position he would have occupied but for the 
defendant's tort " Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728, 731 (Utah 1984). Therefore, an 
injured plaintiff is entitled to recover "all damages, whether special or general, which are casually 
connected to a party's tortious action." Id. 
In tort causes of action involving the loss of use of property, Utah courts have emphasized 
that a plaintiff is not only entitled to the value of the property lost, but also any profits the plaintiff 
lost by virtue of being deprived of such property. To illustrate this point, the Utah Supreme Court 
relied on the case of State v. Stanley, 506 P.2d 1284 (Alaska 1973) and stated as follows: 
-7-
[T]he measure of damages for loss of use of property was set out in 
State v. Stanley . . . . Stanley had lost his crab fishing boat as a result 
of the state's negligence. Damages were awarded for loss of use for 
18 months, the period required to replace the vessel. After 
recognizing the general objective of tort law to place an injured 
person in a position nearly as possible to the position he would have 
occupied but for the defendant's tort, the court applied that objective 
to the loss of a vessel: "[Tjhe damages would be the vessel's share of" 
gross earnings reasonably anticipated for the period involved,... less 
the expenditures which would have been chargeable to the owner." 
Acculog, 692 P.2d at 731. 
This concept of lost profits has also been applied in cases involving a breach of duty 
connected to the sale of real estate. In United States v. Bald Eagle Realty, 21 F.Supp.2d 1332 
(D.Utah 1998), land developers brought an action against a real estate broker in which they claimed 
a breach of the broker's duty to deal fairly with prospective purchasers. The developers sought to 
recover the profits they would earned from the future development of the property but for the 
defendant's breach. See id. at 1334. In response, the defendant moved for summary judgment 
claiming that the developers' damages must be measured by the difference between the property's 
fair market value at the time of sale and the amount bid by the developers. See id. In its decision, 
the Court denied the defendant's summary judgment motion and allowed the developers to seek lost 
profits. In doing so, the court stated: 
"The liability of real estate agents, brokers and salespersons, as in all 
actions predicated upon the failure to perform some duty, sounds in 
tort. In tort cases damages are generally awarded in order to 
compensate claimants for loss. The measure of damages is the 
amount which will compensate for all the detriment proximately 
caused by the breach of the duty" 
Id. at 1336 (quoting Hagar v. Mobley, 638 P.2d 127 (Wyo. 1981)). 
-8-
Here, as in Bald Eagle, Five F has brought a tort claim against Heritage for breach of 
fiduciary duty. Therefore, if successful, Five F is entitled to recover for all the detriment caused by 
Heritage's breach, including the value of the rental property lost, together with the lost profits which 
would have been generated during the period in which the loss occurred. 
DATED this /$"""day of October, 2001. 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
BENSON L. HATHAW) 
GARY R. GUELKER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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at the end of the case including all of the instructions I 
will have given you during the trial. 
Please listen carefully because you won't get a 
chance to review these written instructions until the end of 
the case and you need to have these concepts in mind as we go 
through the trial. 
(Initial instructions read to the jury.) 
THE JUDGE: Other instructions will follow the 
presentation of evidence in this case. Ready for opening 
statements? 
MR. HATHAWAY: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Mr. Hathaway, you may address the 
jury. Thank you, Mr. Jardine. 
OPENING STATEMENT BY MR. HATHAWAY 
MR. HATHAWAY: Ladies and gentlemen, Your Honor, 
Counsel. Let me first thank all of you for responding to 
this call for your civic duty and also for your making 
arrangements to spend the next couple of days with us. 
Thank you (short inaudible, no mic), thank you as well on 
behalf of my client. 
Five F, the plaintiff in this lawsuit, is a limited 
liability company. It's a company that was set up to engage 
in the development of real estate here in the St. George 
area. Five F consisted of Ray Fowler who's sitting here at 
counsel table with me, his wife Cathy, and their three 
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THE JUDGE: I think I'd rather take them one at a 
time. 
MR. JARDINE: Okay. So that would be our 
position, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Mr. Hathaway, your 
response? 
RESPONSE BY MR. HATHAWAY 
MR. HATHAWAY: Your Honor, this Court has 
concluded once in a memorandum decision and several times 
since then in our discussions with the, the, and in other 
motions, what the bases are for a finding of fiduciary 
duty. 
And I, I think it's helpful to read the 
Blodgett-Marsh (phonetic) case in conjunction with, with the 
Banbury case which was cited (inaudible word) and as a basis 
in that. 
THE JUDGE: I just reviewed them over the lunch 
hour. 
MR. HATHAWAY: Well then you know, Your Honor, 
that one of the problems recognized by Blodgett-Marsh 
(phonetic) was the ease with which a trustee may facilitate 
foreclosures compared to the more burdensome mortgage. 
Under that circumstance and under that case it seemed, it 
seemed that the relationship of itself might be apprise 
(phonetic) to that, to a fiduciary obligations. It didn't 
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RESPONSE BY MR. HATHAWAY 
MR. HATHAWAY: Well, first of all, as I understand 
the (inaudible word) of a 54 (b) or (c) motion it is that 
there is just a failing of evidence, no evidence to support 
any of the claims. We have, we have logged that they had 
the legal theories and the legal claims. 
Under the breach of covenant and good faith and 
fair dealing simply is first, there is an inherent obligation 
in all contracts. 
Second, in order to determine whether or not it's 
been complied with, I step forward one. The second is that, 
is that no one will intentionally do anything which 
contravenes the justified expectations of the other party 
under the contract. 
The third is we, you look at the contract and the 
course of conduct of the people. It's, it's not limited to 
a review of the contract documents. We have, we have argued 
this and debated it. It's not... In other words, strict 
compliance with the contract terms, strict compliance with 
the statutory provisions of themselves don't satisfy the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
I cited the case, and I was trying to find it 
quickly, and with another moment I could probably find it. 
But the Utah Supreme Court has said when one party to a 
contract retains discretion that he can exercise unilaterally 
FIVE F VS. HERITAGE OCT. 24, 2001 
Penny C. Abbott, Reporter/Transcriber 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
On that basis, Your Honor, I think there is 
evidence that a justifiable expectation was derived, he was 
derived of with respect to that issue. 
And with respect to the last point Mr. Hathaway 
made about the bank charging late fees, if we're entitled to 
it under the contract that's a perfect example that if we 
choose to charge fees we're entitled to under the contract. 
We're not precluded by the implied covenant for doing that to 
our detriment. And s o — 
THE JUDGE: Which late fees are you talking 
about? 
MR. JARDINE: I think he said in his argument to 
you that we had this discretion to charge late fees like the 
5% late fee charge. So if the contract gave us the right to 
charge the fees then I think we're entitled to do it and we 
can't imply a covenant to the contrary under this 
doctrine. 
So that would be our argument, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Are there, is there any other 
portion of your motion you'd like to address at this time? 
MR. JARDINE: I think those are the only two, Your 
Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Anything further you want 
to say, Mr. Hathaway, in reply to this last— 
RESPONSE BY MR. HATHAWAY 
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subsequent sale of the property.". 
And the other two cases we've given are to that 
effect. 
And since their only damage claim they've put 
forward to the jury is to recover excess, alleged excess 
recovery after the sale occurred we believe that's a failure 
of proof of damages, and we'd move on that basis. 
We've, we've briefed, Your Honor. I'll just note 
it for the Court that we think the bankruptcy court order 
constitutes judicial estoppel and how we proceeded and to the 
same effect of the trust deeds. 
And that would be the basis of our motion. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Do you need a minute to 
think about those cases or read them before you respond, 
Mr. Hathaway? 
ARGUMENT BY MR. HATHAWAY 
MR. HATHAWAY: Well a, I guess, Your Honor, that 
depends. But I want to make one distinction at least 
initially. 
And let me address the, the judicial estoppel claim 
first. I believe that's already been ruled upon by this 
Court in a prior motion for summary judgment proceeding. At 
least it was argued and briefed. 
In regard to these claims, Your Honor, the 
confusion comes in confusing the, the damage theory for the 
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WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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v. 
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AMENDED PROPOSED 
PRETRIAL ORDER 
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This matter came before the Court on at a pretrial conference held on October 4,2001, 
before the Honorable J. Philip Eves. Benson L. Hathaway, Jr. of the law firm of Stirba & Hathaway 
appeared as counsel for the Plaintiff, Five F, Inc. ("Five F"). James S. Jardine of the law firm of 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker and George W. Pratt of the law firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbook & 
McDonough appeared as counsel for the Defendant Heritage Bank ("Heritage"). Based on 
proceedings during the final pretrial conference and the hearing on certain pending motions, the 
Court directed the parties to file an amended pretrial order on October 17,2001. The following 
action was taken: 
A. JURISDICTION. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4. The jurisdiction of the court is not disputed and is hereby 
determined to be present. 
B. VENUE. Venue is proper before this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-13-4 
and 78-13-7. The parties agree that venue is properly laid in the Fifth Judicial District Court of 
Washington County, Utah. 
C. GENERAL NATURE OF THE CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES. 
1. FIVE F'S CLAIMS AGAINST HERITAGE. 
a. Five F claims that Heritage, as Trustee under its September 12, 
1996 Promissory Note and Trust Deed with Five F, owed Five F a 
fiduciary duty to act in the interest of Five F as Trustor and with a 
punctilio of honor. 
b. Five F claims that Heritage, as Trustee, breached its fiduciary duty 
to Five F, by, among other things, failing to consult with Five F prior to 
the trust deed foreclosure sale; by disregarding any interest Five F may 
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have had in the property; and, otherwise by not acting in the interest of 
Five F and with a high punctilio of honor. 
c. Five F claims that as a consequence of Heritage's breach of its 
fiduciary duty, Five F has been damaged by the loss of the value of its real 
property used as collateral under the subject note and trust deed, for lost 
rents, lost profits, lost future income and other benefits of ownership of the 
real property used as collateral under the subject note and trust deed. Five 
F claims in addition, that it is entitled to its attorney's fees, consequential 
damages, and punitive damages. 
d. Five F claims Heritage breached its contract, including its covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, under its September 12, 1996 promissory 
note and trust deed with Five F by, among other things, failing to consult 
with Five F in the process of its foreclosure and bid preparation; by the 
manner in which it accounted for the balance owed by Five F at various 
times during the life of the loan; in its calculation of the credit amount bid 
at the two foreclosure sales, by failing to give Five F credit for the value of 
the real property if" foreclosed on, by reaping an excessive recovery for 
itself in substantial excess of its contract rights under its note and trust 
deed with Five F, and by depriving Five F of the benefit of its bargain with 
Heritage under its promissory note and trust deed. 
e. Five F claims as a result of Heritage's breach of its contract, 
including its covenant of good faith and fair dealing, that Five F has been 
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damaged by being deprived of the value of the real property used as 
collateral under the subject note and trust deed in excess of the amount 
Five F agreed to pay under those instruments, Five F's lost profits, lost 
rents, lost business opportunities and anticipated future earnings, its 
attorney's fees, costs and consequential damages. 
f. Five F alternatively claims that Heritage has been unjustly 
enriched through its excessive recovery in the foreclosure of all of the 
collateral pledged by Five F under its September 12, 1996 note and trust 
deed and its failure and refusal to duly credit bid Five F's contractual 
obligation against the value of the foreclosed real property, and Five F has 
been damaged by such unjust enrichment in the amount Heritage has 
received from Five F in this transaction, less the amount Heritage was 
entitled to recovery in its obligations with Five F. 
2. HERITAGE'S ANSWER AND DEFENSES: 
Heritage denies all of Five F's claims. On September 12, 1996, Heritage made a loan to 
Five F in the amount of $1,200,000, which was secured by a note and trust deed on several 
pieces of property, with assignment of rents. Five F promised to repay the $1,200,000 by 
December 31, 1996, but failed to do so, prompting Heritage to begin a non-judicial foreclosure 
through a Trustee's Sale of its collateral. 
In May of 1997, Heritage's foreclosure was stopped when Five F filed a chapter 11 
bankruptcy petition. Five F proposed a plan of reorganization, which the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah confirmed by order entered February 18,1998. Under 
the plan of reorganization, Five F was required to pay Heritage in full no later than May 31, 
1998, or if it did not do so, the confirmed plan expressly permitted Heritage to conduct a 
Trustee's Sale on the 10.44-acre parcel securing the Note. That sale was held on July 13,1998. 
Heritage, acting as lender-beneficiary, credit bid $1,090,000, which was the highest bid at the 
sale and which therefore Heritage as trustee accepted. Heritage thus acquired title to the 10.44-
acre parcel and Five F was credited with $1,090,000 against its loan balance. Because there was 
a balance still owing on the Note, the plan further authorized Heritage to conduct a second 
Trustee's Sale on the four-plex property that also secured the loan. Accordingly, a second 
Trustee' Sale was held on August 12, 1998, at which sale Heritage credit bid $210,000. That bid 
was the highest bid and was therefore accepted by Heritage as trustee. 
As trustee, Heritage did not owe a fiduciary duty to Five F. Five F and Heritage had no 
confidential relation. Five F did not rely on Heritage for any business advice. Heritage did not 
have a position of dominance with Five F, since it was merely a lender to Five F. 
Moreover, Heritage in its role as trustee treated Five F fairly. Heritage fully complied 
with its statutory duties as trustee, including consulting with Five F on the order of the sale of the 
parcels. 
With respect to Five F's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, Heritage asserts that it has fully complied with the terms of its note and trust deed with 
Five F and did so in good faith. 
Once Five F defaulted on its Note and foreclosure proceedings began, Heritage had no 
obligation to bid on the properties at the Trustee's Sale. And even if Heritage elected to bid, it 
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was free to bid an amount it determined protected its interests. Five F's claim fails because 
Heritage complied with all of its duties under the note and trust deed. Moreover, Five F could 
not justifiably expect: (1) that Heritage would bid at all; (2) that Heritage would bid the amount 
of its debt or of any appraisal, especially when it considered the appraisals at best uncertain; or 
(3) that it would receive as credit against its loan anything more than the highest bid at the 
Trustee's Sale. 
As a matter of law, any evidence regarding the collateral property or its disposition after 
the trustee sale is irrelevant and inadmissible. 
Five F's unjust enrichment claim fails for three reasons. First, an unjust enrichment 
claim is precluded when there is a written contract, such as this, the note and trust deed. Second, 
even assuming arguendo that this claim is properly part of this lawsuit, it fails as a matter of 
fairness. Although it was possible that Heritage would ultimately sell the subject property for 
more than the amount it had bid, Heritage also took the corresponding risk that the property 
would be sold for less than the amount of Heritage's bid. Under law and equity, Five F is the 
party that bears the risks of the Trustee's Sale process. The outcome that Five F challenges was 
not unjust because Five F received what it had bargained for, and further, Heritage was not 
unjustly enriched because it received exactly what the Trustee's Sale process mandated. Third, 
when all of Heritage's default rights and indirect costs are considered, there was no enrichment. 
Finally, all of Five F's claims are barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Five F 
proposed and succeeded in obtaining confirmation of a chapter 11 plan which provided, with 
respect to Heritage, that if Five F did not pay Heritage in full by May 31, 1998, Heritage could 
then proceed to conduct a foreclosure sale of the 10.4 acre parcel and then, if it was not paid in 
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full from that sale, it could proceed to conduct a foreclosure sale of the remaining four-plex. 
Heritage proceeded in strict accordance with Five F's confirmed plan, was the high bidder at the 
first foreclosure sale, where it was not paid in full, and then scheduled the second foreclosure 
sale, where it was also the high bidder. Thus, Heritage acquired title to all its collateral through 
foreclosure, in strict accordance with Five F's confirmed bankruptcy plan. Consequently, Five F 
is judicially estopped to challenge the validity and results of the foreclosure sales, as it attempts 
to do in this suit. 
D. TRIAL OF CLAIMS BY COURT. 
Five F's claim of unjust enrichment and Heritage's defense of judicial estoppel will be tried 
by the Court outside the presence of the jury. Five F stipulates that if its claim for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is submitted to the jury, then the unjust enrichment 
claim is withdrawn. Facts unique to the unjust enrichment claim and the defense of judicial 
estoppel, if any, shall not be argued to or in the presence of the jury. 
E. UNCONTROVERTED FACTS. The following facts are established by 
admissions in the pleadings, by court order pursuant to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, or by stipulation of the parties and counsel. 
1. Plaintiff Five F is a Utah limited liability company with its principal place of 
business in St. George, Utah. 
2. Defendant Heritage Savings Bank is a Utah financial institution with its principal 
place of business in St. George, Utah. 
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3. On September 12,1996, Heritage loaned Five F $1,200,000, and Five F executed 
a Promissory Note in favor of Heritage in the amount of $1,200,000.00. 
4. The Note was secured by a Trust Deed with Assignment of Rents, through which 
Five F conveyed to Heritage as Trustee, title to three parcels of real property, an undeveloped 
parcel consisting of 10.44 acres, and two four-plexes. 
5. Prior to closing the loan to Five F, Heritage had received appraisals on the three 
parcels of real property pledged to secure the loan (the 10.44-acre parcel of raw land, and the two 
four-plexes), in the amounts, respectively, of $1,640,000.00, $306,000.00, and $306,000.00. 
6. Mr. Fowler was aware of these appraisal valuations at the time of the closing. 
7. Heritage was the Beneficiary and also the Trustee under the Trust Deed, of which 
Fowler was aware when he signed the Trust Deed. 
8. Five F defaulted in its obligations under the Note, by failing to pay all principal 
and accrued interest by December 31, 1996, as required by the Note. 
9. On February 28, 1997, Heritage as Trustee commenced a nonjudicial foreclosure 
proceeding against all three parcels of real property by filing a Notice of Default with the 
Washington County Recorder. 
10. At the time of the December 31, 1998 default, Five F owed Heritage on its Note 
the full principal amount of approximately $1,200,000 plus interest and costs to be incurred in 
foreclosure. 
11. On March 17,1998, Five F made a partial payment on the loan of $240,000, in 
exchange for reconveyance of one of the two four-plexes. 
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12. Heritage's foreclosure proceeding was interrupted when, on or about May 23, 
1997, Five F filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. 
13. In connection with the chapter 11 proceeding, Heritage assessed its lien against 
the real property securing the Note, as well as the rents collected by Five F from the remaining 
four-plex property. 
14. In its chapter 11 bankruptcy case Five F sought and obtained confirmation of a 
Plan of Reorganization, which was confirmed by order of the bankruptcy court on February 18, 
1998. 
15. Five F's Plan of Reorganization provided that Heritage could proceed with its 
foreclosure of the property if Five F did not paid Heritage in full by May 31,1998. 
16. Five F failed to pay Heritage in full by May 31,1998. 
17. A trustee's sale was held on the 10.44-acre tract on July 13, 1998. 
18. At the July 13,1998, trustee's sale, Heritage credit bid $1,090,000 and acquired 
title to the 10.44-acre parcel. 
19. On August 12, 1998, a trustee's sale was held on the four-plex property. 
20. At the August 12, 1998 Trustee's Sale, Heritage credit bid $210,000.00 and 
acquired title to the four-plex property. 
21. Heritage sold the four-plex to a third party on about August 20, 1998, for 
$280,000.00, yielding net sale proceeds to Heritage of $261,009.10. 
22. On October 6, 2000, Heritage sold the 10.44-acre parcel for $1,682,000.00. 
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F. CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT. l The contested issues of fact remaining for 
decision are: 
1. PLAINTIFF'S CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT: 
a. Whether Five F and its representatives reposed their trust or 
confidence in Heritage as Trustee and relied on Heritage's 
guidance. 
b. Whether Heritage was in a position to exercise 
extraordinary influence over Five F in the handling of the loan and 
foreclosure of the collateral. 
c. Whether Heritage stood in a dominant position vis-a-vis 
Five F in the handling of its loan and the foreclosure of the 
collateral. 
d. Whether Heritage as Trustee allowed Five F to participate 
in any meaningful way in the Trustee's Sale, including the 
calculation of the credit bid, and the calculation of balance owed. 
e. Whether Heritage as Trustee acted in the interest of Five F 
with a high punctilio of honor in its capacity as Trustee under its 
Promissory Note and Trust Deed with Five F. 
f. Whether Five F was damaged as a consequence of 
Heritage's conduct. 
1
 By including various contested issues of fact or law herein, the parties do not agree that such issues are material, 
relevant, properly pleaded, or otherwise correct, and specifically reserve their right to argue against such issue at 
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g. Whether Heritage's conduct as Trustee was wanton, 
intentional, purposeful or in reckless disregard of the contractual 
and legal rights of Five F. 
h. The extent of the income and wealth of Heritage. 
i. Whether there is a probability that Heritage might repeat 
the conduct complained of. 
j . Whether as a result of the amounts paid to Heritage by Five 
F, together with the value of the real property taken by Heritage in 
foreclosure, Heritage has received the benefit of assets 
substantially in excess of the obligation arising in Five F under the 
Note and Trust Deed, to the detriment of Five F. 
k. Whether Five F understood that, in the event of Five F's 
default, Heritage could foreclose on the property used as collateral, 
but that value of the collateral would not be considered as credit 
against the loan. 
1. Whether Five F was justified in expecting to be obligated 
under its Promissory Note and Trust Deed with Heritage only to 
the extent of the face amount of the note, plus interest together 
with costs and fees. 
trial. Specifically, the parties have included contested issues of fact and law consistent with their prior positions 
presented to the Court in its motion, in order to preserve those issues. 
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m. Whether Five F expected to lose all of its collateral pledged 
to secure its Promissory Note with Heritage notwithstanding the 
actual value of the pledged property and its contractual obligations 
under the terms of the Promissory Note. 
n. Whether Heritage determined its credit bid at the sale of the 
10.44 acres, by deducting $225,000 from what it calculated Five F 
owed it, expecting it could retrieve this amount from a subsequent 
quick sale of the four-plex, which decision was made with full 
knowledge and consideration of the September 1996 appraisal of 
the 10.44 acres in the amount of $1,640,000, the April 1998 
appraisal in the amount of $1,830,000 and $1,380,000, and, that by 
Heritage's calculations, as of the date of the sale, Five F owed 
Heritage $1,314,685.33. 
o. Whether Heritage determined the amount to be credit bid at 
the Trustee's Sale of Five F's four-plex by deducting from the 
amount it calculated remained owed by Five F an amount 
calculated to be the approximate amount of rents which had been 
collected and were being held in a reserve account pursuant to the 
bankruptcy court's order. 
p. Whether Heritage's conduct in the performance of its 
obligations as Beneficiary under its Promissory Note and Trust 
Deed with Five F was contrary to Five F's justified expectations. 
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q. Whether Five F was damaged directly and as a 
consequence of Heritage's actions under the performance of its 
obligations under the Note and Trust Deed. 
r. Alternatively, whether Heritage received a windfall outside 
of its contractual obligations in the foreclosure and subsequent sale 
of the collateral, 
s. Whether Five F intended to bestow the value of the pledged 
collateral notwithstanding its value and Five F's contractual 
obligations, 
t. Whether Heritage was paid in full upon foreclosure of the 
10.44 acres on Five F's obligation under the Promissory Note and 
Trust Deed, 
u. What amount is required in equity to make Five F whole as 
a result of Heritage's unjust enrichment. 
2. DEFENDANT'S CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT 
a. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim 
(1) Did Heritage as trustee conduct the trustee sales in 
accordance with the statutory requirements? 
(2) Did Heritage, above and beyond its role as lender and 
mortgagee, have and exercise extraordinary influence over 
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Five F? If so, did Heritage exercise that influence 
unlawfully? 
(3) Did Heritage, above and beyond its role as lender and 
mortgagee, because of dependence, weakness of age, state 
of mental strength or state of business intelligence, hold a 
position of superiority or dominance over Five F? If so, did 
Heritage use that position of superiority or dominance 
unlawfully? 
(4) Did Five F, separate and apart from its pledge of property 
as collateral for its loan from Heritage, otherwise place its 
property in the charge of Heritage? 
(5) Did Heritage, above and beyond its role as lender and 
mortgagee, have an overmastering influence over Five F? 
If so, did Heritage use that influence unlawfully? 
(6) Did Five F, with Heritage's understanding, repose a 
continuous trust in the skill and integrity of Heritage, above 
and beyond the borrower-lender relationship? 
(7) Were the note and trust deed negotiated at arm's length? 
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(8) Did Five F request Heritage as trustee to consult with it in 
any respect? 
(9) Did Heritage as trustee have a fiduciary duty to Five F? 
(10) If Heritage as trustee had a fiduciary duty to Five F, was 
Five F injured by Heritage's conduct as trustee? 
(11) If Five F was injured by Heritage's conduct as trustee, what 
damages did it suffer? 
(12) If someone else had been substituted to act as trustee under 
the trust deed, would the outcome of the trustee's sales 
have been altered in any way? 
(13) By the time the foreclosure sales were conducted, had the 
relationship between Heritage and Five F become 
"adversarial," such that any fiduciary duties that may have 
existed were extinguished? 
b. Breach of Contract Claim 
(1) Did Heritage breach the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing? 
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(2) Did Five F expressly agree in its confirmed Chapter 11 plan 
that, in the event Heritage was not paid in full by May 31, 
1998, it could proceed with a trustee sale on the 10.4 acre 
parcel and then, if the proceeds from the trustee sale did not 
pay in full the Note, it could conduct a foreclosure sale of 
the four-plex? 
(3) Under the operation of the trust deed and trust deed statute, 
was Heritage paid the amount of the proceeds of the trustee 
sale or some other amount? 
(4) Did Five F have a justified expectation under its contract 
with Heritage, i.e., the promissory note, trust deed, and 
confirmed Chapter 11 plan, that if Heritage bid at the 
trustee sale, it would bid an amount for the 10.4 acre parcel 
equal to or greater than the fair market value, or the amount 
of any appraisal it had in its possession? 
(5) Did Five F have a justified expectation that Heritage would 
not foreclose, under any circumstances, on all of its 
collateral? 
(a) Did Five F ever disclose this expectation to 
Heritage? 
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(b) Did Five F deliberately fail to disclose this 
expectation to Heritage to induce Heritage to make 
the loan? 
(c) Was Heritage "paid in full" by its foreclosure on the 
10.44 acre parcel? 
(6) Did Five F have a justified expectation that in the event of 
foreclosure its collateral would not be sold at the Trustee's 
Sale to the highest bidder, which amount would be applied 
to its debt? 
(7) Would the obligations that Five F seeks to enforce against 
Heritage result in a better contract for Five F than the 
contract that Five F actually entered into with Heritage? 
(8) Is Five F attempting to establish new, independent rights or 
duties that were not created in the parties' contract, or 
agreed by Heritage? 
(9) In connection with the two foreclosure sales, did Heritage 
fully comply with all provisions of the trust deed and the 
foreclosure statute? 
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(10) Did Five F have a justifiable expectation that Heritage 
would consult with it about and agree upon Five F's 
position on the calculation of the bids it presented at the 
trustee sales? 
(11) Did Five F suffer damages as a result of any breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing? 
(12) What damages, if any, were suffered by Five F as a result 
of any breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing? 
c. Unjust Enrichment Claim 
(1) Was there an express contract governing the rights of 
Heritage and Five F in the event of a default on the Note by 
Five F? 
(2) Did Five F confer a benefit upon Heritage through 
Heritage's exercise of its contractual foreclosure rights? 
(3) If so, at the time such benefit was conferred, was Heritage 
aware of the benefit? 
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(4) Under the circumstances, would it be inequitable for 
Heritage to retain any benefit received through its exercise 
of its contractual foreclosure rights? 
(5) Did Five F engage in inequitable conduct to induce 
Heritage to enter into the contracts or otherwise engage in 
inequitable conduct? 
G. CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW. The contested issues of law, in addition to 
those implicit in the foregoing issues of fact, are: 
1. PLAINTIFF'S CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW 
a. Whether Heritage as trustee under the trust deed between Heritage 
Bank and Five F owed Five F a fiduciary duty. 
b. Whether Heritage breached that duty by failing to act in the 
interest of Five F and to accord itself with a high punctilio of honor. 
c. Whether Heritage's conduct was consistent with Five F's justified 
expectations under Five F's promissory note and trust deed with Heritage. 
d. Whether Five F's confirmed Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Plan is a bar 
to the instant action. 
e. Whether Heritage's duty under the Trust Deed is greater than the 
mere obligation to sell the pledged property in accordance with the default 
provision of the Trust Deed. 
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f. Whether Heritage's conduct in foreclosing on Five F's property 
comported with all requirements of Utah law. 
g. Whether Heritage has been unjustly enriched. 
2. DEFENDANT'S CONTESTED ISSUES OF LAW 
a. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim 
(1) Did Heritage as trustee have a fiduciary duty to Five F as 
trustor when its only relation with Five F was as a lender 
negotiating with Five F at arm's length? 
(2) In light of Utah Code Ann. § 57-l-27(l)(1988), did 
Heritage as trustee have any duty to consult with Five F 
about the trustee sale other than as to "the order in which 
the trust property shall be sold?" 
(3) Did Heritage as Trustee owe a fiduciary duty to Five F as 
trustor under the facts of this case? 
(4) After the relationship between Heritage and Five F had 
turned adversarial, did Heritage owe any fiduciary duty to 
Five F? 
(5) Can a trier of fact consider any evidence regarding the 
collateral property or its disposition after the trustee sale? 
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(6) Can Five F now seek punitive damages under its breach of 
fiduciary duty claim when it did not pray for such damages 
or allege wanton, intentional or reckless conduct in its 
complaint? 
(7) Can Five F now seek lost profits under its breach of 
fiduciary duty claim when it did not pray for such damages 
and absent expert testimony, evidence of profits of similar 
businesses or evidence of subsequent profits? 
b. Breach of Contract Claim 
(1) Did Heritage as lender or beneficiary have a contractual 
duty to bid at the trustee sale of the 10.4 acre parcel? 
(2) If Heritage decided to bid on the 10.4 acre parcel, did it 
have a contractual duty to bid the fair market value of the 
parcel or the amount of an appraisal in its possession? 
(3) Was Heritage as beneficiary entitled to bid an amount at the 
trustee sale on the 10.4 acre parcel that it determined 
necessary to avoid any risk of loss or protect its own 
interests? 
(4) Is the note, trust deed and bankruptcy plan ambiguous in 
any material respect? Is parol evidence of Five F's 
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purported expectations admissible where those expectations 
are nowhere reflected in the promissory note, trust deed, or 
confirmed plan? 
(5) As a matter of law, could Five F have a justified 
expectation as to what would be bid or accepted at the 
trustee sale other than the highest bid? 
(6) Once the trustee sale under the deed of trust occurred, if it 
complied with all statutory requirements, were Five F's 
rights fully extinguished with respect to the property sold? 
(7) Can the trier of fact consider any evidence regarding the 
collateral property or its disposition after the Trustee sale? 
(8) Does the party's contract in this case - that is, the 
promissory note, trust deed, and confirmed Chapter 11 plan 
- specifically authorize Heritage to foreclose against the 
10.4 acre parcel and then, if not paid in full from that sale, 
foreclose against the four-plex and acquire both at the 
foreclosure sales by credit bid, thus precluding any claim 
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing as a matter of law? 
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(9) By conducting the two separate foreclosure sales in 
accordance with the terms of the confirmed chapter 11 
plan, was Heritage simply exercising its express contractual 
rights, thus precluding the assertion of any claim for breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing? 
(10) Do the obligations that Five F seeks to imply, through the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, result in a 
better contract for Five F than the contract that was actually 
entered into with Heritage and proposed by Five F in its 
chapter 11 plan, thus precluding the assertion of any claim 
for breach of implied covenant? 
(11) By pursuing this claim is Five F attempting to establish 
new, independent rights or duties, that were not created in 
the parties' contract, or agreed to by Heritage? 
(12) Where Heritage fully complied with all provisions of the 
Note, Trust Deed, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Plan and trust 
deed foreclosure statute, can it be held liable for breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing? 
(13) May Five F introduce evidence of lost profits when it did 
not pray for such damages and absent expert testimony, 
23 
evidence of profits of similar businesses or evidence of 
subsequent profits? 
(14) May Five F introduce evidence on Heritage's internal rate 
of return with respect to its breach of contract claim? 
c. Unjust Enrichment Claim 
(1) As a matter of law, can Five F bring a claim for unjust 
enrichment where there is an express contract governing 
the rights of Heritage and Five F in the event of a default 
on the Note by Five F? 
(2) Was Heritage unjustly enriched through its exercise of its 
contractually agreed upon foreclosure rights? 
(3) Does Five F's inequitable conduct in inducing Heritage to 
make the loan preclude it from obtaining the equitable 
remedy of unjust enrichment? 
d. Other 
(1) Is Five F's confirmed bankruptcy plan a bar to any or all of 
Five F's claims under a theory of judicial estoppel? 
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(2) As a matter of law, can Five F attack the validity of the 
Plan of Reorganization it successfully advanced in its 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding? 
(3) Did the Plan of Reorganization, advanced by Five F and 
adopted by the bankruptcy court, give Heritage the legal 
right to foreclose on the second parcel if it was not "paid in 
full" by foreclosure on the first parcel? 
(4) Under Rule 9(g), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, may Five 
F recover alleged damages consisting of lost profits and 
loss of good will, when such alleged damages were not 
specifically prayed for in Five F's Amended Complaint? 
(5) As a matter of law, if Five F's obligation to Heritage under 
the Note was not satisfied by the proceeds of the first 
trustee sale, was it entitled to proceed with the trustee sale 
on the second parcel? 
H. ATTORNEYS' FEES. The parties reserve their arguments, if any, regarding their 
right to attorneys' fees and their entitlement to attorneys' fees for later presentation to the Court. 
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I. EXHIBITS 
1. PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS. Five F's exhibits will be provided to Heritage 
by October 5,2001 by 10:00 a.m. 
2. DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS. Heritage's exhibits will be provided to Five 
F by October 5,2001 by 10:00 a.m. 
3. EXHIBITS IN CUSTODY OF COURT CLERK. Exhibits received in 
evidence and placed in the custody of the clerk may be withdrawn from the 
clerk's office upon signing of receipts therefor by the respective parties offering 
them. The exhibits shall be returned to the clerk's office within a reasonable time 
and in the meantime shall be available for inspection at the request of other 
parties. 
4. EXHIBITS IN CUSTODY OF PARTIES. Exhibits identified and 
offered that remain in the custody of the party offering them shall be made 
available for review by the offering party to any other party to the action that 
requests access to them in writing. 
5. AUTHENTICITY. The parties shall file any objection to the authenticity 
of proposed exhibits not later than five business days from receipt of an exhibit. 
The proposed exhibits are subject to all other objections, if any, by an opposing 
party at the trial. 
6. SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBITS. If exhibits other than those exchanged 
on the date stated above are to be offered, the existence of which could not have 
reasonably been anticipated, they will be submitted to opposing counsel at least 
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72 hours before their introduction at trial. The opposing party reserves its right to 
object to such exhibits, outside the presence of the jury, by objection at trial or on 
motion. 
7. IMPEACHMENT EXHIBITS. Any exhibits to be used for 
impeachment of a witness called by an opposing party that are not otherwise 
disclosed pursuant to another part of this Order to the extent their use can be 
reasonably anticipated, shall be submitted to opposing counsel by 5:00 p.m. on 
the day preceding their proposed use, provided that the Court may permit use of 
such exhibits on shorter notice upon a showing of good cause. The foregoing 
does not apply to the use of documents for impeachment purposes that a party 
does not intend to offer as an exhibit. A party may object to the admission of an 
exhibit introduced pursuant to the provisions of this paragraph upon a showing of 
undue surprise and prejudice caused by the failure of the proponent to disclose its 
intended use of the document earlier. 
8. DEMONSTRATIVE EXHIBITS. 
a. Enlargement of Exhibits. Each party may, for demonstrative 
purposes, enlarge any exhibit, provided that (i) a copy of the exhibit to be 
enlarged has been provided to opposing counsel; (ii) the exhibit has been 
properly offered into evidence; and (iii) the exhibit has been received by 
the Court. Each party reserves the right to object to use of any exhibit that 
has been enlarged. Enlarged exhibits shall be used during the trial only 
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and will not be received into evidence and will not accompany the jury 
into the jury room, unless otherwise stipulated by the parties. 
b. Other Demonstrative Exhibits. The parties need not exchange or 
identify demonstrative exhibits at the time that the parties exchange other 
exhibits on October 5, 2001. If a party intends to use a demonstrative 
exhibit at trial, it shall provide 24 hours notice to the opposing party so 
that objections, if any, to the use of the proposed demonstrative exhibit 
can be made and those objections resolved by the Court not later than the 
afternoon preceding the day on which the proposed demonstrative exhibit 
is to be used. 
c. Summaries of Voluminous Documents. Documents that 
constitute summaries pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 1006, which may be 
offered in evidence, also need not be identified at the time the parties 
exchange other exhibits on October 5, 2001. However, the categories of 
source documents for such potential summaries should be exchanged by 
the parties on October 5, 2001. Such documents shall be numbered as 
exhibits. The parties shall provide copies of such summaries that they 
intend to offer as exhibits on or before October 15, 2001. The parties may 
seek exceptions from the Court for good cause. 
9. USE OF EXHIBITS BY OTHER PARTY. Each party reserves the 
right to offer into evidence an exhibit identified by any other party. 
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10. NUMBERING OF EXHIBITS. Five F may number its proposed 
exhibits beginning "P-l" and continuing with the use of consecutive numbers. 
Heritage may number its proposed exhibits beginning with the letter "D" followed 
by the next consecutive number after the last number used by Five F. 
WITNESSES. 
1. In the absence of reasonable notice to opposing counsel to the contrary: 
a. Plaintiff will call as lay witnesses: 
1. Ray Fowler 
2. William T. Thurman 
3. Brian Chadaz 
4. Daniel Johnson 
5. Randy Rynearson 
6. Stan McConkie 
b. Plaintiff may call as lay witnesses: 
1. Cathy Fowler 
2. Brent Beesley 
3. Thomas Rich 
4. Any witness called by Defendant 
c. Expert witnesses Plaintiff will call at trial 
1. Derk Rasmussen, RGL Gallagher 
136 East So. Temple, Suite 1770 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 355-0400 
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d. Expert witnesses Plaintiff may call at trial 
1. John KLBushnell, MAI 
3446 Chaparral Drive 
St. George, Utah 84790 
2. In the absence of reasonable notice to opposing counsel to the contrary2: 
a. Defendant will call as lay witnesses: 
1. Brent Beesley 
2. Brian Chadaz 
3. Raymond Fowler 
4. Bill Thurman 
b. Defendant may call as lay witnesses: 
1. Kathy Fowler 
2. Kerry Soper 
3. Gary Esplin, City Manager, St. George, Utah 
4. Tom Rich 
5. Any witness subpoenaed by plaintiff 
6. Any witness listed by plaintiff 
7. Any witness called by plaintiff 
c. Defendant will call as expert witnesses: 
1. Merrill Norman 
2. David Thomas 
2
 The parties reserve the right to call any witness listed here by deposition if such witness is unavailable. 
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d. Defendant may call as expert witnesses: 
1. None at this time. 
e. Defendant may call other rebuttal witnesses as needed. 
3. Testimony Offered by Deposition. A party intending to present 
testimony by deposition shall designate the portions of the deposition testimony to 
be presented not later than October 12, 2001. Cross-designations to such 
depositions shall be made not later than October 17, 2001. Further cross-
designations may be made upon reasonable notice to the opposing party, and in 
any event prior to trial. Exceptions may be made upon stipulation of the parties or 
by the Court for good cause shown. 
4. Other Witnesses. In the event that witnesses other than those listed are to 
be called to testify at the trial, a statement of their names, addresses, and the 
general subject matter of their testimony will be served upon opposing counsel on 
or before October 17, 2001. This restriction shall not apply to rebuttal witnesses 
whose testimony, where required, cannot be reasonably anticipated before the 
time of trial. 
5. Notice of Witnesses. Each party will provide to the other party two days 
advance notice of the witnesses (including witnesses whose testimony being 
offered by deposition), and the order in which it intends to call those witnesses on 
each trial day, subject to any unforeseeable changes in the length or scheduling of 
witnesses. 
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K. REQUESTS FOR INSTRUCTIONS. Requests for instructions to the jury and 
special requests for voir dire examination of the jury will be submitted on October 17, 2001, 
subject to further rulings of the Court. The parties reserve the right to supplement their proposed 
jury instructions, and such supplementation shall be submitted to opposing counsel and the Court 
no later than October 22,2001. The parties shall submit two hard copy versions of proposed jury 
instructions: one with annotations, and the other without annotations, and also shall bring to trial 
these proposed jury instructions on computer discs, in Corel WordPerfect 8 format. 
L. TRIAL BRIEF. The parties may submit a trial brief to the Court and to opposing 
counsel by October 18, 2001. 
M. AMENDMENTS TO PLEADINGS. Five F filed its First Amended Complaint 
on May 11,1999. The deadline for amending pleadings as established by the Court has expired. 
There were no other requests to amend pleadings. 
N. DISCOVERY. Discovery has been completed. 
O. PENDING MOTIONS. The following motions are pending in whole or in part: 
1. Heritage's Motion In Limine Re: Damages Claims, which the Court took 
under advisement. 
2. Heritage's Motion In Limine Re: Certain Accounting Documents For The 
Five F Loan And Documents Produced By Deloitte & Touche, issues on which 
the Court reserved until the time of trial. 
3. The Court took under advisement the issue of whether Plaintiff could seek 
punitive damages. 
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P. JUROR NOTEBOOKS. At the commencement of deliberations, each juror may 
be provided with a notebook containing materials mutually agreed to by the parties, or otherwise 
ordered by the Court. The cost of such notebooks shall be borne by both parties equally. 
Q. SPECIAL VERDICT. The parties will submit a special verdict form to the 
Court on October 19, 2001. 
R. TRIAL SETTING. The case is set for a jury trial on October 22-26,2001 at 9:00 
a.m. at the Fifth Judicial District Courthouse, Washington County, Utah. Counsel for both parties 
shall arrive the first day of trial at 8:45 a.m. 
S. MODIFICATIONS TO PRETRIAL ORDER. The parties may request a 
modification of this order as a result of any subsequent rulings by the Court and/or intervening 
events that necessitate modification of this order. 
T. POSSIBILITY OF SETTLEMENT. Possibility of settlement is considered poor. 
DATED this l( ~"day of October, 2001. 
BY THE COURT 
J. Philip Eves 
District Court Judge 
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The foregoing proposed pretrial order (prior to execution by the court) is hereby adopted this 
day of October, 2001. 
614360v3 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED PROPOSED 
/ / ^h PRETRIAL ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, on this ? b '"day of October, 2001 to the 
following: 
Benson L. Hathaway 
Aimee K. Martinez 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0810 
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